Rule Library

Sigma Rules

558 rules found for "Red Canary"

3,731Total
3,132Detection
457Emerging
139Hunting
Threat Huntmediumtest

Suspicious Creation TXT File in User Desktop

Detects creation of .txt files in user desktop folders via cmd.exe. This behavior may indicate ransomware deploying ransom notes, but can also occur during legitimate administrative tasks. Analysts should investigate for suspicious filenames (e.g., "RANSOM", "DECRYPT", "READ_ME"), bulk file creation patterns, or concurrent encryption activity to determine if this is part of a ransomware attack.

WindowsFile Event
François HubautSun Dec 26windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Non-DLL Extension File Renamed With DLL Extension

Detects rename operations of files with non-DLL extensions to files with a DLL extension. This is often performed by malware in order to avoid initial detections based on extensions.

WindowsFile Rename
François HubautSat Feb 19windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Dllhost.EXE Initiated Network Connection To Non-Local IP Address

Detects Dllhost.EXE initiating a network connection to a non-local IP address. Aside from Microsoft own IP range that needs to be excluded. Network communication from Dllhost will depend entirely on the hosted DLL. An initial baseline is recommended before deployment.

WindowsNetwork Connection
bartblazeMon Jul 13windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

HH.EXE Initiated HTTP Network Connection

Detects a network connection initiated by the "hh.exe" process to HTTP destination ports, which could indicate the execution/download of remotely hosted .chm files.

WindowsNetwork Connection
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Wed Oct 05windows
Threat Huntlowtest

Msiexec.EXE Initiated Network Connection Over HTTP

Detects a network connection initiated by an "Msiexec.exe" process over port 80 or 443. Adversaries might abuse "msiexec.exe" to install and execute remotely hosted packages. Use this rule to hunt for potentially anomalous or suspicious communications.

WindowsNetwork Connection
François HubautSun Jan 16windows
Threat Huntlowtest

Compress-Archive Cmdlet Execution

Detects PowerShell scripts that make use of the "Compress-Archive" cmdlet in order to compress folders and files. An adversary might compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network.

WindowsPowerShell Script
Timur Zinniatullin+1Mon Oct 21windows
Threat Huntmediumexperimental

Mail Forwarding/Redirecting Activity Via ExchangePowerShell Cmdlet

Detects email forwarding or redirecting activity via ExchangePowerShell Cmdlet

WindowsPowerShell Script
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Sun Mar 01windows
Threat Huntmediumexperimental

Inbox Rules Creation Or Update Activity Via ExchangePowerShell Cmdlet

Detects inbox rule creation or update via ExchangePowerShell cmdlet, a technique commonly observed in Business Email Compromise (BEC) attacks to hide emails. The usage of inbox rules can be a sign of a compromised mailbox, where an attacker is attempting to evade detections by suppressing or redirecting incoming emails. Analysts should review these rules in context, validate whether they reflect normal user behavior, and correlate with other indicators such as unusual login activity or recent mailbox rule modifications.

WindowsPowerShell Script
Marco Pedrinazzi (InTheCyber)Tue Feb 10windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Windows Mail App Mailbox Access Via PowerShell Script

Detects PowerShell scripts that try to access the default Windows MailApp MailBox. This indicates manipulation of or access to the stored emails of a user. E.g. this could be used by an attacker to exfiltrate or delete the content of the emails.

WindowsPowerShell Script
François HubautSat Jul 08windows
Threat Huntlowtest

New Windows Firewall Rule Added Via New-NetFirewallRule Cmdlet - ScriptBlock

Detects when a powershell script contains calls to the "New-NetFirewallRule" cmdlet in order to add a new firewall rule with an "Allow" action.

WindowsPowerShell Script
François HubautFri May 10windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

SMB over QUIC Via PowerShell Script

Detects the mounting of Windows SMB shares over QUIC, which can be an unexpected event in some enterprise environments

WindowsPowerShell Script
François HubautFri Jul 21windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Potential Registry Reconnaissance Via PowerShell Script

Detects PowerShell scripts with potential registry reconnaissance capabilities. Adversaries may interact with the Windows registry to gather information about the system credentials, configuration, and installed software.

