Detectionhightest

Forfiles.EXE Child Process Masquerading

Detects the execution of "forfiles" from a non-default location, in order to potentially spawn a custom "cmd.exe" from the current working directory.

Convert In Phoenix Studio

Open this Sigma rule in the converter with the YAML preloaded and ready for backend selection.

Launch
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Anish BogatiCreated Fri Jan 05f53714ec-5077-420e-ad20-907ff9bb2958windows
Log Source
WindowsProcess Creation
ProductWindows← raw: windows
CategoryProcess Creation← raw: process_creation

Events generated when a new process is spawned on the system. Covers command-line arguments, parent/child relationships, and process metadata.

Detection Logic
Detection Logic2 selectors
detection:
    selection:
        # Notes:
        #   - The parent must not have CLI options
        #   - The Child Image must be named "cmd" as its hardcoded in the "forfiles" binary
        #   - The Child CLI will always contains "/c echo" as its hardcoded in the original "forfiles" binary
        ParentCommandLine|endswith:
            - '.exe'
            - '.exe"'
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|startswith: '/c echo "'
    filter_main_parent_not_sys:
        ParentImage|contains:
            - ':\Windows\System32\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\'
        ParentImage|endswith: '\forfiles.exe'
        Image|contains:
            - ':\Windows\System32\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\'
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
False Positives
Unknown

False positive likelihood has not been assessed. Additional context may be needed during triage.

Rule Metadata
Rule ID
f53714ec-5077-420e-ad20-907ff9bb2958
Status
test
Level
high
Type
Detection
Created
Fri Jan 05
Path
rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_forfiles_child_process_masquerading.yml
Raw Tags
attack.defense-evasionattack.t1036
View on GitHub