Rule Library

Sigma Rules

1,619 rules found

3,731Total
3,132Detection
457Emerging
139Hunting
Detectionhightest

HackTool - SharpDPAPI Execution

Detects the execution of the SharpDPAPI tool based on CommandLine flags and PE metadata. SharpDPAPI is a C# port of some DPAPI functionality from the Mimikatz project.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Wed Jun 26windows
Detectionhightest

HackTool - SharpImpersonation Execution

Detects execution of the SharpImpersonation tool. Which can be used to manipulate tokens on a Windows computers remotely (PsExec/WmiExec) or interactively

WindowsProcess Creation
Sai Prashanth Pulisetti+1Tue Dec 27windows
Detectionmediumtest

HackTool - SharpLDAPmonitor Execution

Detects execution of the SharpLDAPmonitor. Which can monitor the creation, deletion and changes to LDAP objects.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Fri Dec 30windows
Detectionhightest

HackTool - SILENTTRINITY Stager Execution

Detects SILENTTRINITY stager use via PE metadata

WindowsProcess Creation
Aleksey Potapov+1Tue Oct 22windows
Detectioncriticaltest

HackTool - Sliver C2 Implant Activity Pattern

Detects process activity patterns as seen being used by Sliver C2 framework implants

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Thu Aug 25windows
Detectionhightest

HackTool - SOAPHound Execution

Detects the execution of SOAPHound, a .NET tool for collecting Active Directory data, using specific command-line arguments that may indicate an attempt to extract sensitive AD information.

WindowsProcess Creation
kostastsaleFri Jan 26windows
Detectionhightest

HackTool - Stracciatella Execution

Detects Stracciatella which executes a Powershell runspace from within C# (aka SharpPick technique) with AMSI, ETW and Script Block Logging disabled based on PE metadata characteristics.

WindowsProcess Creation
Martin MuellerMon Apr 17windows
Detectioncriticaltest

HackTool - SysmonEOP Execution

Detects the execution of the PoC that can be used to exploit Sysmon CVE-2022-41120

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Sun Dec 04windows
Detectionhightest

HackTool - TruffleSnout Execution

Detects the use of TruffleSnout.exe an iterative AD discovery toolkit for offensive operators, situational awareness and targeted low noise enumeration.

WindowsProcess Creation
François HubautSat Aug 20windows
Detectionhightest

HackTool - UACMe Akagi Execution

Detects the execution of UACMe, a tool used for UAC bypasses, via default PE metadata

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)+1Mon Aug 30windows
Detectioncriticaltest

HackTool - Windows Credential Editor (WCE) Execution

Detects the use of Windows Credential Editor (WCE), a popular post-exploitation tool used to extract plaintext passwords, hash, PIN code and Kerberos tickets from memory. It is often used by threat actors for credential dumping and lateral movement within compromised networks.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Dec 31windows
Detectionhightest

HackTool - winPEAS Execution

WinPEAS is a script that search for possible paths to escalate privileges on Windows hosts. The checks are explained on book.hacktricks.xyz

WindowsProcess Creation
Georg Lauenstein (sure[secure])Mon Sep 19windows
Detectionhightest

HackTool - WinPwn Execution

Detects commandline keywords indicative of potential usge of the tool WinPwn. A tool for Windows and Active Directory reconnaissance and exploitation.

WindowsProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan PoudelMon Dec 04windows
Detectionhightest

HackTool - Wmiexec Default Powershell Command

Detects the execution of PowerShell with a specific flag sequence that is used by the Wmiexec script

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Wed Mar 08windows
Detectionhighexperimental

HackTool - WSASS Execution

Detects execution of WSASS, a tool used to dump LSASS memory on Windows systems by leveraging WER's (Windows Error Reporting) WerFaultSecure.EXE to bypass PPL (Protected Process Light) protections.

WindowsProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Sun Nov 23windows
Detectionhightest

HackTool - XORDump Execution

Detects suspicious use of XORDump process memory dumping utility

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Jan 28windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious ZipExec Execution

ZipExec is a Proof-of-Concept (POC) tool to wrap binary-based tools into a password-protected zip file.

