Phoenix Studio
Convert indexed Sigma rules into analyst-ready detections.
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Indexed Rules
3,707
Ready to search
Backends
17
Live from sigconverter.io
CLI Versions
10
Newest: 2.0.2
Translation Workspace
Shape the rule before it leaves Phoenix
Tune Translation
Active Rule
Directory Service Restore Mode(DSRM) Registry Value Tampering
Target Profile
Splunk
Splunk SPL & tstats data model queries
Format Mode
Default
Plain SPL queries
Conversion Output
Directory Service Restore Mode(DSRM) Registry Value Tampering
Using Splunk · Default · sigma-cli 2.0.2
Translation controls
Adjust the rule on the left, then regenerate when you want a fresh backend-native query.
BackendSplunkFormatDefaultVersion2.0.2
title: Directory Service Restore Mode(DSRM) Registry Value Tampering
id: b61e87c0-50db-4b2e-8986-6a2be94b33b0
related:
- id: 53ad8e36-f573-46bf-97e4-15ba5bf4bb51
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects changes to "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" registry value.
During a Domain Controller (DC) promotion, administrators create a Directory Services Restore Mode (DSRM) local administrator account with a password that rarely changes. The DSRM account is an “Administrator” account that logs in with the DSRM mode when the server is booting up to restore AD backups or recover the server from a failure.
Attackers could abuse DSRM account to maintain their persistence and access to the organization's Active Directory.
If the "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" value is set to "0", the administrator account can only be used if the DC starts in DSRM.
If the "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" value is set to "1", the administrator account can only be used if the local AD DS service is stopped.
If the "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" value is set to "2", the administrator account can always be used.
references:
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1785
- https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/detecting-dsrm-account-misconfigurations/
- https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/dsrm-credentials
author: Nischal Khadgi
date: 2024-07-11
tags:
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.credential-access
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1556
logsource:
category: registry_set
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetObject|endswith: '\Control\Lsa\DsrmAdminLogonBehavior'
filter_main_default_value:
Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)' # Default value
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
CLI command
Copy the exact command to reproduce this translation locally.
sigma convert --without-pipeline -t splunk -f default rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_dsrm_tampering.yml