Phoenix Studio

Convert indexed Sigma rules into analyst-ready detections.

This studio is built around Phoenix's own rule corpus, not a blank editor. Search by title or rule id, choose a live sigma-cli backend, then reveal pipelines only when you actually need them.

Indexed Rules

3,707

Ready to search

Backends

17

Live from sigconverter.io

CLI Versions

10

Newest: 2.0.2

Translation Workspace

Shape the rule before it leaves Phoenix

Tune Translation

Active Rule

Malicious DLL Load By Compromised 3CXDesktopApp

Target Profile

Splunk

Splunk SPL & tstats data model queries

Format Mode

Default

Plain SPL queries

Conversion Output

Malicious DLL Load By Compromised 3CXDesktopApp

Using Splunk · Default · sigma-cli 2.0.2

Translation controls

Adjust the rule on the left, then regenerate when you want a fresh backend-native query.

BackendSplunkFormatDefaultVersion2.0.2
title: Malicious DLL Load By Compromised 3CXDesktopApp
id: d0b65ad3-e945-435e-a7a9-438e62dd48e9
related:
    - id: 3c4b3bbf-36b4-470c-b6cf-f07e8b1c7e26 # Proxy C2
      type: similar
    - id: 76bc1601-9546-4b75-9419-06e0e8d10651 # Proxy GH
      type: similar
    - id: bd03a0dc-5d93-49eb-b2e8-2dfd268600f8 # DNS C2
      type: similar
    - id: 51eecf75-d069-43c7-9ea2-63f75499edd4 # net_connection C2
      type: similar
    - id: 93bbde78-dc86-4e73-9ffc-ff8a384ca89c # ProcCreation Exec
      type: similar
    - id: 63f3605b-979f-48c2-b7cc-7f90523fed88 # ProcCreation ChildProc
      type: similar
    - id: e7581747-1e44-4d4b-85a6-0db0b4a00f2a # ProcCreation Update
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects DLL load activity of known compromised DLLs used in by the compromised 3CXDesktopApp
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/09/27/foggyweb-targeted-nobelium-malware-leads-to-persistent-backdoor/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-03-31
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Hashes|contains:
            # ffmpeg.dll
            - 'SHA256=7986BBAEE8940DA11CE089383521AB420C443AB7B15ED42AED91FD31CE833896'
            - 'SHA1=BF939C9C261D27EE7BB92325CC588624FCA75429'
            - 'MD5=74BC2D0B6680FAA1A5A76B27E5479CBC'
            # d3dcompiler_47.dll
            - 'SHA256=11BE1803E2E307B647A8A7E02D128335C448FF741BF06BF52B332E0BBF423B03'
            - 'SHA1=20D554A80D759C50D6537DD7097FED84DD258B3E'
            - 'MD5=82187AD3F0C6C225E2FBA0C867280CC9'
            # Inner object from ffmpeg.dll
            - 'SHA256=F79C3B0ADB6EC7BCC8BC9AE955A1571AAED6755A28C8B17B1D7595EE86840952'
            - 'SHA1=894E7D4FFD764BB458809C7F0643694B036EAD30'
            - 'MD5=11BC82A9BD8297BD0823BCE5D6202082'
            # ICONIC Stealer payload
            - 'SHA256=8AB3A5EAAF8C296080FADF56B265194681D7DA5DA7C02562953A4CB60E147423'
            - 'SHA1=3B3E778B647371262120A523EB873C20BB82BEAF'
            - 'MD5=7FAEA2B01796B80D180399040BB69835'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

CLI command

Copy the exact command to reproduce this translation locally.

sigma convert --without-pipeline -t splunk -f default rules-emerging-threats/2023/TA/3CX-Supply-Chain/image_load_malware_3cx_compromise_susp_dll.yml