Detectionhightest
Renamed PAExec Execution
Detects execution of renamed version of PAExec. Often used by attackers
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Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jason LynchCreated Sat May 22Updated Sat Nov 23c4e49831-1496-40cf-8ce1-b53f942b02f9windows
Log Source
WindowsProcess Creation
ProductWindows← raw: windows
CategoryProcess Creation← raw: process_creation
Events generated when a new process is spawned on the system. Covers command-line arguments, parent/child relationships, and process metadata.
Detection Logic
Detection Logic2 selectors
detection:
selection:
- Description: 'PAExec Application'
- OriginalFileName: 'PAExec.exe'
- Product|contains: 'PAExec'
- Hashes|contains:
- IMPHASH=11D40A7B7876288F919AB819CC2D9802
- IMPHASH=6444f8a34e99b8f7d9647de66aabe516
- IMPHASH=dfd6aa3f7b2b1035b76b718f1ddc689f
- IMPHASH=1a6cca4d5460b1710a12dea39e4a592c
filter_main_known_location:
- Image|endswith: '\paexec.exe'
- Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\PAExec-'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*False Positives
Weird admins that rename their tools
Software companies that bundle PAExec with their software and rename it, so that it is less embarrassing
When executed with the "-s" flag. PAExec will copy itself to the "C:\Windows\" directory with a different name. Usually like this "PAExec-[XXXXX]-[ComputerName]"
MITRE ATT&CK
Tactics
Techniques
Related Rules
Similar
Rule not found7b0666ad-3e38-4e3d-9bab-78b06de85f7b
Rule Metadata
Rule ID
c4e49831-1496-40cf-8ce1-b53f942b02f9
Status
test
Level
high
Type
Detection
Created
Sat May 22
Modified
Sat Nov 23
Path
rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_paexec.yml
Raw Tags
attack.defense-evasionattack.t1202