Rule Library

Sigma Rules

1,709 rules found

3,731Total
3,132Detection
457Emerging
139Hunting
Detectionhightest

Potential Credential Dumping Via WER

Detects potential credential dumping via Windows Error Reporting LSASS Shtinkering technique which uses the Windows Error Reporting to dump lsass

WindowsProcess Creation
@pbssubhash+1Thu Dec 08windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Child Process Of Wermgr.EXE

Detects suspicious Windows Error Reporting manager (wermgr.exe) child process

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Oct 14windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Execution Location Of Wermgr.EXE

Detects suspicious Windows Error Reporting manager (wermgr.exe) execution location.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Oct 14windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious File Download From IP Via Wget.EXE

Detects potentially suspicious file downloads directly from IP addresses using Wget.exe

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Jul 27windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious File Download From File Sharing Domain Via Wget.EXE

Detects potentially suspicious file downloads from file sharing domains using wget.exe

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Fri May 05windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious File Download From IP Via Wget.EXE - Paths

Detects potentially suspicious file downloads directly from IP addresses and stored in suspicious locations using Wget.exe

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Fri Feb 23windows
Detectionhightest

Whoami.EXE Execution From Privileged Process

Detects the execution of "whoami.exe" by privileged accounts that are often abused by threat actors

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Fri Jan 28windows
Detectionhightest

Security Privileges Enumeration Via Whoami.EXE

Detects a whoami.exe executed with the /priv command line flag instructing the tool to show all current user privileges. This is often used after a privilege escalation attempt.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Wed May 05windows
Detectionhightest

Add Insecure Download Source To Winget

Detects usage of winget to add a new insecure (http) download source. Winget will not allow the addition of insecure sources, hence this could indicate potential suspicious activity (or typos)

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Apr 17windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Processes Spawned by WinRM

Detects suspicious processes including shells spawnd from WinRM host process

WindowsProcess Creation
Andreas Hunkeler+1Thu May 20windows
Detectionhighexperimental

Winrs Local Command Execution

Detects the execution of Winrs.exe where it is used to execute commands locally. Commands executed this way are launched under Winrshost.exe and can represent proxy execution used for defense evasion or lateral movement.

WindowsProcess Creation
Liran Ravich+1Wed Oct 22windows
Detectionhightest

New ActiveScriptEventConsumer Created Via Wmic.EXE

Detects WMIC executions in which an event consumer gets created. This could be used to establish persistence

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Jun 25windows
Detectionhightest

Potential Windows Defender Tampering Via Wmic.EXE

Detects potential tampering with Windows Defender settings such as adding exclusion using wmic

WindowsProcess Creation
François HubautSun Dec 11windows
Detectionhightest

Potential Remote SquiblyTwo Technique Execution

Detects potential execution of the SquiblyTwo technique that leverages Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious code remotely. This technique bypasses application whitelisting by using wmic.exe to process malicious XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) scripts that can contain embedded JScript or VBScript. The attack typically works by fetching XSL content from a remote source (using HTTP/HTTPS) and executing it with full trust privileges directly in memory, avoiding disk-based detection mechanisms. This is a common LOLBin (Living Off The Land Binary) technique used for defense evasion and code execution.

WindowsProcess Creation
Markus Neis+2Wed Jan 16windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious WMIC Execution Via Office Process

Office application called wmic to proxye execution through a LOLBIN process. This is often used to break suspicious parent-child chain (Office app spawns LOLBin).

