Rule Library

Sigma Rules

794 rules found for "Microsoft"

3,707Total
3,116Detection
451Emerging
137Hunting
Detectionhightest

Bad Opsec Defaults Sacrificial Processes With Improper Arguments

Detects attackers using tooling with bad opsec defaults. E.g. spawning a sacrificial process to inject a capability into the process without taking into account how the process is normally run. One trivial example of this is using rundll32.exe without arguments as a sacrificial process (default in CS, now highlighted by c2lint), running WerFault without arguments (Kraken - credit am0nsec), and other examples.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218.011 · Rundll32
Oleg Kolesnikov invrep_de+3Fri Oct 23windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Suspicious Browser Launch From Document Reader Process

Detects when a browser process or browser tab is launched from an application that handles document files such as Adobe, Microsoft Office, etc. And connects to a web application over http(s), this could indicate a possible phishing attempt.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionT1204.002 · Malicious File
Joseph KamauMon May 27windows
Detectionmediumtest

Copy From Or To Admin Share Or Sysvol Folder

Detects a copy command or a copy utility execution to or from an Admin share or remote

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0008 · Lateral MovementTA0009 · CollectionTA0010 · ExfiltrationT1039 · Data from Network Shared Drive+2
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+4Mon Dec 30windows
Detectionhightest

Potential Data Exfiltration Activity Via CommandLine Tools

Detects the use of various CLI utilities exfiltrating data via web requests

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionT1059.001 · PowerShell
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Aug 02windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Download from Office Domain

Detects suspicious ways to download files from Microsoft domains that are used to store attachments in Emails or OneNote documents

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0011 · Command and ControlTA0042 · Resource DevelopmentT1105 · Ingress Tool TransferT1608 · Stage Capabilities
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Mon Dec 27windows
Detectioncriticaltest

DumpStack.log Defender Evasion

Detects the use of the filename DumpStack.log to evade Microsoft Defender

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense Evasion
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Thu Jan 06windows
Detectionhightest

ETW Logging Tamper In .NET Processes Via CommandLine

Detects changes to environment variables related to ETW logging via the CommandLine. This could indicate potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1562 · Impair Defenses
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+1Sat May 02windows
Detectionhightest

ETW Trace Evasion Activity

Detects command line activity that tries to clear or disable any ETW trace log which could be a sign of logging evasion.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1070 · Indicator RemovalT1562.006 · Indicator Blocking2016-04-002 · CAR 2016-04-002
@neu5ron+3Fri Mar 22windows
Detectionhighstable

Suspicious Eventlog Clearing or Configuration Change Activity

Detects the clearing or configuration tampering of EventLog using utilities such as "wevtutil", "powershell" and "wmic". This technique were seen used by threat actors and ransomware strains in order to evade defenses.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1070.001 · Clear Windows Event LogsT1562.002 · Disable Windows Event Logging2016-04-002 · CAR 2016-04-002
Ecco+4Thu Sep 26windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potentially Suspicious EventLog Recon Activity Using Log Query Utilities

Detects execution of different log query utilities and commands to search and dump the content of specific event logs or look for specific event IDs. This technique is used by threat actors in order to extract sensitive information from events logs such as usernames, IP addresses, hostnames, etc.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0006 · Credential AccessTA0007 · DiscoveryT1552 · Unsecured CredentialsT1087 · Account Discovery
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Fri Sep 09windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Hidden Directory Creation Via NTFS INDEX_ALLOCATION Stream - CLI

Detects command line containing reference to the "::$index_allocation" stream, which can be used as a technique to prevent access to folders or files from tooling such as "explorer.exe" or "powershell.exe"

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1564.004 · NTFS File Attributes
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Mon Oct 09windows
Detectionmediumexperimental

Potentially Suspicious Inline JavaScript Execution via NodeJS Binary

Detects potentially suspicious inline JavaScript execution using Node.js with specific keywords in the command line.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionT1059.007 · JavaScript
Microsoft+1Mon Apr 21windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potentially Suspicious JWT Token Search Via CLI

Detects potentially suspicious search for JWT tokens via CLI by looking for the string "eyJ0eX" or "eyJhbG". JWT tokens are often used for access-tokens across various applications and services like Microsoft 365, Azure, AWS, Google Cloud, and others. Threat actors may search for these tokens to steal them for lateral movement or privilege escalation.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0006 · Credential AccessT1528 · Steal Application Access TokenT1552.001 · Credentials In Files
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Oct 25windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential File Download Via MS-AppInstaller Protocol Handler

Detects usage of the "ms-appinstaller" protocol handler via command line to potentially download arbitrary files via AppInstaller.EXE The downloaded files are temporarly stored in ":\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.DesktopAppInstaller_8wekyb3d8bbwe\AC\INetCache\<RANDOM-8-CHAR-DIRECTORY>"

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0002 · ExecutionT1218 · System Binary Proxy Execution
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Thu Nov 09windows
Detectionhightest

