Detectionhightest
Suspicious Mshta.EXE Execution Patterns
Detects suspicious mshta process execution patterns
Convert In Phoenix Studio
Open this Sigma rule in the converter with the YAML preloaded and ready for backend selection.
Launch
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Created Sat Jul 17Updated Tue Feb 21e32f92d1-523e-49c3-9374-bdb13b46a3bawindows
Log Source
WindowsProcess Creation
ProductWindows← raw: windows
CategoryProcess Creation← raw: process_creation
Events generated when a new process is spawned on the system. Covers command-line arguments, parent/child relationships, and process metadata.
Detection Logic
Detection Logic3 selectors
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'MSHTA.EXE'
selection_susp:
# Suspicious parents
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\regsvr32.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
# Suspicious folders
CommandLine|contains:
- '\AppData\Local\'
- 'C:\ProgramData\'
- 'C:\Users\Public\'
- 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
filter_img:
# Filter legit Locations
- Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
# Suspicious extensions
- CommandLine|contains:
- '.htm'
- '.hta'
# Filter simple execution
- CommandLine|endswith:
- 'mshta.exe'
- 'mshta'
condition: all of selection_* or (selection_img and not filter_img)False Positives
Unknown
False positive likelihood has not been assessed. Additional context may be needed during triage.
MITRE ATT&CK
Tactics
Techniques
Rule Metadata
Rule ID
e32f92d1-523e-49c3-9374-bdb13b46a3ba
Status
test
Level
high
Type
Detection
Created
Sat Jul 17
Modified
Tue Feb 21
Path
rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_mshta_susp_pattern.yml
Raw Tags
attack.executionattack.t1106