Detectionmediumtest

Potential PendingFileRenameOperations Tampering

Detect changes to the "PendingFileRenameOperations" registry key from uncommon or suspicious images locations to stage currently used files for rename or deletion after reboot.

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François HubautCreated Fri Jan 27Updated Tue Oct 074eec988f-7bf0-49f1-8675-1e6a510b3a2awindows
Log Source
WindowsRegistry Set
ProductWindows← raw: windows
CategoryRegistry Set← raw: registry_set
Detection Logic
Detection Logic3 selectors
detection:
    selection_main:
        TargetObject|contains: '\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\PendingFileRenameOperations'
    selection_susp_paths:
        Image|contains: '\Users\Public\'
            # - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'  # Commented out as it's used by legitimate installers
    selection_susp_images:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\reg.exe'
            - '\regedit.exe'
    condition: selection_main and 1 of selection_susp_*
False Positives

Installers and updaters may set currently in use files for rename or deletion after a reboot.

Rule Metadata
Rule ID
4eec988f-7bf0-49f1-8675-1e6a510b3a2a
Status
test
Level
medium
Type
Detection
Created
Fri Jan 27
Modified
Tue Oct 07
Path
rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_susp_pendingfilerenameoperations.yml
Raw Tags
attack.defense-evasionattack.t1036.003
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