Detectionhightest
Suspicious Child Process Created as System
Detection of child processes spawned with SYSTEM privileges by parents with LOCAL SERVICE or NETWORK SERVICE accounts
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Launch
Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), Open Threat Research (OTR)Created Sat Oct 26Updated Sun Dec 01590a5f4c-6c8c-4f10-8307-89afe9453a9dwindows
Log Source
WindowsProcess Creation
ProductWindows← raw: windows
CategoryProcess Creation← raw: process_creation
Events generated when a new process is spawned on the system. Covers command-line arguments, parent/child relationships, and process metadata.
Definition
Requirements: ParentUser field needs sysmon >= 13.30
Detection Logic
Detection Logic2 selectors
detection:
selection:
ParentUser|contains:
- 'AUTHORI'
- 'AUTORI'
ParentUser|endswith:
- '\NETWORK SERVICE'
- '\LOCAL SERVICE'
User|contains: # covers many language settings
- 'AUTHORI'
- 'AUTORI'
User|endswith: # System
- '\SYSTEM'
- '\Système'
- '\СИСТЕМА'
IntegrityLevel:
- 'System'
- 'S-1-16-16384'
filter_rundll32:
Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
CommandLine|contains: 'DavSetCookie'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*False Positives
Unknown
False positive likelihood has not been assessed. Additional context may be needed during triage.
MITRE ATT&CK
Rule Metadata
Rule ID
590a5f4c-6c8c-4f10-8307-89afe9453a9d
Status
test
Level
high
Type
Detection
Created
Sat Oct 26
Modified
Sun Dec 01
Path
rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_child_process_as_system_.yml
Raw Tags
attack.defense-evasionattack.privilege-escalationattack.t1134.002