Rule Library

Sigma Rules

3,132 rules found for "sigma"

3,731Total
3,132Detection
457Emerging
139Hunting
Detectioncriticaltest

Mailbox Export to Exchange Webserver

Detects a successful export of an Exchange mailbox to untypical directory or with aspx name suffix which can be used to place a webshell or the needed role assignment for it

Windowsmsexchange-management
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+2Mon Aug 09windows
Detectionhightest

Remove Exported Mailbox from Exchange Webserver

Detects removal of an exported Exchange mailbox which could be to cover tracks from ProxyShell exploit

Windowsmsexchange-management
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Fri Aug 27windows
Detectionhightest

Exchange Set OabVirtualDirectory ExternalUrl Property

Rule to detect an adversary setting OabVirtualDirectory External URL property to a script in Exchange Management log

Windowsmsexchange-management
Jose RodriguezMon Mar 15windows
Detectionmediumtest

MSExchange Transport Agent Installation - Builtin

Detects the Installation of a Exchange Transport Agent

Windowsmsexchange-management
Tobias MichalskiTue Jun 08windows
Detectionhightest

Failed MSExchange Transport Agent Installation

Detects a failed installation of a Exchange Transport Agent

Windowsmsexchange-management
Tobias MichalskiTue Jun 08windows
Detectionlowtest

NTLM Logon

Detects logons using NTLM, which could be caused by a legacy source or attackers

Windowsntlm
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Jun 08windows
Detectionmediumtest

NTLM Brute Force

Detects common NTLM brute force device names

Windowsntlm
Jerry ShockleyWed Feb 02windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Remote Desktop Connection to Non-Domain Host

Detects logons using NTLM to hosts that are potentially not part of the domain.

Windowsntlm
James PembertonFri May 22windows
Detectionmediumtest

OpenSSH Server Listening On Socket

Detects scenarios where an attacker enables the OpenSSH server and server starts to listening on SSH socket.

Windowsopenssh
mdecrevoisierTue Oct 25windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Access Token Abuse

Detects potential token impersonation and theft. Example, when using "DuplicateToken(Ex)" and "ImpersonateLoggedOnUser" with the "LOGON32_LOGON_NEW_CREDENTIALS flag".

Windowssecurity
Michaela Adams+1Sun Nov 06windows
Detectionlowtest

Admin User Remote Logon

Detect remote login by Administrator user (depending on internal pattern).

Windowssecurity
juju4Sun Oct 29windows
Detectioncriticaltest

DiagTrackEoP Default Login Username

Detects the default "UserName" used by the DiagTrackEoP POC

Windowssecurity
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Wed Aug 03windows
Detectionlowstable

A Member Was Added to a Security-Enabled Global Group

Detects activity when a member is added to a security-enabled global group

Windowssecurity
Alexandr Yampolskyi+1Wed Apr 26windows
Detectionlowstable

A Member Was Removed From a Security-Enabled Global Group

Detects activity when a member is removed from a security-enabled global group

Windowssecurity
Alexandr Yampolskyi+1Wed Apr 26windows
Detectionhightest

Successful Overpass the Hash Attempt

Detects successful logon with logon type 9 (NewCredentials) which matches the Overpass the Hash behavior of e.g Mimikatz's sekurlsa::pth module.

Windowssecurity
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+1Mon Feb 12windows
Detectionmediumstable

Pass the Hash Activity 2

Detects the attack technique pass the hash which is used to move laterally inside the network

Windowssecurity
Dave Kennedy+1Fri Jun 14windows
Detectionhightest

RDP Login from Localhost

RDP login with localhost source address may be a tunnelled login

Windowssecurity
Thomas PatzkeMon Jan 28windows
Detectionlowstable

A Security-Enabled Global Group Was Deleted

Detects activity when a security-enabled global group is deleted

Windowssecurity
Alexandr Yampolskyi+1Wed Apr 26windows
Detectionmediumtest

External Remote RDP Logon from Public IP

Detects successful logon from public IP address via RDP. This can indicate a publicly-exposed RDP port.

Windowssecurity
Micah Babinski+1Thu Jan 19windows
Detectionhightest

External Remote SMB Logon from Public IP

Detects successful logon from public IP address via SMB. This can indicate a publicly-exposed SMB port.

Windowssecurity
Micah Babinski+1Thu Jan 19windows
Detectionmediumtest

Failed Logon From Public IP

Detects a failed logon attempt from a public IP. A login from a public IP can indicate a misconfigured firewall or network boundary.

Windowssecurity
NVISOWed May 06windows
Detectionlowtest

Outgoing Logon with New Credentials

Detects logon events that specify new credentials

Windowssecurity
Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems)Wed Apr 06windows
Detectionhightest

Potential Privilege Escalation via Local Kerberos Relay over LDAP

Detects a suspicious local successful logon event where the Logon Package is Kerberos, the remote address is set to localhost, and the target user SID is the built-in local Administrator account. This may indicate an attempt to leverage a Kerberos relay attack variant that can be used to elevate privilege locally from a domain joined limited user to local System privileges.

Windowssecurity
Elastic SecurityWed Apr 27windows
Detectionhightest

RottenPotato Like Attack Pattern

Detects logon events that have characteristics of events generated during an attack with RottenPotato and the like

Windowssecurity
@sbousseaden+1Fri Nov 15windows
Detectionlowstable

Successful Account Login Via WMI

Detects successful logon attempts performed with WMI

Windowssecurity
Thomas PatzkeWed Dec 04windows
Detectionhightest

Windows Filtering Platform Blocked Connection From EDR Agent Binary

Detects a Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) blocked connection event involving common Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. Adversaries may use WFP filters to prevent Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents from reporting security events.

