Detectionhightest
Sensitive File Access Via Volume Shadow Copy Backup
Detects a command that accesses the VolumeShadowCopy in order to extract sensitive files such as the Security or SAM registry hives or the AD database (ntds.dit)
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Launch
Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems), Tobias MichalskiCreated Mon Aug 09Updated Thu Jan 18f57f8d16-1f39-4dcb-a604-6c73d9b54b3dwindows
Log Source
WindowsProcess Creation
ProductWindows← raw: windows
CategoryProcess Creation← raw: process_creation
Events generated when a new process is spawned on the system. Covers command-line arguments, parent/child relationships, and process metadata.
Detection Logic
Detection Logic2 selectors
detection:
selection_1:
# copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\NTDS\NTDS.dit C:\temp\ntds.dit 2>&1
# There is an additional "\" to escape the special "?"
CommandLine|contains: '\\\\\?\\GLOBALROOT\\Device\\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy'
selection_2:
CommandLine|contains:
- '\\NTDS.dit'
- '\\SYSTEM'
- '\\SECURITY'
condition: all of selection_*False Positives
Unlikely
False positives are unlikely for most environments. High confidence detection.
MITRE ATT&CK
Tactics
Techniques
Rule Metadata
Rule ID
f57f8d16-1f39-4dcb-a604-6c73d9b54b3d
Status
test
Level
high
Type
Detection
Created
Mon Aug 09
Modified
Thu Jan 18
Path
rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_sensitive_file_access_shadowcopy.yml
Raw Tags
attack.impactattack.t1490