Detectionhighexperimental
Suspicious WSL InstallLocation Registry Key Modification Via CommandLine
Detects the use of reg.exe or PowerShell to modify the WSL InstallLocation registry key via command-line arguments. Legitimate modifications to this key are performed exclusively by the Windows Installer (msiexec.exe) during WSL package installation or update. Manual use of reg.exe or PowerShell to set this value strongly indicates an attempt to redirect WSL execution to a malicious binary.
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Launch
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Created Tue May 05f9f62824-de4e-40ca-afe7-8358f76a876dwindows
Log Source
WindowsProcess Creation
ProductWindows← raw: windows
CategoryProcess Creation← raw: process_creation
Events generated when a new process is spawned on the system. Covers command-line arguments, parent/child relationships, and process metadata.
Detection Logic
Detection Logic4 selectors
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\reg.exe'
- OriginalFileName:
- 'powershell.exe'
- 'pwsh.dll'
- 'reg.exe'
selection_cli_action:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' add ' # reg.exe add subcommand
- 'New-ItemProperty'
- 'Set-ItemProperty'
- 'sp ' # PowerShell alias for Set-ItemProperty
selection_cli_key:
CommandLine|contains:
- '\Lxss\MSI'
- '/Lxss/MSI' # forward-slash variant sometimes used with PowerShell paths
selection_cli_value:
CommandLine|contains: 'InstallLocation'
condition: all of selection_*False Positives
Unlikely
False positives are unlikely for most environments. High confidence detection.
References
MITRE ATT&CK
Rule Metadata
Rule ID
f9f62824-de4e-40ca-afe7-8358f76a876d
Status
experimental
Level
high
Type
Detection
Created
Tue May 05
Path
rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wsl_installlocation_modification_via_cmdline.yml
Raw Tags
attack.stealthattack.defense-impairmentattack.persistenceattack.t1112attack.t1218