Detectionmediumtest
Potential Direct Syscall of NtOpenProcess
Detects potential calls to NtOpenProcess directly from NTDLL.
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Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems), Tim SheltonCreated Wed Jul 28Updated Wed Dec 133f3f3506-1895-401b-9cc3-e86b16e630d0windows
Log Source
WindowsProcess Access
ProductWindows← raw: windows
CategoryProcess Access← raw: process_access
Events when a process opens a handle to another process, commonly used for credential dumping via LSASS.
Detection Logic
Detection Logic13 selectors
detection:
selection:
CallTrace|startswith: 'UNKNOWN'
filter_main_vcredist:
TargetImage|endswith: 'vcredist_x64.exe'
SourceImage|endswith: 'vcredist_x64.exe'
filter_main_generic:
# Examples include "systeminfo", "backgroundTaskHost", "AUDIODG"
SourceImage|contains:
- ':\Program Files (x86)\'
- ':\Program Files\'
- ':\Windows\System32\'
- ':\Windows\SysWOW64\'
- ':\Windows\WinSxS\'
TargetImage|contains:
- ':\Program Files (x86)\'
- ':\Program Files\'
- ':\Windows\System32\'
- ':\Windows\SysWOW64\'
- ':\Windows\WinSxS\'
filter_main_kerneltrace_edge:
# Cases in which the CallTrace is just e.g. 'UNKNOWN(19290435374)' from Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Audit-API-Calls provider
Provider_Name: 'Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Audit-API-Calls'
filter_optional_vmware:
TargetImage|endswith: ':\Windows\system32\systeminfo.exe'
SourceImage|endswith: 'setup64.exe' # vmware
filter_optional_cylance:
SourceImage|endswith: ':\Windows\Explorer.EXE'
TargetImage|endswith: ':\Program Files\Cylance\Desktop\CylanceUI.exe'
filter_optional_amazon:
SourceImage|endswith: 'AmazonSSMAgentSetup.exe'
TargetImage|endswith: 'AmazonSSMAgentSetup.exe'
filter_optional_vscode: # VsCode
SourceImage|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Programs\Microsoft VS Code\Code.exe'
TargetImage|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Programs\Microsoft VS Code\Code.exe'
filter_optional_teams: # MS Teams
TargetImage|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe'
SourceImage|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe'
filter_optional_discord: # Discord
TargetImage|contains: '\AppData\Local\Discord\'
TargetImage|endswith: '\Discord.exe'
filter_optional_yammer:
SourceImage|contains: '\AppData\Local\yammerdesktop\app-'
SourceImage|endswith: '\Yammer.exe'
TargetImage|contains: '\AppData\Local\yammerdesktop\app-'
TargetImage|endswith: '\Yammer.exe'
GrantedAccess: '0x1000'
filter_optional_evernote:
TargetImage|endswith: '\Evernote\Evernote.exe'
filter_optional_adobe_acrobat:
SourceImage|contains: ':\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\'
SourceImage|endswith: '\AcroCEF.exe'
TargetImage|contains: ':\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\'
TargetImage|endswith: '\AcroCEF.exe'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*False Positives
Unknown
False positive likelihood has not been assessed. Additional context may be needed during triage.
References
MITRE ATT&CK
Tactics
Techniques
Rule Metadata
Rule ID
3f3f3506-1895-401b-9cc3-e86b16e630d0
Status
test
Level
medium
Type
Detection
Created
Wed Jul 28
Modified
Wed Dec 13
Path
rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_susp_direct_ntopenprocess_call.yml
Raw Tags
attack.executionattack.t1106