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CLI Versions
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Newest: 2.0.2
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Active Rule
Potential File Override/Append Via SET Command
Target Profile
Splunk
Splunk SPL & tstats data model queries
Format Mode
Default
Plain SPL queries
Conversion Output
Potential File Override/Append Via SET Command
Using Splunk · Default · sigma-cli 2.0.2
Translation controls
Adjust the rule on the left, then regenerate when you want a fresh backend-native query.
BackendSplunkFormatDefaultVersion2.0.2
title: Potential File Override/Append Via SET Command
id: 65e4c134-ee52-4099-9e35-5e17a4b45c62
status: test
description: |
Detects the use of the "SET" internal command of Cmd.EXE with the /p flag followed directly by an "=" sign.
Attackers used this technique along with an append redirection operator ">>" in order to update the content of a file indirectly.
Ex: cmd /c >> example.txt set /p="test data". This will append "test data" to contents of "example.txt".
The typical use case of the "set /p=" command is to prompt the user for input.
references:
- https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2024/08/07/sophos-mdr-hunt-tracks-mimic-ransomware-campaign-against-organizations-in-india/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/set_1
- https://ss64.com/nt/set.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), MahirAli Khan (in/mahiralikhan)
date: 2024-08-22
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.defense-evasion
- detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'Cmd.Exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- '/c set /p='
- '"set /p='
- '>>*set /p=' # To catch edge cases where the attacker passes it via a "cmd /c"
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of the SET with the "/p" flag for user prompting. command in administrative scripts or user-generated scripts.
level: low
CLI command
Copy the exact command to reproduce this translation locally.
sigma convert --without-pipeline -t splunk -f default rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cmd_set_prompt_abuse.yml