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Active Rule
Suspicious LNK Command-Line Padding with Whitespace Characters
Target Profile
Splunk
Splunk SPL & tstats data model queries
Format Mode
Default
Plain SPL queries
Conversion Output
Suspicious LNK Command-Line Padding with Whitespace Characters
Using Splunk · Default · sigma-cli 2.0.2
Translation controls
Adjust the rule on the left, then regenerate when you want a fresh backend-native query.
BackendSplunkFormatDefaultVersion2.0.2
title: Suspicious LNK Command-Line Padding with Whitespace Characters
id: dd8756e7-a3a0-4768-b47e-8f545d1a751c
status: experimental
description: |
Detects exploitation of LNK file command-line length discrepancy, where attackers hide malicious commands beyond the 260-character UI limit while the actual command-line argument field supports 4096 characters using whitespace padding (e.g., 0x20, 0x09-0x0D).
Adversaries insert non-printable whitespace characters (e.g., Line Feed \x0A, Carriage Return \x0D) to pad the visible section of the LNK file, pushing malicious commands past the UI-visible boundary.
The hidden payload, executed at runtime but invisible in Windows Explorer properties, enables stealthy execution and evasion—commonly used for social engineering attacks.
This rule flags suspicious use of such padding observed in real-world attacks.
references:
- https://syedhasan010.medium.com/forensics-analysis-of-an-lnk-file-da68a98b8415
- https://thehackernews.com/2025/03/unpatched-windows-zero-day-flaw.html
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/25/c/windows-shortcut-zero-day-exploit.html
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-03-19
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204.002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- ParentImage|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
- ParentCommandLine|contains: '.lnk'
selection_cmd:
- CommandLine|contains:
- ' ' # Padding of SPACE (0x20)
# - ' ' # Horizontal Tab (0x9)
- '\u0009'
- '\u000A' # Line Feed
- '\u0011'
- '\u0012'
- '\u0013'
- '\u000B' # Vertical Tab
- '\u000C' # \x0C
- '\u000D' # \x0D
- CommandLine|re: '\n\n\n\n\n\n' # In some cases \u000[ABCD] are represented as a newline in the eventlog
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
CLI command
Copy the exact command to reproduce this translation locally.
sigma convert --without-pipeline -t splunk -f default rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_lnk_exec_hidden_cmd.yml