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Detectionhighstable

Password Change on Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) Account

Detects potential attempts made to set the Directory Services Restore Mode administrator password. The Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) account is a local administrator account on Domain Controllers. Attackers may change the password in order to obtain persistence.

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Launch
Thomas PatzkeCreated Sun Feb 19Updated Sun Aug 2353ad8e36-f573-46bf-97e4-15ba5bf4bb51windows
Log Source
Windowssecurity
ProductWindows← raw: windows
Servicesecurity← raw: security
Detection Logic
Detection Logic1 selector
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4794
    condition: selection
False Positives

Initial installation of a domain controller.

References
1
Resolving title…
adsecurity.org
2
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learn.microsoft.com
MITRE ATT&CK
Related Rules
SimilarDetectionhigh

Directory Service Restore Mode(DSRM) Registry Value Tampering

Detects changes to "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" registry value. During a Domain Controller (DC) promotion, administrators create a Directory Services Restore Mode (DSRM) local administrator account with a password that rarely changes. The DSRM account is an “Administrator” account that logs in with the DSRM mode when the server is booting up to restore AD backups or recover the server from a failure. Attackers could abuse DSRM account to maintain their persistence and access to the organization's Active Directory. If the "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" value is set to "0", the administrator account can only be used if the DC starts in DSRM. If the "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" value is set to "1", the administrator account can only be used if the local AD DS service is stopped. If the "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" value is set to "2", the administrator account can always be used.

Detects similar activity. Both rules may fire on overlapping events.

Rule Metadata
Rule ID
53ad8e36-f573-46bf-97e4-15ba5bf4bb51
Status
stable
Level
high
Type
Detection
Created
Sun Feb 19
Modified
Sun Aug 23
Author
Thomas Patzke
Path
rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_dsrm_password_change.yml
Raw Tags
attack.privilege-escalationattack.persistenceattack.t1098
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