Detectionhightest
Potential SysInternals ProcDump Evasion
Detects uses of the SysInternals ProcDump utility in which ProcDump or its output get renamed, or a dump file is moved or copied to a different name
Convert In Phoenix Studio
Open this Sigma rule in the converter with the YAML preloaded and ready for backend selection.
Launch
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Created Tue Jan 11Updated Tue May 0979b06761-465f-4f88-9ef2-150e24d3d737windows
Log Source
WindowsProcess Creation
ProductWindows← raw: windows
CategoryProcess Creation← raw: process_creation
Events generated when a new process is spawned on the system. Covers command-line arguments, parent/child relationships, and process metadata.
Detection Logic
Detection Logic3 selectors
detection:
selection_1:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'copy procdump'
- 'move procdump'
selection_2:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'copy '
- '.dmp '
CommandLine|contains:
- '2.dmp'
- 'lsass'
- 'out.dmp'
selection_3:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'copy lsass.exe_' # procdump default pattern e.g. lsass.exe_220111_085234.dmp
- 'move lsass.exe_' # procdump default pattern e.g. lsass.exe_220111_085234.dmp
condition: 1 of selection_*False Positives
False positives are expected in cases in which ProcDump just gets copied to a different directory without any renaming
References
MITRE ATT&CK
Techniques
Sub-techniques
Rule Metadata
Rule ID
79b06761-465f-4f88-9ef2-150e24d3d737
Status
test
Level
high
Type
Detection
Created
Tue Jan 11
Modified
Tue May 09
Path
rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sysinternals_procdump_evasion.yml
Raw Tags
attack.defense-evasionattack.t1036attack.t1003.001attack.credential-access