Detectioncriticaltest
Persistence Via Sticky Key Backdoor
By replacing the sticky keys executable with the local admins CMD executable, an attacker is able to access a privileged windows console session without authenticating to the system. When the sticky keys are "activated" the privilleged shell is launched.
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Log Source
WindowsProcess Creation
ProductWindows← raw: windows
CategoryProcess Creation← raw: process_creation
Events generated when a new process is spawned on the system. Covers command-line arguments, parent/child relationships, and process metadata.
Detection Logic
Detection Logic1 selector
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'copy '
- '/y '
- 'C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe C:\windows\system32\sethc.exe'
condition: selectionFalse Positives
Unlikely
False positives are unlikely for most environments. High confidence detection.
MITRE ATT&CK
Sub-techniques
Rule Metadata
Rule ID
1070db9a-3e5d-412e-8e7b-7183b616e1b3
Status
test
Level
critical
Type
Detection
Created
Tue Feb 18
Modified
Tue Mar 07
Author
Path
rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cmd_sticky_keys_replace.yml
Raw Tags
attack.persistenceattack.t1546.008attack.privilege-escalation