Detectionhightest

Potential PowerShell Execution Via DLL

Detects potential PowerShell execution from a DLL instead of the usual PowerShell process as seen used in PowerShdll. This detection assumes that PowerShell commands are passed via the CommandLine.

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Launch
Markus Neis, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Created Sat Aug 25Updated Thu Mar 076812a10b-60ea-420c-832f-dfcc33b646bawindows
Log Source
WindowsProcess Creation
ProductWindows← raw: windows
CategoryProcess Creation← raw: process_creation

Events generated when a new process is spawned on the system. Covers command-line arguments, parent/child relationships, and process metadata.

Detection Logic
Detection Logic2 selectors
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\InstallUtil.exe'
              - '\RegAsm.exe'
              - '\RegSvcs.exe'
              - '\regsvr32.exe'
              - '\rundll32.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'InstallUtil.exe'
              - 'RegAsm.exe'
              - 'RegSvcs.exe'
              - 'REGSVR32.EXE'
              - 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Default.GetString'
            - 'DownloadString'
            - 'FromBase64String'
            - 'ICM '
            - 'IEX '
            - 'Invoke-Command'
            - 'Invoke-Expression'
    condition: all of selection_*
False Positives
Unknown

False positive likelihood has not been assessed. Additional context may be needed during triage.

MITRE ATT&CK
Rule Metadata
Rule ID
6812a10b-60ea-420c-832f-dfcc33b646ba
Status
test
Level
high
Type
Detection
Created
Sat Aug 25
Modified
Thu Mar 07
Path
rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_execution_via_dll.yml
Raw Tags
attack.defense-evasionattack.t1218.011
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