Detectionhightest

Suspicious Encoded PowerShell Command Line

Detects suspicious powershell process starts with base64 encoded commands (e.g. Emotet)

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Launch
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Anton Kutepov, oscd.communityCreated Mon Sep 03Updated Thu Apr 06ca2092a1-c273-4878-9b4b-0d60115bf5eawindows
Log Source
WindowsProcess Creation
ProductWindows← raw: windows
CategoryProcess Creation← raw: process_creation

Events generated when a new process is spawned on the system. Covers command-line arguments, parent/child relationships, and process metadata.

Detection Logic
Detection Logic5 selectors
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_cli_enc:
        CommandLine|contains: ' -e' # covers -en and -enc
    selection_cli_content:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' JAB'
            - ' SUVYI'
            - ' SQBFAFgA'
            - ' aQBlAHgA'
            - ' aWV4I'
            - ' IAA'
            - ' IAB'
            - ' UwB'
            - ' cwB'
    selection_standalone:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.exe -ENCOD '
            - ' BA^J e-' # Reversed
    filter_optional_remote_signed:
        CommandLine|contains: ' -ExecutionPolicy remotesigned '
    condition: selection_img and (all of selection_cli_* or selection_standalone) and not 1 of filter_optional_*
MITRE ATT&CK
Rule Metadata
Rule ID
ca2092a1-c273-4878-9b4b-0d60115bf5ea
Status
test
Level
high
Type
Detection
Created
Mon Sep 03
Modified
Thu Apr 06
Path
rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_base64_encoded_cmd.yml
Raw Tags
attack.executionattack.t1059.001
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