Potentially Suspicious Call To Win32_NTEventlogFile Class

Detects usage of the WMI class "Win32_NTEventlogFile" in a potentially suspicious way (delete, backup, change permissions, etc.) from a PowerShell script

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense Evasion
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Jul 13windows
Detectionmediumtest

Use Short Name Path in Image

Detect use of the Windows 8.3 short name. Which could be used as a method to avoid Image detection

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1564.004 · NTFS File Attributes
François Hubaut+1Sun Aug 07windows
Detectionmediumtest

Use NTFS Short Name in Command Line

Detect use of the Windows 8.3 short name. Which could be used as a method to avoid command-line detection

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1564.004 · NTFS File Attributes
François Hubaut+1Fri Aug 05windows
Detectionmediumtest

Use NTFS Short Name in Image

Detect use of the Windows 8.3 short name. Which could be used as a method to avoid Image based detection

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1564.004 · NTFS File Attributes
François Hubaut+1Sat Aug 06windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Redirection to Local Admin Share

Detects a suspicious output redirection to the local admins share, this technique is often found in malicious scripts or hacktool stagers

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0010 · ExfiltrationT1048 · Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Sun Jan 16windows
Detectionhightest

Script Interpreter Execution From Suspicious Folder

Detects a suspicious script execution in temporary folders or folders accessible by environment variables

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionT1059 · Command and Scripting Interpreter
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Feb 08windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Script Execution From Temp Folder

Detects a suspicious script executions from temporary folder

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionT1059 · Command and Scripting Interpreter
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+2Wed Jul 14windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Windows Service Tampering

Detects the usage of binaries such as 'net', 'sc' or 'powershell' in order to stop, pause, disable or delete critical or important Windows services such as AV, Backup, etc. As seen being used in some ransomware scripts

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0040 · ImpactT1489 · Service StopT1562.001 · Disable or Modify Tools
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+2Thu Sep 01windows
Detectionlowtest

Malicious Windows Script Components File Execution by TAEF Detection

Windows Test Authoring and Execution Framework (TAEF) framework allows you to run automation by executing tests files written on different languages (C, C#, Microsoft COM Scripting interfaces Adversaries may execute malicious code (such as WSC file with VBScript, dll and so on) directly by running te.exe

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218 · System Binary Proxy Execution
Agro oscd.communityTue Oct 13windows
Detectionmediumtest

Malicious PE Execution by Microsoft Visual Studio Debugger

There is an option for a MS VS Just-In-Time Debugger "vsjitdebugger.exe" to launch specified executable and attach a debugger. This option may be used adversaries to execute malicious code by signed verified binary. The debugger is installed alongside with Microsoft Visual Studio package.

WindowsProcess Creation
T1218 · System Binary Proxy ExecutionTA0005 · Defense Evasion
Agro+2Wed Oct 14windows
Detectionmediumtest

Weak or Abused Passwords In CLI

Detects weak passwords or often abused passwords (seen used by threat actors) via the CLI. An example would be a threat actor creating a new user via the net command and providing the password inline

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0002 · Execution
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Wed Sep 14windows
Detectionmediumtest

Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets

Detects the use of various web request commands with commandline tools and Windows PowerShell cmdlets (including aliases) via CommandLine

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionT1059.001 · PowerShell
James Pemberton+4Thu Oct 24windows
Detectionmediumtest

Active Directory Database Snapshot Via ADExplorer

Detects the execution of Sysinternals ADExplorer with the "-snapshot" flag in order to save a local copy of the active directory database. This can be used by attackers to extract data for Bloodhound, usernames for password spraying or use the meta data for social engineering. The snapshot doesn't contain password hashes but there have been cases, where administrators put passwords in the comment field.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0007 · DiscoveryT1087.002 · Domain AccountT1069.002 · Domain GroupsT1482 · Domain Trust Discovery
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Mar 14windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Active Directory Database Snapshot Via ADExplorer

Detects the execution of Sysinternals ADExplorer with the "-snapshot" flag in order to save a local copy of the active directory database to a suspicious directory. This can be used by attackers to extract data for Bloodhound, usernames for password spraying or use the meta data for social engineering. The snapshot doesn't contain password hashes but there have been cases, where administrators put passwords in the comment field.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0007 · DiscoveryT1087.002 · Domain AccountT1069.002 · Domain GroupsT1482 · Domain Trust Discovery
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Mar 14windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Memory Dumping Activity Via LiveKD

Detects execution of LiveKD based on PE metadata or image name

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense Evasion
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon May 15windows
Detectionhightest

Kernel Memory Dump Via LiveKD

Detects execution of LiveKD with the "-m" flag to potentially dump the kernel memory

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense Evasion
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue May 16windows
Detectionmediumtest

Procdump Execution

Detects usage of the SysInternals Procdump utility

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1036 · MasqueradingT1003.001 · LSASS MemoryTA0006 · Credential Access
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 16windows
Detectionhighstable

