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CLI Versions
10
Newest: 2.0.2
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Active Rule
Dbghelp/Dbgcore DLL Loaded By Uncommon/Suspicious Process
Target Profile
Splunk
Splunk SPL & tstats data model queries
Format Mode
Default
Plain SPL queries
Conversion Output
Dbghelp/Dbgcore DLL Loaded By Uncommon/Suspicious Process
Using Splunk · Default · sigma-cli 2.0.2
Translation controls
Adjust the rule on the left, then regenerate when you want a fresh backend-native query.
BackendSplunkFormatDefaultVersion2.0.2
title: Dbghelp/Dbgcore DLL Loaded By Uncommon/Suspicious Process
id: 0e277796-5f23-4e49-a490-483131d4f6e1
related:
- id: bdc64095-d59a-42a2-8588-71fd9c9d9abc # Unsigned Loading
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects the load of dbghelp/dbgcore DLL by a potentially uncommon or potentially suspicious process.
The Dbghelp and Dbgcore DLLs export functions that allow for the dump of process memory. Tools like ProcessHacker, Task Manager and some attacker tradecraft use the MiniDumpWriteDump API found in dbghelp.dll or dbgcore.dll.
As an example, SilentTrynity C2 Framework has a module that leverages this API to dump the contents of Lsass.exe and transfer it over the network back to the attacker's machine.
Keep in mind that many legitimate Windows processes and services might load the aforementioned DLLs for debugging or other related purposes. Investigate the CommandLine and the Image location of the process loading the DLL.
references:
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/minidumpapiset/nf-minidumpapiset-minidumpwritedump
- https://www.pinvoke.net/default.aspx/dbghelp/MiniDumpWriteDump.html
- https://medium.com/@fsx30/bypass-edrs-memory-protection-introduction-to-hooking-2efb21acffd6
author: Perez Diego (@darkquassar), oscd.community, Ecco
date: 2019-10-27
modified: 2024-03-01
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003.001
- detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ImageLoaded|endswith:
- '\dbghelp.dll'
- '\dbgcore.dll'
Image|endswith:
- '\bash.exe'
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\dnx.exe'
- '\excel.exe'
- '\monitoringhost.exe'
- '\msbuild.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\outlook.exe'
- '\powerpnt.exe'
- '\regsvcs.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\sc.exe'
- '\scriptrunner.exe'
- '\winword.exe'
- '\wmic.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
# - '\powershell.exe' # Note: Triggered by installing common software
# - '\regsvr32.exe' # Note: triggered by installing common software
# - '\schtasks.exe' # Note: triggered by installing software
# - '\svchost.exe' # Note: triggered by some services
filter_main_tiworker:
# Note: This filter requires "CommandLine" field enrichment
CommandLine|startswith: 'C:\WINDOWS\WinSxS\'
CommandLine|endswith: '\TiWorker.exe -Embedding'
filter_main_generic:
# Note: This filter requires "CommandLine" field enrichment
Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
CommandLine|endswith:
- '-k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted'
- '-k WerSvcGroup'
filter_main_rundll32:
# Note: This filter requires "CommandLine" field enrichment
Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- '/d srrstr.dll,ExecuteScheduledSPPCreation'
- 'aepdu.dll,AePduRunUpdate'
- 'shell32.dll,OpenAs_RunDL'
- 'Windows.Storage.ApplicationData.dll,CleanupTemporaryState'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Debugging scripts might leverage this DLL in order to dump process memory for further analysis.
level: medium
CLI command
Copy the exact command to reproduce this translation locally.
sigma convert --without-pipeline -t splunk -f default rules-threat-hunting/windows/image_load/image_load_dll_dbghelp_dbgcore_susp_load.yml