Detectionhightest

Potential Rundll32 Execution With DLL Stored In ADS

Detects execution of rundll32 where the DLL being called is stored in an Alternate Data Stream (ADS).

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Harjot SinghCreated Sat Jan 21Updated Wed Feb 089248c7e1-2bf3-4661-a22c-600a8040b446windows
Log Source
WindowsProcess Creation
ProductWindows← raw: windows
CategoryProcess Creation← raw: process_creation

Events generated when a new process is spawned on the system. Covers command-line arguments, parent/child relationships, and process metadata.

Detection Logic
Detection Logic2 selectors
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
    selection_cli:
        # Example:
        #   rundll32 "C:\ads\file.txt:ADSDLL.dll",DllMain
        # Note: This doesn't cover the use case where a full path for the DLL isn't used. As it requires a more expensive regex
        CommandLine|re: '[Rr][Uu][Nn][Dd][Ll][Ll]32(\.[Ee][Xx][Ee])? \S+?\w:\S+?:'
    condition: all of selection_*
False Positives
Unknown

False positive likelihood has not been assessed. Additional context may be needed during triage.

Rule Metadata
Rule ID
9248c7e1-2bf3-4661-a22c-600a8040b446
Status
test
Level
high
Type
Detection
Created
Sat Jan 21
Modified
Wed Feb 08
Path
rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rundll32_ads_stored_dll_execution.yml
Raw Tags
attack.defense-evasionattack.t1564.004
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