WindowsProcess Creation
Vadim Khrykov+1Mon Aug 23windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Process Created Via Wmic.EXE

Detects WMIC executing "process call create" with suspicious calls to processes such as "rundll32", "regsrv32", etc.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Mon Oct 12windows
Detectionhightest

Potential Tampering With Security Products Via WMIC

Detects uninstallation or termination of security products using the WMIC utility

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Sat Jan 30windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious WmiPrvSE Child Process

Detects suspicious and uncommon child processes of WmiPrvSE

WindowsProcess Creation
Vadim Khrykov (ThreatIntel)+2Mon Aug 23windows
Detectionhightest

UEFI Persistence Via Wpbbin - ProcessCreation

Detects execution of the binary "wpbbin" which is used as part of the UEFI based persistence method described in the reference section

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Jul 18windows
Detectionhightest

Cscript/Wscript Uncommon Script Extension Execution

Detects Wscript/Cscript executing a file with an uncommon (i.e. non-script) extension

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon May 15windows
Detectionhighexperimental

Installation of WSL Kali-Linux

Detects installation of Kali Linux distribution through Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL). Attackers may use Kali Linux WSL to leverage its penetration testing tools and capabilities for malicious purposes.

WindowsProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Fri Oct 10windows
Detectionhighexperimental

WSL Kali-Linux Usage

Detects the use of Kali Linux through Windows Subsystem for Linux

WindowsProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Fri Oct 10windows
Detectionhightest

Proxy Execution Via Wuauclt.EXE

Detects the use of the Windows Update Client binary (wuauclt.exe) for proxy execution.

WindowsProcess Creation
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+4Mon Oct 12windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Windows Update Agent Empty Cmdline

Detects suspicious Windows Update Agent activity in which a wuauclt.exe process command line doesn't contain any command line flags

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Sat Feb 26windows
Detectionhightest

Cab File Extraction Via Wusa.EXE From Potentially Suspicious Paths

Detects the execution of the "wusa.exe" (Windows Update Standalone Installer) utility to extract ".cab" files using the "/extract" argument from potentially suspicious paths.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Fri Aug 05windows
Detectionhightest

Wusa.EXE Executed By Parent Process Located In Suspicious Location

Detects execution of the "wusa.exe" (Windows Update Standalone Installer) utility by a parent process that is located in a suspicious location. Attackers could instantiate an instance of "wusa.exe" in order to bypass User Account Control (UAC). They can duplicate the access token from "wusa.exe" to gain elevated privileges.

WindowsProcess Creation
X__Junior (Nextron Systems)Sun Nov 26windows
Detectionhightest

Xwizard.EXE Execution From Non-Default Location

Detects the execution of Xwizard tool from a non-default directory. When executed from a non-default directory, this utility can be abused in order to side load a custom version of "xwizards.dll".

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Sep 20windows
Detectionhighexperimental

Windows Credential Guard Related Registry Value Deleted - Registry

Detects attempts to disable Windows Credential Guard by deleting registry values. Credential Guard uses virtualization-based security to isolate secrets so that only privileged system software can access them. Adversaries may disable Credential Guard to gain access to sensitive credentials stored in the system, such as NTLM hashes and Kerberos tickets, which can be used for lateral movement and privilege escalation.

WindowsRegistry Delete
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Fri Dec 26windows
Detectionhightest

Folder Removed From Exploit Guard ProtectedFolders List - Registry

Detects the removal of folders from the "ProtectedFolders" list of of exploit guard. This could indicate an attacker trying to launch an encryption process or trying to manipulate data inside of the protected folder

WindowsRegistry Delete
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Fri Aug 05windows
Detectionhightest

Terminal Server Client Connection History Cleared - Registry

Detects the deletion of registry keys containing the MSTSC connection history

WindowsRegistry Delete
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Tue Oct 19windows
Detectionhightest

Removal Of AMSI Provider Registry Keys

Detects the deletion of AMSI provider registry key entries in HKLM\Software\Microsoft\AMSI. This technique could be used by an attacker in order to disable AMSI inspection.

WindowsRegistry Delete
François HubautMon Jun 07windows
Detectionhighexperimental

RunMRU Registry Key Deletion - Registry

Detects attempts to delete the RunMRU registry key, which stores the history of commands executed via the run dialog. In the clickfix techniques, the phishing lures instruct users to open a run dialog through (Win + R) and execute malicious commands. Adversaries may delete this key to cover their tracks after executing commands.

