Phoenix Studio

Convert indexed Sigma rules into analyst-ready detections.

This studio is built around Phoenix's own rule corpus, not a blank editor. Search by title or rule id, choose a live sigma-cli backend, then reveal pipelines only when you actually need them.

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Indexed Rules

3,707

Ready to search

Backends

Live from sigconverter.io

CLI Versions

Newest: 2.0.2

Translation Workspace

Shape the rule before it leaves Phoenix

Tune Translation

Active Rule

Potential Hidden Directory Creation Via NTFS INDEX_ALLOCATION Stream

sigma-cli version

Backend

Format

Target Profile

Splunk

Splunk SPL & tstats data model queries

Format Mode

Default

Plain SPL queries

Conversion Output

Potential Hidden Directory Creation Via NTFS INDEX_ALLOCATION Stream

Using Splunk · Default · sigma-cli 2.0.2

Translation controls

Adjust the rule on the left, then regenerate when you want a fresh backend-native query.

BackendSplunkFormatDefaultVersion2.0.2

title: Potential Hidden Directory Creation Via NTFS INDEX_ALLOCATION Stream
id: a8f866e1-bdd4-425e-a27a-37619238d9c7
related:
    - id: 0900463c-b33b-49a8-be1d-552a3b553dae
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects the creation of hidden file/folder with the "::$index_allocation" stream. Which can be used as a technique to prevent access to folder and files from tooling such as "explorer.exe" and "powershell.exe"
references:
    - https://twitter.com/pfiatde/status/1681977680688738305
    - https://soroush.me/blog/2010/12/a-dotty-salty-directory-a-secret-place-in-ntfs-for-secret-files/
    - https://sec-consult.com/blog/detail/pentesters-windows-ntfs-tricks-collection/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/5c3b23002d2bbede3c07e7307165fc2a235a427d/atomics/T1564.004/T1564.004.md#atomic-test-5---create-hidden-directory-via-index_allocation
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-fscc/c54dec26-1551-4d3a-a0ea-4fa40f848eb3
author: Scoubi (@ScoubiMtl)
date: 2023-10-09
tags:
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1564.004
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        # Note: Both Sysmon and ETW are unable to log the presence of such streams in the CommandLine. But EDRs such as Crowdstrike are able to use e.g. CMD console history. Users are advised to test this before usage
        TargetFilename|contains: '::$index_allocation'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: medium

CLI command

Copy the exact command to reproduce this translation locally.

sigma convert --without-pipeline -t splunk -f default rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_hidden_dir_index_allocation.yml