WindowsProcess Creation
François HubautSun Nov 07windows
Detectionlowtest

Suspicious Execution of Hostname

Use of hostname to get information

WindowsProcess Creation
François HubautSat Jan 01windows
Detectionhighexperimental

Hypervisor-protected Code Integrity (HVCI) Related Registry Tampering Via CommandLine

Detects the tampering of Hypervisor-protected Code Integrity (HVCI) related registry values via command line tool reg.exe. HVCI uses virtualization-based security to protect code integrity by ensuring that only trusted code can run in kernel mode. Adversaries may tamper with HVCI to load malicious or unsigned drivers, which can be used to escalate privileges, maintain persistence, or evade security mechanisms.

WindowsProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Mon Jan 26windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious HWP Sub Processes

Detects suspicious Hangul Word Processor (Hanword) sub processes that could indicate an exploitation

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Thu Oct 24windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Fake Instance Of Hxtsr.EXE Executed

HxTsr.exe is a Microsoft compressed executable file called Microsoft Outlook Communications. HxTsr.exe is part of Outlook apps, because it resides in a hidden "WindowsApps" subfolder of "C:\Program Files". Any instances of hxtsr.exe not in this folder may be malware camouflaging itself as HxTsr.exe

WindowsProcess Creation
SreemanFri Apr 17windows
Detectionmediumtest

Use Icacls to Hide File to Everyone

Detect use of icacls to deny access for everyone in Users folder sometimes used to hide malicious files

WindowsProcess Creation
François HubautMon Jul 18windows
Detectionhightest

File Download And Execution Via IEExec.EXE

Detects execution of the IEExec utility to download and execute files

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon May 16windows
Detectionhightest

Self Extracting Package Creation Via Iexpress.EXE From Potentially Suspicious Location

Detects the use of iexpress.exe to create binaries via Self Extraction Directive (SED) files located in potentially suspicious locations. This behavior has been observed in-the-wild by different threat actors.

WindowsProcess Creation
Joseliyo Sanchez+1Mon Feb 05windows
Detectionhightest

Disable Windows IIS HTTP Logging

Disables HTTP logging on a Windows IIS web server as seen by Threat Group 3390 (Bronze Union)

WindowsProcess Creation
François HubautSun Jan 09windows
Detectionhightest

Microsoft IIS Service Account Password Dumped

Detects the Internet Information Services (IIS) command-line tool, AppCmd, being used to list passwords

WindowsProcess Creation
Tim Rauch+2Tue Nov 08windows
Detectionmediumtest

IIS Native-Code Module Command Line Installation

Detects suspicious IIS native-code module installations via command line

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Wed Dec 11windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious IIS URL GlobalRules Rewrite Via AppCmd

Detects usage of "appcmd" to create new global URL rewrite rules. This behaviour has been observed being used by threat actors to add new rules so they can access their webshells.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Sun Jan 22windows
Detectionhightest

Microsoft IIS Connection Strings Decryption

Detects use of aspnet_regiis to decrypt Microsoft IIS connection strings. An attacker with Microsoft IIS web server access via a webshell or alike can decrypt and dump any hardcoded connection strings, such as the MSSQL service account password using aspnet_regiis command.

WindowsProcess Creation
Tim Rauch+1Wed Sep 28windows
Detectionmediumexperimental

IIS WebServer Log Deletion via CommandLine Utilities

Detects attempts to delete Internet Information Services (IIS) log files via command line utilities, which is a common defense evasion technique used by attackers to cover their tracks. Threat actors often abuse vulnerabilities in web applications hosted on IIS servers to gain initial access and later delete IIS logs to evade detection.

WindowsProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Tue Sep 02windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious IIS Module Registration

Detects a suspicious IIS module registration as described in Microsoft threat report on IIS backdoors

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Thu Aug 04windows
Detectionmediumtest

C# IL Code Compilation Via Ilasm.EXE

Detects the use of "Ilasm.EXE" in order to compile C# intermediate (IL) code to EXE or DLL.

