Detectionhightest

Privilege Escalation via Named Pipe Impersonation

Detects a remote file copy attempt to a hidden network share. This may indicate lateral movement or data staging activity.

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Tim Rauch, Elastic SecurityCreated Tue Sep 27Updated Fri Dec 309bd04a79-dabe-4f1f-a5ff-92430265c96bwindows
Log Source
WindowsProcess Creation
ProductWindows← raw: windows
CategoryProcess Creation← raw: process_creation

Events generated when a new process is spawned on the system. Covers command-line arguments, parent/child relationships, and process metadata.

Detection Logic
Detection Logic2 selectors
detection:
    selection_name:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'Cmd.Exe'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
    selection_args:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'echo'
            - '>'
            - '\\\\.\\pipe\\'
    condition: all of selection*
False Positives

Other programs that cause these patterns (please report)

Rule Metadata
Rule ID
9bd04a79-dabe-4f1f-a5ff-92430265c96b
Status
test
Level
high
Type
Detection
Created
Tue Sep 27
Modified
Fri Dec 30
Path
rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_priv_escalation_via_named_pipe.yml
Raw Tags
attack.lateral-movementattack.t1021
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