Emerging Threatcriticalexperimental

RedSun - TieringEngineService.exe Detected as EICAR Test File

Detects Windows Defender (EventID 1119 - Remediation Action Failed) flagging TieringEngineService.exe dropped in a characteristic RS-{GUID} temporary directory, or the RedSun.exe process itself being present. This covers the staging pattern used by RedSun, a Cloud Files API and opportunistic lock (oplock) based AV bypass/privilege escalation tool. RedSun works as follows: 1. Registers a Cloud Files sync root and creates a Cloud Files placeholder for TieringEngineService.exe under %TEMP%\RS-{GUID}\ 2. The placeholder file carries EICAR test file content (Virus:DOS/EICAR_Test_File) to reliably trigger a Defender scan and remediation attempt 3. Requests a batch oplock (FSCTL_REQUEST_BATCH_OPLOCK) on the placeholder file 4. When Defender attempts to scan/quarantine the file, the oplock triggers - holding the file open 5. During the oplock break window, RedSun swaps the mount point (junction) to redirect \\?\C:\Windows\System32 to the attacker-controlled temp path 6. This races the AV/OS into executing the malicious TieringEngineService.exe with elevated privileges

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Launch
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Created Fri Apr 17a7c3e5f2-8b1d-4e9a-b6c2-3d7f5e8a9b4c2026
Emerging Threat
Active Threat

Developed to detect an active or emerging threat. Prioritize investigation of any alerts and correlate with threat intelligence.

Log Source
Windowswindefend
ProductWindows← raw: windows
Servicewindefend← raw: windefend
Detection Logic
Detection Logic3 selectors
detection:
    # EventID 1119: Microsoft Defender Antivirus has encountered an error trying to take action on malware or unwanted software
    # Path field from event: file:_C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Local\Temp\<n>\RS-{GUID}\TieringEngineService.exe
    # Threat name 'Virus:DOS/EICAR_Test_File' is expected - RedSun uses EICAR content to reliably trigger a Defender scan/remediation
    selection_eid:
        EventID: 1119
        SourceName: 'Real-Time Protection'
    selection_susp_path:
        Path|endswith: '\TieringEngineService.exe'
        ThreatName|endswith: 'EICAR_Test_File'
    selection_susp_process:
        ProcessName|endswith: '\RedSun.exe'
    condition: selection_eid and 1 of selection_susp_*
False Positives
Unlikely

False positives are unlikely for most environments. High confidence detection.

Testing & Validation

Regression Tests

by Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
Positive Detection Test1 matchevtx

Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon

Rule Metadata
Rule ID
a7c3e5f2-8b1d-4e9a-b6c2-3d7f5e8a9b4c
Status
experimental
Level
critical
Type
Emerging Threat
Created
Fri Apr 17
Path
rules-emerging-threats/2026/Exploits/RedSun/win_defender_exploit_redsun_tiering_engine_detected_as_eicar.yml
Raw Tags
attack.defense-evasionattack.t1036.005attack.t1562.001attack.privilege-escalationattack.t1055detection.emerging-threats
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