Windowssecurity
@gott_cyberMon Jan 08windows
Detectionmediumtest

Azure AD Health Monitoring Agent Registry Keys Access

This detection uses Windows security events to detect suspicious access attempts to the registry key of Azure AD Health monitoring agent. This detection requires an access control entry (ACE) on the system access control list (SACL) of the following securable object HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Microsoft Online\Reporting\MonitoringAgent.

Windowssecurity
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+2Thu Aug 26windows
Detectionmediumtest

Azure AD Health Service Agents Registry Keys Access

This detection uses Windows security events to detect suspicious access attempts to the registry key values and sub-keys of Azure AD Health service agents (e.g AD FS). Information from AD Health service agents can be used to potentially abuse some of the features provided by those services in the cloud (e.g. Federation). This detection requires an access control entry (ACE) on the system access control list (SACL) of the following securable object: HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ADHealthAgent. Make sure you set the SACL to propagate to its sub-keys.

Windowssecurity
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+2Thu Aug 26windows
Detectionhightest

Powerview Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync AD Extend Right

Backdooring domain object to grant the rights associated with DCSync to a regular user or machine account using Powerview\Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync Extended Right cmdlet, will allow to re-obtain the pwd hashes of any user/computer

Windowssecurity
Samir Bousseaden+4Wed Apr 03windows
Detectionhightest

AD Privileged Users or Groups Reconnaissance

Detect priv users or groups recon based on 4661 eventid and known privileged users or groups SIDs

Windowssecurity
Samir BousseadenWed Apr 03windows
Detectionlowtest

ADCS Certificate Template Configuration Vulnerability

Detects certificate creation with template allowing risk permission subject

Windowssecurity
Orlinum+1Wed Nov 17windows
Detectionhightest

ADCS Certificate Template Configuration Vulnerability with Risky EKU

Detects certificate creation with template allowing risk permission subject and risky EKU

Windowssecurity
Orlinum+1Wed Nov 17windows
Detectionlowtest

Add or Remove Computer from DC

Detects the creation or removal of a computer. Can be used to detect attacks such as DCShadow via the creation of a new SPN.

Windowssecurity
François HubautFri Oct 14windows
Detectionlowtest

Access To ADMIN$ Network Share

Detects access to ADMIN$ network share

Windowssecurity
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Sat Mar 04windows
Detectioncriticaltest

AD Object WriteDAC Access

Detects WRITE_DAC access to a domain object

Windowssecurity
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)Thu Sep 12windows
Detectioncriticaltest

Active Directory Replication from Non Machine Account

Detects potential abuse of Active Directory Replication Service (ADRS) from a non machine account to request credentials.

Windowssecurity
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)Fri Jul 26windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential AD User Enumeration From Non-Machine Account

Detects read access to a domain user from a non-machine account

Windowssecurity
Maxime ThiebautMon Mar 30windows
Detectionhightest

Enabled User Right in AD to Control User Objects

Detects scenario where if a user is assigned the SeEnableDelegationPrivilege right in Active Directory it would allow control of other AD user objects.

Windowssecurity
@neu5ronSun Jul 30windows
Detectionhightest

Active Directory User Backdoors

Detects scenarios where one can control another users or computers account without having to use their credentials.

Windowssecurity
@neu5ronThu Apr 13windows
Detectionhightest

Weak Encryption Enabled and Kerberoast

Detects scenario where weak encryption is enabled for a user profile which could be used for hash/password cracking.

Windowssecurity
@neu5ronSun Jul 30windows
Detectionhightest

Hacktool Ruler

This events that are generated when using the hacktool Ruler by Sensepost

Windowssecurity
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Wed May 31windows
Detectionmediumtest

Remote Task Creation via ATSVC Named Pipe

Detects remote task creation via at.exe or API interacting with ATSVC namedpipe

Windowssecurity
Samir BousseadenWed Apr 03windows
Detectionhightest

Security Eventlog Cleared

One of the Windows Eventlogs has been cleared. e.g. caused by "wevtutil cl" command execution

Windowssecurity
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Jan 10windows
Detectionmediumtest

Processes Accessing the Microphone and Webcam

Potential adversaries accessing the microphone and webcam in an endpoint.

Windowssecurity
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+1Sun Jun 07windows
Detectionhightest

CobaltStrike Service Installations - Security

Detects known malicious service installs that appear in cases in which a Cobalt Strike beacon elevates privileges or lateral movement

Windowssecurity
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Wed May 26windows
Detectioninformationalstable

Failed Code Integrity Checks

Detects code integrity failures such as missing page hashes or corrupted drivers due unauthorized modification. This could be a sign of tampered binaries.

Windowssecurity
Thomas PatzkeTue Dec 03windows
Detectionmediumtest

DCERPC SMB Spoolss Named Pipe

Detects the use of the spoolss named pipe over SMB. This can be used to trigger the authentication via NTLM of any machine that has the spoolservice enabled.

Windowssecurity
OTR (Open Threat Research)Wed Nov 28windows
Detectionhightest

DCOM InternetExplorer.Application Iertutil DLL Hijack - Security

Detects a threat actor creating a file named `iertutil.dll` in the `C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\` directory over the network for a DCOM InternetExplorer DLL Hijack scenario.

Windowssecurity
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+1Mon Oct 12windows