WindowsRegistry Delete
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Thu Sep 25windows
Detectionhightest

Creation of a Local Hidden User Account by Registry

Sysmon registry detection of a local hidden user account.

WindowsRegistry Event
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon May 03windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Via Wsreset

Unfixed method for UAC bypass from Windows 10. WSReset.exe file associated with the Windows Store. It will run a binary file contained in a low-privilege registry.

WindowsRegistry Event
oscd.community+1Wed Oct 07windows
Detectionhighstable

CMSTP Execution Registry Event

Detects various indicators of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer execution

WindowsRegistry Event
Nik SeetharamanMon Jul 16windows
Detectionhighexperimental

Windows Defender Threat Severity Default Action Modified

Detects modifications or creations of Windows Defender's default threat action settings based on severity to 'allow' or take 'no action'. This is a highly suspicious configuration change that effectively disables Defender's ability to automatically mitigate threats of a certain severity level, allowing malicious software to run unimpeded. An attacker might use this technique to bypass defenses before executing payloads.

WindowsRegistry Event
Matt Anderson (Huntress)Fri Jul 11windows
Detectionhightest

Disable Security Events Logging Adding Reg Key MiniNt

Detects the addition of a key 'MiniNt' to the registry. Upon a reboot, Windows Event Log service will stop writing events.

WindowsRegistry Event
Ilyas Ochkov+1Fri Oct 25windows
Detectionhightest

Wdigest CredGuard Registry Modification

Detects potential malicious modification of the property value of IsCredGuardEnabled from HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest to disable Cred Guard on a system. This is usually used with UseLogonCredential to manipulate the caching credentials.

WindowsRegistry Event
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+1Sun Aug 25windows
Detectionhightest

Esentutl Volume Shadow Copy Service Keys

Detects the volume shadow copy service initialization and processing via esentutl. Registry keys such as HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\VSS\\Diag\\VolSnap\\Volume are captured.

WindowsRegistry Event
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+1Tue Oct 20windows
Detectionhightest

HybridConnectionManager Service Installation - Registry

Detects the installation of the Azure Hybrid Connection Manager service to allow remote code execution from Azure function.

WindowsRegistry Event
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+1Mon Apr 12windows
Detectionhightest

Potential Qakbot Registry Activity

Detects a registry key used by IceID in a campaign that distributes malicious OneNote files

WindowsRegistry Event
Hieu TranMon Mar 13windows
Detectionhightest

Narrator's Feedback-Hub Persistence

Detects abusing Windows 10 Narrator's Feedback-Hub

WindowsRegistry Event
Dmitriy Lifanov+1Fri Oct 25windows
Detectionhightest

NetNTLM Downgrade Attack - Registry

Detects NetNTLM downgrade attack

WindowsRegistry Event
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+2Tue Mar 20windows
Detectionhightest

Registry Persistence Mechanisms in Recycle Bin

Detects persistence registry keys for Recycle Bin

WindowsRegistry Event
François HubautThu Nov 18windows
Detectionhightest

RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Registry Manipulation

Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook

WindowsRegistry Event
Alexander RauschWed Jun 24windows
Detectionhightest

WINEKEY Registry Modification

Detects potential malicious modification of run keys by winekey or team9 backdoor

WindowsRegistry Event
omkar72Fri Oct 30windows
Detectionhightest

Shell Open Registry Keys Manipulation

Detects the shell open key manipulation (exefile and ms-settings) used for persistence and the pattern of UAC Bypass using fodhelper.exe, computerdefaults.exe, slui.exe via registry keys (e.g. UACMe 33 or 62)

WindowsRegistry Event
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 30windows
Detectionhightest

Security Support Provider (SSP) Added to LSA Configuration

Detects the addition of a SSP to the registry. Upon a reboot or API call, SSP DLLs gain access to encrypted and plaintext passwords stored in Windows.

WindowsRegistry Event
iwillkeepwatchFri Jan 18windows