Phoenix Studio
Convert indexed Sigma rules into analyst-ready detections.
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Indexed Rules
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Backends
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pySigma Versions
10
Newest: 1.3.3
Translation Workspace
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Active Rule
Registry Tampering by Potentially Suspicious Processes
Target Profile
Splunk
Splunk through pysigma-backend-splunk.
Format Mode
Default
Default pySigma output mode for this backend.
Conversion Output
Registry Tampering by Potentially Suspicious Processes
Using Splunk · Default · pySigma 1.3.3
Translation controls
Adjust the rule on the left, then regenerate when you want a fresh backend-native query.
BackendSplunkFormatDefaultVersion1.3.3
title: Registry Tampering by Potentially Suspicious Processes
id: 7f4c43f9-b1a5-4c7d-b24a-b41bf3a3ebf2
related:
- id: 2a0a169d-cc66-43ce-9ae2-6e678e54e46a
type: similar
- id: 921aa10f-2e74-4cca-9498-98f9ca4d6fdf
type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
Detects suspicious registry modifications made by suspicious processes such as script engine processes such as WScript, or CScript etc.
These processes are rarely used for legitimate registry modifications, and their activity may indicate an attempt to modify the registry
without using standard tools like regedit.exe or reg.exe, potentially for evasion and persistence.
references:
- https://www.nextron-systems.com/2025/07/29/detecting-the-most-popular-mitre-persistence-method-registry-run-keys-startup-folder/
- https://www.linkedin.com/posts/mauricefielenbach_livingofftheland-redteam-persistence-activity-7344801774182051843-TE00/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-08-13
modified: 2026-04-14
tags:
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.persistence
- attack.execution
- attack.t1112
- attack.t1059.005
logsource:
category: registry_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
# Add more suspicious processes
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
filter_main_binary_data:
Details: 'Binary Data'
filter_main_null:
Details: null
filter_main_wscript_legit_1:
Image|endswith: '\wscript.exe'
TargetObject|contains:
- 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Notifications\Data\'
- '\Services\bam\State\UserSettings\S-1-'
- 'Software\Microsoft\Windows Script\Settings\Telemetry\wscript.exe\'
- 'Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\'
filter_main_wscript_legit_2:
Image|endswith: '\wscript.exe'
TargetObject|contains: '\wscript.exe'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Some legitimate admin or install scripts may use these processes for registry modifications.
level: medium
CLI command
Copy the exact command to reproduce this translation locally.
sigma convert --without-pipeline -t splunk -f default rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_susp_process_registry_modification.yml