WindowsPowerShell Script
François HubautSun Jul 02windows
Threat Huntlowtest

Use Of Remove-Item to Delete File - ScriptBlock

PowerShell Remove-Item with -Path to delete a file or a folder with "-Recurse"

WindowsPowerShell Script
François HubautSat Jan 15windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Potential Data Exfiltration Over SMTP Via Send-MailMessage Cmdlet

Detects the execution of a PowerShell script with a call to the "Send-MailMessage" cmdlet along with the "-Attachments" flag. This could be a potential sign of data exfiltration via Email. Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.

WindowsPowerShell Script
François HubautMon Sep 26windows
Threat Huntlowtest

Set Files as System Files Using Attrib.EXE

Detects the execution of "attrib" with the "+s" flag to mark files as system files

WindowsProcess Creation
François HubautFri Feb 04windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Potential Data Exfiltration Via Curl.EXE

Detects the execution of the "curl" process with "upload" flags. Which might indicate potential data exfiltration

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Fri Jul 03windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Curl.EXE Execution With Custom UserAgent

Detects execution of curl.exe with custom useragent options

WindowsProcess Creation
François HubautSun Jan 23windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Microsoft Workflow Compiler Execution

Detects the execution of Microsoft Workflow Compiler, which may permit the execution of arbitrary unsigned code.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nik Seetharaman+1Wed Jan 16windows
Threat Huntlowtest

Net.EXE Execution

Detects execution of "Net.EXE".

WindowsProcess Creation
Michael Haag+2Wed Jan 16windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

SMB over QUIC Via Net.EXE

Detects the mounting of Windows SMB shares over QUIC, which can be an unexpected event in some enterprise environments.

WindowsProcess Creation
François HubautFri Jul 21windows
Threat Huntlowtest

New Windows Firewall Rule Added Via New-NetFirewallRule Cmdlet

Detects calls to the "New-NetFirewallRule" cmdlet from PowerShell in order to add a new firewall rule with an "Allow" action.

WindowsProcess Creation
François HubautFri May 03windows
Threat Huntlowtest

SC.EXE Query Execution

Detects execution of "sc.exe" to query information about registered services on the system

WindowsProcess Creation
François HubautMon Dec 06windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Potential CommandLine Obfuscation Using Unicode Characters

Detects potential CommandLine obfuscation using unicode characters. Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit.

WindowsProcess Creation
François Hubaut+1Sat Jan 15windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

File or Folder Permissions Modifications

Detects a file or folder's permissions being modified or tampered with.

WindowsProcess Creation
Jakob Weinzettl+2Wed Oct 23windows
Threat Huntlowtest

Process Terminated Via Taskkill

Detects execution of "taskkill.exe" in order to stop a service or a process. Look for suspicious parents executing this command in order to hunt for potential malicious activity. Attackers might leverage this in order to conduct data destruction or data encrypted for impact on the data stores of services like Exchange and SQL Server.

WindowsProcess Creation
François Hubaut+2Sun Dec 26windows
Threat Huntinformationaltest

Suspicious Tasklist Discovery Command

Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network

WindowsProcess Creation
François HubautSat Dec 11windows
Threat Huntlowtest

System Information Discovery Via Wmic.EXE

Detects the use of the WMI command-line (WMIC) utility to identify and display various system information, including OS, CPU, GPU, disk drive names, memory capacity, display resolution, baseboard, BIOS, and GPU driver products/versions.

WindowsProcess Creation
Joseliyo SanchezTue Dec 19windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript

Detects script file execution (.js, .jse, .vba, .vbe, .vbs, .wsf, .wsh) by Wscript/Cscript.

WindowsProcess Creation
Michael HaagWed Jan 16windows
Threat Huntlowtest

Command Executed Via Run Dialog Box - Registry

Detects execution of commands via the run dialog box on Windows by checking values of the "RunMRU" registry key. This technique was seen being abused by threat actors to deceive users into pasting and executing malicious commands, often disguised as CAPTCHA verification steps.

WindowsRegistry Set
Ahmed Farouk+1Fri Nov 01windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Service Binary in User Controlled Folder

Detects the setting of the "ImagePath" value of a service registry key to a path controlled by a non-administrator user such as "\AppData\" or "\ProgramData\". Attackers often use such directories for staging purposes. This rule might also trigger on badly written software, where if an attacker controls an auto starting service, they might achieve persistence or privilege escalation. Note that while ProgramData is a user controlled folder, software might apply strict ACLs which makes them only accessible to admin users. Remove such folders via filters if you experience a lot of noise.

WindowsRegistry Set
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Mon May 02windows