Phoenix Studio

Convert indexed Sigma rules into analyst-ready detections.

This studio is built around Phoenix's own rule corpus, not a blank editor. Search by title or rule id, choose a live sigma-cli backend, then reveal pipelines only when you actually need them.

Indexed Rules

3,707

Ready to search

Backends

17

Live from sigconverter.io

CLI Versions

10

Newest: 2.0.2

Translation Workspace

Shape the rule before it leaves Phoenix

Tune Translation

Active Rule

Potential Remote SquiblyTwo Technique Execution

Target Profile

Splunk

Splunk SPL & tstats data model queries

Format Mode

Default

Plain SPL queries

Conversion Output

Potential Remote SquiblyTwo Technique Execution

Using Splunk · Default · sigma-cli 2.0.2

Translation controls

Adjust the rule on the left, then regenerate when you want a fresh backend-native query.

BackendSplunkFormatDefaultVersion2.0.2
title: Potential Remote SquiblyTwo Technique Execution
id: 8d63dadf-b91b-4187-87b6-34a1114577ea
related:
    - id: 06ce37c2-61ab-4f05-9ff5-b1a96d18ae32
      type: similar
    - id: 05c36dd6-79d6-4a9a-97da-3db20298ab2d
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects potential execution of the SquiblyTwo technique that leverages Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)
    to execute malicious code remotely. This technique bypasses application whitelisting by using wmic.exe to process
    malicious XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) scripts that can contain embedded JScript or VBScript.
    The attack typically works by fetching XSL content from a remote source (using HTTP/HTTPS) and executing it
    with full trust privileges directly in memory, avoiding disk-based detection mechanisms. This is a common
    LOLBin (Living Off The Land Binary) technique used for defense evasion and code execution.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20190209154607/https://subt0x11.blogspot.com/2018/04/wmicexe-whitelisting-bypass-hacking.html
    - https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/986280382042595328 # Deleted
    - https://atomicredteam.io/defense-evasion/T1220/
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wmic/
    - https://x.com/byrne_emmy12099/status/1932346420226658668
author: Markus Neis, Florian Roth, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2026-01-24
tags:
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1220
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.007
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_pe:
        - Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
        - Hashes|contains:  # Sysmon field hashes contains all types
              - 'IMPHASH=1B1A3F43BF37B5BFE60751F2EE2F326E'
              - 'IMPHASH=37777A96245A3C74EB217308F3546F4C'
              - 'IMPHASH=9D87C9D67CE724033C0B40CC4CA1B206'
              - 'IMPHASH=B12619881D79C3ACADF45E752A58554A'
              - 'IMPHASH=16A48C3CABF98A9DC1BF02C07FE1EA00'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '/format:'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '://'
            - '\\\\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

CLI command

Copy the exact command to reproduce this translation locally.

sigma convert --without-pipeline -t splunk -f default rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_squiblytwo_bypass.yml