Phoenix Studio
Convert indexed Sigma rules into analyst-ready detections.
This studio is built around Phoenix's own rule corpus, not a blank editor. Search by title or rule id, choose a live sigma-cli backend, then reveal pipelines only when you actually need them.
Indexed Rules
3,707
Ready to search
Backends
17
Live from sigconverter.io
CLI Versions
10
Newest: 2.0.2
Translation Workspace
Shape the rule before it leaves Phoenix
Tune Translation
Active Rule
Use Short Name Path in Command Line
Target Profile
Splunk
Splunk SPL & tstats data model queries
Format Mode
Default
Plain SPL queries
Conversion Output
Use Short Name Path in Command Line
Using Splunk · Default · sigma-cli 2.0.2
Translation controls
Adjust the rule on the left, then regenerate when you want a fresh backend-native query.
BackendSplunkFormatDefaultVersion2.0.2
title: Use Short Name Path in Command Line
id: 349d891d-fef0-4fe4-bc53-eee623a15969
related:
- id: a96970af-f126-420d-90e1-d37bf25e50e1
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects the use of short name paths (8.3 format) in command lines, which can be used to obfuscate paths or access restricted locations.
Windows creates short 8.3 filenames (like PROGRA~1) for compatibility with MS-DOS-based or 16-bit Windows programs.
When investigating, examine:
- Commands using short paths to access sensitive directories or files
- Web servers on Windows (especially Apache) where short filenames could bypass security controls
- Correlation with other suspicious behaviors
- baseline of short name usage in your environment and look for deviations
references:
- https://www.acunetix.com/blog/articles/windows-short-8-3-filenames-web-security-problem/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-2000-server/cc959352(v=technet.10)
- https://twitter.com/frack113/status/1555830623633375232
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2022-08-07
modified: 2025-10-22
tags:
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.t1564.004
- detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains:
- '~1\'
- '~2\'
filter_main_system_process:
ParentImage:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\Dism.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\cleanmgr.exe'
filter_main_winget:
- ParentImage|endswith: '\winget.exe'
- ParentImage|contains: '\AppData\Local\Temp\WinGet\'
filter_main_csc:
ParentImage|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v'
ParentImage|endswith: '\csc.exe'
filter_main_installers:
- Image|contains|all:
- '\AppData\'
- '\Temp\'
- CommandLine|contains: '\AppData\Local\Temp\' # sometimes installers spawn other installers from temp folder
filter_optional_dopus:
ParentImage: 'C:\Program Files\GPSoftware\Directory Opus\dopus.exe'
filter_optional_aurora:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\aurora-agent-64.exe'
- '\aurora-agent.exe'
filter_optional_thor:
ParentImage|endswith: '\thor\thor64.exe'
filter_optional_git:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'C:\Program Files\Git\post-install.bat'
- 'C:\Program Files\Git\cmd\scalar.exe'
filter_optional_webex:
- ParentImage|endswith: '\WebEx\webexhost.exe'
- CommandLine|contains: '\appdata\local\webex\webex64\meetings\wbxreport.exe'
filter_optional_veeam:
ParentImage|endswith: '\veeam.backup.shell.exe'
filter_optional_everything:
ParentImage|endswith: '\Everything\Everything.exe'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Applications could use this notation occasionally which might generate some false positives. In that case investigate the parent and child process.
level: medium
CLI command
Copy the exact command to reproduce this translation locally.
sigma convert --without-pipeline -t splunk -f default rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_ntfs_short_name_path_use_cli.yml