Detectionmediumtest

Changing Existing Service ImagePath Value Via Reg.EXE

Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for registry to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code at Service start. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services

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François HubautCreated Thu Dec 30Updated Wed Mar 139b0b7ac3-6223-47aa-a3fd-e8f211e637dbwindows
Log Source
WindowsProcess Creation
ProductWindows← raw: windows
CategoryProcess Creation← raw: process_creation

Events generated when a new process is spawned on the system. Covers command-line arguments, parent/child relationships, and process metadata.

Detection Logic
Detection Logic2 selectors
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'add '
            - 'SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\'
            - ' ImagePath '
    selection_value:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -d '
    condition: all of selection*
False Positives
Unknown

False positive likelihood has not been assessed. Additional context may be needed during triage.

Rule Metadata
Rule ID
9b0b7ac3-6223-47aa-a3fd-e8f211e637db
Status
test
Level
medium
Type
Detection
Created
Thu Dec 30
Modified
Wed Mar 13
Path
rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_reg_service_imagepath_change.yml
Raw Tags
attack.privilege-escalationattack.defense-evasionattack.persistenceattack.t1574.011
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