Detectionmediumtest

Desktop.INI Created by Uncommon Process

Detects unusual processes accessing desktop.ini, which can be leveraged to alter how Explorer displays a folder's content (i.e. renaming files) without changing them on disk.

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Launch
Maxime Thiebaut, Tim Shelton (HAWK.IO)Created Thu Mar 19Updated Tue Dec 0981315b50-6b60-4d8f-9928-3466e1022515windows
Log Source
WindowsFile Event
ProductWindows← raw: windows
CategoryFile Event← raw: file_event

Events for file system activity including creation, modification, and deletion.

Detection Logic
Detection Logic5 selectors
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\desktop.ini'
    filter_main_generic:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Windows\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
    filter_main_upgrade:
        TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\$WINDOWS.~BT\NewOS\'
    filter_optional_jetbrains:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
        Image|endswith: '\AppData\Local\JetBrains\Toolbox\bin\7z.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains: '\JetBrains\apps\'
    filter_optional_onedrive:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
False Positives

Operations performed through Windows SCCM or equivalent

Read only access list authority

Rule Metadata
Rule ID
81315b50-6b60-4d8f-9928-3466e1022515
Status
test
Level
medium
Type
Detection
Created
Thu Mar 19
Modified
Tue Dec 09
Path
rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_desktop_ini_created_by_uncommon_process.yml
Raw Tags
attack.privilege-escalationattack.persistenceattack.t1547.009
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