Detectioncriticaltest

TrustedPath UAC Bypass Pattern

Detects indicators of a UAC bypass method by mocking directories

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Launch

Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Created Fri Aug 27Updated Tue Jun 174ac47ed3-44c2-4b1f-9d51-bf46e8914126windows

Log Source

WindowsProcess Creation

ProductWindows← raw: windows

CategoryProcess Creation← raw: process_creation

Events generated when a new process is spawned on the system. Covers command-line arguments, parent/child relationships, and process metadata.

Detection Logic

detection:
    selection:
        Image|contains:
            - 'C:\Windows \System32\'
            - 'C:\Windows \SysWOW64\'
    condition: selection

False Positives

Unknown

False positive likelihood has not been assessed. Additional context may be needed during triage.

References

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactics

TA0004 · Privilege Escalation TA0005 · Defense Evasion

Sub-techniques

T1548.002 · Bypass User Account Control

Related Rules

SimilarDetectionhigh

Trusted Path Bypass via Windows Directory Spoofing

Detects DLLs loading from a spoofed Windows directory path with an extra space (e.g "C:\Windows \System32") which can bypass Windows trusted path verification. This technique tricks Windows into treating the path as trusted, allowing malicious DLLs to load with high integrity privileges bypassing UAC.

Detects similar activity. Both rules may fire on overlapping events.

Rule Metadata

Rule ID

4ac47ed3-44c2-4b1f-9d51-bf46e8914126

Status

test

Level

critical

Type

Detection

Created

Fri Aug 27

Modified

Tue Jun 17

Author

Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)

Path

rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_trustedpath.yml

Raw Tags

attack.privilege-escalationattack.defense-evasionattack.t1548.002

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