Rule Library

Sigma Rules

1,414 rules found for "Nextron Systems"

3,731Total
3,132Detection
457Emerging
139Hunting
Detectionmediumtest

Query Usage To Exfil Data

Detects usage of "query.exe" a system binary to exfil information such as "sessions" and "processes" for later use

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 01windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Greedy Compression Using Rar.EXE

Detects RAR usage that creates an archive from a suspicious folder, either a system folder or one of the folders often used by attackers for staging purposes

WindowsProcess Creation
X__Junior (Nextron Systems)+1Thu Dec 15windows
Detectionmediumexperimental

RDP Enable or Disable via Win32_TerminalServiceSetting WMI Class

Detects enabling or disabling of Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) using alternate methods such as WMIC or PowerShell. In PowerShell one-liner commands, the "SetAllowTSConnections" method of the "Win32_TerminalServiceSetting" class may be used to enable or disable RDP. In WMIC, the "rdtoggle" alias or "Win32_TerminalServiceSetting" class may be used for the same purpose.

WindowsProcess Creation
Daniel Koifman (KoifSec)+1Sat Nov 15windows
Detectionhightest

Process Memory Dump via RdrLeakDiag.EXE

Detects the use of the Microsoft Windows Resource Leak Diagnostic tool "rdrleakdiag.exe" to dump process memory

WindowsProcess Creation
Cedric MAURUGEON+3Fri Sep 24windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potentially Suspicious Execution Of Regasm/Regsvcs With Uncommon Extension

Detects potentially suspicious execution of the Regasm/Regsvcs utilities with an uncommon extension.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Feb 13windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potentially Suspicious Execution Of Regasm/Regsvcs From Uncommon Location

Detects potentially suspicious execution of the Regasm/Regsvcs utilities from a potentially suspicious location

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Aug 25windows
Detectionhightest

Regedit as Trusted Installer

Detects a regedit started with TrustedInstaller privileges or by ProcessHacker.exe

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Thu May 27windows
Detectionmediumtest

Enumeration for 3rd Party Creds From CLI

Detects processes that query known 3rd party registry keys that holds credentials via commandline

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Jun 20windows
Detectionhighexperimental

Registry Export of Third-Party Credentials

Detects the use of reg.exe to export registry paths associated with third-party credentials. Credential stealers have been known to use this technique to extract sensitive information from the registry.

WindowsProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Thu May 22windows
Detectionhightest

IE ZoneMap Setting Downgraded To MyComputer Zone For HTTP Protocols Via CLI

Detects changes to Internet Explorer's (IE / Windows Internet properties) ZoneMap configuration of the "HTTP" and "HTTPS" protocols to point to the "My Computer" zone. This allows downloaded files from the Internet to be granted the same level of trust as files stored locally.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Sep 05windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Debugger Registration Cmdline

Detects the registration of a debugger for a program that is available in the logon screen (sticky key backdoor).

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+2Fri Sep 06windows
Detectionhightest

Potential Credential Dumping Attempt Using New NetworkProvider - CLI

Detects when an attacker tries to add a new network provider in order to dump clear text credentials, similar to how the NPPSpy tool does it

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Aug 23windows
Detectionhightest

Potential Provisioning Registry Key Abuse For Binary Proxy Execution

Detects potential abuse of the provisioning registry key for indirect command execution through "Provlaunch.exe".

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Aug 08windows
Detectionhightest

Potential PowerShell Execution Policy Tampering - ProcCreation

Detects changes to the PowerShell execution policy registry key in order to bypass signing requirements for script execution from the CommandLine

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Wed Jan 11windows
Detectionmediumtest

Persistence Via TypedPaths - CommandLine

Detects modification addition to the 'TypedPaths' key in the user or admin registry via the commandline. Which might indicate persistence attempt

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 22windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Regsvr32 Commandline Flag Anomaly

Detects a potential command line flag anomaly related to "regsvr32" in which the "/i" flag is used without the "/n" which should be uncommon.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Sat Jul 13windows
Detectionhightest

Potentially Suspicious Regsvr32 HTTP IP Pattern

Detects regsvr32 execution to download and install DLLs located remotely where the address is an IP address.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Jan 11windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potentially Suspicious Regsvr32 HTTP/FTP Pattern

Detects regsvr32 execution to download/install/register new DLLs that are hosted on Web or FTP servers.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Wed May 24windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Regsvr32 Execution From Remote Share

Detects REGSVR32.exe to execute DLL hosted on remote shares

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Oct 31windows
Detectionhightest

Potentially Suspicious Child Process Of Regsvr32

Detects potentially suspicious child processes of "regsvr32.exe".