WindowsProcess Creation
François Hubaut+1Sat May 07windows
Detectionhightest

ImagingDevices Unusual Parent/Child Processes

Detects unusual parent or children of the ImagingDevices.exe (Windows Contacts) process as seen being used with Bumblebee activity

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Sep 27windows
Detectionhightest

Arbitrary File Download Via IMEWDBLD.EXE

Detects usage of "IMEWDBLD.exe" to download arbitrary files

WindowsProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan PoudelThu Nov 09windows
Detectionmediumtest

InfDefaultInstall.exe .inf Execution

Executes SCT script using scrobj.dll from a command in entered into a specially prepared INF file.

WindowsProcess Creation
François HubautTue Jul 13windows
Detectionmediumtest

File Download Via InstallUtil.EXE

Detects use of .NET InstallUtil.exe in order to download arbitrary files. The files will be written to "%LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\"

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Fri Aug 19windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious Execution of InstallUtil Without Log

Uses the .NET InstallUtil.exe application in order to execute image without log

WindowsProcess Creation
François HubautSun Jan 23windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Shells Spawn by Java Utility Keytool

Detects suspicious shell spawn from Java utility keytool process (e.g. adselfservice plus exploitation)

WindowsProcess Creation
Andreas HunkelerWed Dec 22windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Child Process Of Manage Engine ServiceDesk

Detects suspicious child processes of the "Manage Engine ServiceDesk Plus" Java web service

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Wed Jan 18windows
Detectionmediumtest

Java Running with Remote Debugging

Detects a JAVA process running with remote debugging allowing more than just localhost to connect

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Wed Jan 16windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Processes Spawned by Java.EXE

Detects suspicious processes spawned from a Java host process which could indicate a sign of exploitation (e.g. log4j)

WindowsProcess Creation
Andreas Hunkeler+1Fri Dec 17windows
Detectionmediumtest

Shell Process Spawned by Java.EXE

Detects shell spawned from Java host process, which could be a sign of exploitation (e.g. log4j exploitation)

WindowsProcess Creation
Andreas Hunkeler+1Fri Dec 17windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious SysAidServer Child

Detects suspicious child processes of SysAidServer (as seen in MERCURY threat actor intrusions)

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Aug 26windows
Detectionlowtest

JScript Compiler Execution

Detects the execution of the "jsc.exe" (JScript Compiler). Attacker might abuse this in order to compile JScript files on the fly and bypassing application whitelisting.

WindowsProcess Creation
François HubautMon May 02windows
Detectionhightest

Kavremover Dropped Binary LOLBIN Usage

Detects the execution of a signed binary dropped by Kaspersky Lab Products Remover (kavremover) which can be abused as a LOLBIN to execute arbitrary commands and binaries.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Nov 01windows
Detectionmediumtest

Windows Kernel Debugger Execution

Detects execution of the Windows Kernel Debugger "kd.exe".

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon May 15windows
Detectionhighexperimental

Attempts of Kerberos Coercion Via DNS SPN Spoofing

Detects the presence of "UWhRC....AAYBAAAA" pattern in command line. The pattern "1UWhRCAAAAA..BAAAA" is a base64-encoded signature that corresponds to a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure. Attackers can use this technique to coerce authentication from victim systems to attacker-controlled hosts. It is one of the strong indicators of a Kerberos coercion attack, where adversaries manipulate DNS records to spoof Service Principal Names (SPNs) and redirect authentication requests like in CVE-2025-33073. If you see this pattern in the command line, it is likely an attempt to add spoofed Service Principal Names (SPNs) to DNS records, or checking for the presence of such records through the `nslookup` command.

WindowsProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Fri Jun 20windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potentially Suspicious Child Process of KeyScrambler.exe

Detects potentially suspicious child processes of KeyScrambler.exe

WindowsProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan PoudelMon May 13windows