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CLI Versions
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Newest: 2.0.2
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Active Rule
Potential Remote SquiblyTwo Technique Execution
Target Profile
Splunk
Splunk SPL & tstats data model queries
Format Mode
Default
Plain SPL queries
Conversion Output
Potential Remote SquiblyTwo Technique Execution
Using Splunk · Default · sigma-cli 2.0.2
Translation controls
Adjust the rule on the left, then regenerate when you want a fresh backend-native query.
BackendSplunkFormatDefaultVersion2.0.2
title: Potential Remote SquiblyTwo Technique Execution
id: 8d63dadf-b91b-4187-87b6-34a1114577ea
related:
- id: 06ce37c2-61ab-4f05-9ff5-b1a96d18ae32
type: similar
- id: 05c36dd6-79d6-4a9a-97da-3db20298ab2d
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects potential execution of the SquiblyTwo technique that leverages Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)
to execute malicious code remotely. This technique bypasses application whitelisting by using wmic.exe to process
malicious XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) scripts that can contain embedded JScript or VBScript.
The attack typically works by fetching XSL content from a remote source (using HTTP/HTTPS) and executing it
with full trust privileges directly in memory, avoiding disk-based detection mechanisms. This is a common
LOLBin (Living Off The Land Binary) technique used for defense evasion and code execution.
references:
- https://web.archive.org/web/20190209154607/https://subt0x11.blogspot.com/2018/04/wmicexe-whitelisting-bypass-hacking.html
- https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/986280382042595328 # Deleted
- https://atomicredteam.io/defense-evasion/T1220/
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wmic/
- https://x.com/byrne_emmy12099/status/1932346420226658668
author: Markus Neis, Florian Roth, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2026-01-24
tags:
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.t1047
- attack.t1220
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.005
- attack.t1059.007
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_pe:
- Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
- Hashes|contains: # Sysmon field hashes contains all types
- 'IMPHASH=1B1A3F43BF37B5BFE60751F2EE2F326E'
- 'IMPHASH=37777A96245A3C74EB217308F3546F4C'
- 'IMPHASH=9D87C9D67CE724033C0B40CC4CA1B206'
- 'IMPHASH=B12619881D79C3ACADF45E752A58554A'
- 'IMPHASH=16A48C3CABF98A9DC1BF02C07FE1EA00'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|windash: '/format:'
CommandLine|contains:
- '://'
- '\\\\'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
CLI command
Copy the exact command to reproduce this translation locally.
sigma convert --without-pipeline -t splunk -f default rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_squiblytwo_bypass.yml