Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious Remote Logon with Explicit Credentials

Detects suspicious processes logging on with explicit credentials

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Launch
oscd.community, Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Zach Stanford, Tim SheltonCreated Mon Oct 05Updated Wed Aug 03941e5c45-cda7-4864-8cea-bbb7458d194awindows
Log Source
Windowssecurity
ProductWindows← raw: windows
Servicesecurity← raw: security
Detection Logic
Detection Logic3 selectors
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4648
        ProcessName|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\winrs.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\net.exe'
            - '\net1.exe'
            - '\reg.exe'
    filter1:
        TargetServerName: 'localhost'
    filter2:
        SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
        TargetUserName|endswith: '$'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter*
False Positives

Administrators that use the RunAS command or scheduled tasks

Rule Metadata
Rule ID
941e5c45-cda7-4864-8cea-bbb7458d194a
Status
test
Level
medium
Type
Detection
Created
Mon Oct 05
Modified
Wed Aug 03
Path
rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_logon_explicit_credentials.yml
Raw Tags
attack.privilege-escalationattack.persistenceattack.initial-accessattack.defense-evasionattack.t1078attack.lateral-movement
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