Phoenix Studio
Convert indexed Sigma rules into analyst-ready detections.
This studio is built around Phoenix's own rule corpus, not a blank editor. Search by title or rule id, choose a live sigma-cli backend, then reveal pipelines only when you actually need them.
Indexed Rules
3,707
Ready to search
Backends
17
Live from sigconverter.io
CLI Versions
10
Newest: 2.0.2
Translation Workspace
Shape the rule before it leaves Phoenix
Tune Translation
Active Rule
AWL Bypass with Winrm.vbs and Malicious WsmPty.xsl/WsmTxt.xsl - File
Target Profile
Splunk
Splunk SPL & tstats data model queries
Format Mode
Default
Plain SPL queries
Conversion Output
AWL Bypass with Winrm.vbs and Malicious WsmPty.xsl/WsmTxt.xsl - File
Using Splunk · Default · sigma-cli 2.0.2
Translation controls
Adjust the rule on the left, then regenerate when you want a fresh backend-native query.
BackendSplunkFormatDefaultVersion2.0.2
title: AWL Bypass with Winrm.vbs and Malicious WsmPty.xsl/WsmTxt.xsl - File
id: d353dac0-1b41-46c2-820c-d7d2561fc6ed
related:
- id: 074e0ded-6ced-4ebd-8b4d-53f55908119d
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects execution of attacker-controlled WsmPty.xsl or WsmTxt.xsl via winrm.vbs and copied cscript.exe (can be renamed)
references:
- https://posts.specterops.io/application-whitelisting-bypass-and-arbitrary-unsigned-code-execution-technique-in-winrm-vbs-c8c24fb40404
author: Julia Fomina, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-06
modified: 2022-11-28
tags:
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.t1216
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event
detection:
system_files:
TargetFilename|endswith:
- 'WsmPty.xsl'
- 'WsmTxt.xsl'
in_system_folder:
TargetFilename|startswith:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
condition: system_files and not in_system_folder
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: medium
CLI command
Copy the exact command to reproduce this translation locally.
sigma convert --without-pipeline -t splunk -f default rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_winrm_awl_bypass.yml