Potential LSASS Process Dump Via Procdump

Detects potential credential harvesting attempts through LSASS memory dumps using ProcDump. This rule identifies suspicious command-line patterns that combine memory dump flags (-ma, -mm, -mp) with LSASS-related process markers. LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service) contains sensitive authentication data including plaintext passwords, NTLM hashes, and Kerberos tickets in memory. Attackers commonly dump LSASS memory to extract credentials for lateral movement and privilege escalation.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1036 · MasqueradingTA0006 · Credential AccessT1003.001 · LSASS Memory+1
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Oct 30windows
Detectionhightest

PsExec/PAExec Escalation to LOCAL SYSTEM

Detects suspicious commandline flags used by PsExec and PAExec to escalate a command line to LOCAL_SYSTEM rights

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0042 · Resource DevelopmentT1587.001 · Malware
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Nov 23windows
Detectionhightest

Potential PsExec Remote Execution

Detects potential psexec command that initiate execution on a remote systems via common commandline flags used by the utility

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0042 · Resource DevelopmentT1587.001 · Malware
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Feb 28windows
Detectionmediumtest

PsExec Service Execution

Detects launch of the PSEXESVC service, which means that this system was the target of a psexec remote execution

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · Execution
Thomas Patzke+2Mon Jun 12windows
Detectionhightest

PsExec Service Child Process Execution as LOCAL SYSTEM

Detects suspicious launch of the PSEXESVC service on this system and a sub process run as LOCAL_SYSTEM (-s), which means that someone remotely started a command on this system running it with highest privileges and not only the privileges of the login user account (e.g. the administrator account)

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · Execution
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Thu Jul 21windows
Detectionmediumtest

Sysinternals PsService Execution

Detects usage of Sysinternals PsService which can be abused for service reconnaissance and tampering

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0007 · DiscoveryTA0003 · PersistenceT1543.003 · Windows Service
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Jun 16windows
Detectionmediumtest

Sysinternals PsSuspend Execution

Detects usage of Sysinternals PsSuspend which can be abused to suspend critical processes

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0007 · DiscoveryTA0003 · PersistenceT1543.003 · Windows Service
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Mar 23windows
Detectionhightest

Sysinternals PsSuspend Suspicious Execution

Detects suspicious execution of Sysinternals PsSuspend, where the utility is used to suspend critical processes such as AV or EDR to bypass defenses

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1562.001 · Disable or Modify Tools
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Mar 23windows
Detectionhightest

Potential Privilege Escalation To LOCAL SYSTEM

Detects unknown program using commandline flags usually used by tools such as PsExec and PAExec to start programs with SYSTEM Privileges

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0042 · Resource DevelopmentT1587.001 · Malware
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Sat May 22windows
Detectionmediumtest

Sysmon Configuration Update

Detects updates to Sysmon's configuration. Attackers might update or replace the Sysmon configuration with a bare bone one to avoid monitoring without shutting down the service completely

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1562.001 · Disable or Modify Tools
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Mar 09windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Binary Impersonating Sysinternals Tools

Detects binaries that use the same name as legitimate sysinternals tools to evade detection. This rule looks for the execution of binaries that are named similarly to Sysinternals tools. Adversary may rename their malicious tools as legitimate Sysinternals tools to evade detection.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionTA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218 · System Binary Proxy ExecutionT1202 · Indirect Command Execution+1
François Hubaut+1Mon Dec 20windows
Detectionlowtest

Suspicious Execution of Systeminfo

Detects usage of the "systeminfo" command to retrieve information

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0007 · DiscoveryT1082 · System Information Discovery
François HubautSat Jan 01windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious Recursive Takeown

Adversaries can interact with the DACLs using built-in Windows commands takeown which can grant adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense Evasionattack.t1222.001
François HubautSun Jan 30windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potentially Suspicious Command Targeting Teams Sensitive Files

Detects a commandline containing references to the Microsoft Teams database or cookies files from a process other than Teams. The database might contain authentication tokens and other sensitive information about the logged in accounts.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0006 · Credential AccessT1528 · Steal Application Access Token
@serkinvaleryFri Sep 16windows
Detectionmediumtest

New Virtual Smart Card Created Via TpmVscMgr.EXE

Detects execution of "Tpmvscmgr.exe" to create a new virtual smart card.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · Execution
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Jun 15windows
Detectionhightest

Bypass UAC via CMSTP

Detect commandline usage of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (cmstp.exe) to install specially formatted local .INF files

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0005 · Defense EvasionT1548.002 · Bypass User Account ControlT1218.003 · CMSTP
E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections+2Thu Oct 24windows
Detectionhighstable

CMSTP UAC Bypass via COM Object Access

Detects UAC Bypass Attempt Using Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer Autoelevate-capable COM Objects (e.g. UACMe ID of 41, 43, 58 or 65)

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionTA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0004 · Privilege EscalationT1548.002 · Bypass User Account Control+3
Nik Seetharaman+1Wed Jul 31windows