Threat Huntmediumtest

Regsvr32.EXE Calling of DllRegisterServer Export Function Implicitly

Detects execution of regsvr32 with the silent flag and no other flags on a DLL located in an uncommon or potentially suspicious location. When Regsvr32 is called in such a way, it implicitly calls the DLL export function 'DllRegisterServer'.

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Launch
Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Created Tue Oct 17ce2c44b5-a6ac-412a-afba-9e89326fa972windows
Hunting Hypothesis
Log Source
WindowsProcess Creation
ProductWindows← raw: windows
CategoryProcess Creation← raw: process_creation

Events generated when a new process is spawned on the system. Covers command-line arguments, parent/child relationships, and process metadata.

Detection Logic
Detection Logic5 selectors
detection:
    selection_image:
        - Image|endswith: '\regsvr32.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'REGSVR32.EXE'
    selection_cmdline:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /s '
            - ' /e '
    filter_main_paths:
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - ':\Program Files (x86)'
              - ':\Program Files\'
              - ':\Windows\System32\'
              - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\'
        - CurrentDirectory|contains:
              - ':\Program Files (x86)'
              - ':\Program Files\'
              - ':\Windows\System32\'
              - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\'
    filter_main_other_flags:
        # Note: We filter other flags to keep the logic of the rule
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /i:'
            - '/U '
    filter_main_rpcproxy:
        ParentCommandLine|endswith: ':\Windows\System32\RpcProxy\RpcProxy.dll'
        CommandLine: 'regsvr32 /s rpcproxy.dll'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
False Positives

Legitimate usage as part of application installation, but less likely from e.g. temporary paths.

MITRE ATT&CK

Other

detection.threat-hunting
Rule Metadata
Rule ID
ce2c44b5-a6ac-412a-afba-9e89326fa972
Status
test
Level
medium
Type
Threat Hunt
Created
Tue Oct 17
Path
rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_regsvr32_dllregisterserver_exec.yml
Raw Tags
attack.defense-evasionattack.t1218detection.threat-hunting
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