Phoenix Studio

Convert indexed Sigma rules into analyst-ready detections.

This studio is built around Phoenix's own rule corpus, not a blank editor. Search by title or rule id, choose a live sigma-cli backend, then reveal pipelines only when you actually need them.

Indexed Rules

3,707

Ready to search

Backends

17

Live from sigconverter.io

CLI Versions

10

Newest: 2.0.2

Translation Workspace

Shape the rule before it leaves Phoenix

Tune Translation

Active Rule

Possible Shadow Credentials Added

Target Profile

Splunk

Splunk SPL & tstats data model queries

Format Mode

Default

Plain SPL queries

Conversion Output

Possible Shadow Credentials Added

Using Splunk · Default · sigma-cli 2.0.2

Translation controls

Adjust the rule on the left, then regenerate when you want a fresh backend-native query.

BackendSplunkFormatDefaultVersion2.0.2
title: Possible Shadow Credentials Added
id: f598ea0c-c25a-4f72-a219-50c44411c791
status: test
description: Detects possible addition of shadow credentials to an active directory object.
references:
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/8.4/potential-shadow-credentials-added-to-ad-object.html
    - https://cyberstoph.org/posts/2022/03/detecting-shadow-credentials/
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1581300963650187264?
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-10-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1556
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The "Audit Directory Service Changes" logging policy must be configured in order to receive events. Audit events are generated only for objects with configured system access control lists (SACLs). Audit events are generated only for objects with configured system access control lists (SACLs) and only when accessed in a manner that matches their SACL settings. This policy covers the following events ids - 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141. Note that the default policy does not cover User objects. For that a custom AuditRule need to be setup (See https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule)
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5136
        AttributeLDAPDisplayName: 'msDS-KeyCredentialLink'
        # If you experience a lot of FP you could uncomment the selection below
        # There could be other cases for other tooling add them accordingly
        # AttributeValue|contains: 'B:828'
        # OperationType: '%%14674' # Value Added
    # As stated in the FP sections it's better to filter out the expected accounts that perform this operation to tighten the logic
    # Uncomment the filter below and add the account name (or any other specific field) accordingly
    # Don't forget to add it to the condition section below
    # filter:
        # SubjectUserName: "%name%"
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Modifications in the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute can be done legitimately by the Azure AD Connect synchronization account or the ADFS service account. These accounts can be added as Exceptions. (From elastic FP section)
level: high

CLI command

Copy the exact command to reproduce this translation locally.

sigma convert --without-pipeline -t splunk -f default rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_possible_shadow_credentials_added.yml