WindowsProcess Creation
elhoim+2Thu May 05windows
Detectionmediumtest

Regsvr32 Execution From Potential Suspicious Location

Detects execution of regsvr32 where the DLL is located in a potentially suspicious location.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Fri May 26windows
Detectionhightest

Regsvr32 Execution From Highly Suspicious Location

Detects execution of regsvr32 where the DLL is located in a highly suspicious locations

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Fri May 26windows
Detectionhightest

Regsvr32 DLL Execution With Suspicious File Extension

Detects the execution of REGSVR32.exe with DLL files masquerading as other files

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Mon Nov 29windows
Detectionmediumtest

Scripting/CommandLine Process Spawned Regsvr32

Detects various command line and scripting engines/processes such as "PowerShell", "Wscript", "Cmd", etc. spawning a "regsvr32" instance.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Fri May 26windows
Detectionmediumtest

Regsvr32 DLL Execution With Uncommon Extension

Detects a "regsvr32" execution where the DLL doesn't contain a common file extension.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Wed Jul 17windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Persistence Attempt Via Run Keys Using Reg.EXE

Detects suspicious command line reg.exe tool adding key to RUN key in Registry

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Mon Jun 28windows
Detectionhightest

Add SafeBoot Keys Via Reg Utility

Detects execution of "reg.exe" commands with the "add" or "copy" flags on safe boot registry keys. Often used by attacker to allow the ransomware to work in safe mode as some security products do not

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Fri Sep 02windows
Detectionhighexperimental

RunMRU Registry Key Deletion

Detects deletion of the RunMRU registry key, which stores the history of commands executed via the Run dialog. In the clickfix techniques, the phishing lures instruct users to open a run dialog through (Win + R) and execute malicious commands. Adversaries may delete this key to cover their tracks after executing commands.

WindowsProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Thu Sep 25windows
Detectionhightest

SafeBoot Registry Key Deleted Via Reg.EXE

Detects execution of "reg.exe" commands with the "delete" flag on safe boot registry keys. Often used by attacker to prevent safeboot execution of security products

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Mon Aug 08windows
Detectionhightest

Service Registry Key Deleted Via Reg.EXE

Detects execution of "reg.exe" commands with the "delete" flag on services registry key. Often used by attacker to remove AV software services

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 01windows
Detectionmediumtest

Direct Autorun Keys Modification

Detects direct modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry using reg.exe.

WindowsProcess Creation
Victor Sergeev+3Fri Oct 25windows
Detectionhightest

Security Service Disabled Via Reg.EXE

Detects execution of "reg.exe" to disable security services such as Windows Defender.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+2Wed Jul 14windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Suspicious Registry File Imported Via Reg.EXE

Detects the import of '.reg' files from suspicious paths using the 'reg.exe' utility

WindowsProcess Creation
François Hubaut+1Mon Aug 01windows
Detectionhightest

Enable LM Hash Storage - ProcCreation

Detects changes to the "NoLMHash" registry value in order to allow Windows to store LM Hashes. By setting this registry value to "0" (DWORD), Windows will be allowed to store a LAN manager hash of your password in Active Directory and local SAM databases.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Fri Dec 15windows
Detectionhightest

Reg Add Suspicious Paths

Detects when an adversary uses the reg.exe utility to add or modify new keys or subkeys

WindowsProcess Creation
François Hubaut+1Fri Aug 19windows
Detectionhighexperimental

System Restore Registry Modification via CommandLine

Detects system restore registry modification via command line, which can be used by adversaries to disable system restore on the computer.

WindowsProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Wed Mar 11windows
Detectionhightest

Disabled Volume Snapshots

Detects commands that temporarily turn off Volume Snapshots

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Thu Jan 28windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Windows Defender Registry Key Tampering Via Reg.EXE

Detects the usage of "reg.exe" to tamper with different Windows Defender registry keys in order to disable some important features related to protection and detection

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+2Tue Mar 22windows
Detectionmediumtest

Remote Access Tool - AnyDesk Piped Password Via CLI

Detects piping the password to an anydesk instance via CMD and the '--set-password' flag.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Wed Sep 28windows
Detectionmediumtest

Remote Access Tool - AnyDesk Execution With Known Revoked Signing Certificate

Detects the execution of an AnyDesk binary with a version prior to 8.0.8. Prior to version 8.0.8, the Anydesk application used a signing certificate that got compromised by threat actors. Use this rule to detect instances of older versions of Anydesk using the compromised certificate This is recommended in order to avoid attackers leveraging the certificate and signing their binaries to bypass detections.

WindowsProcess Creation
Sai Prashanth Pulisetti+1Thu Feb 08windows
Detectionhightest

Remote Access Tool - Anydesk Execution From Suspicious Folder

An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri May 20windows
Detectionmediumtest

Remote Access Tool - NetSupport Execution From Unusual Location

Detects execution of client32.exe (NetSupport RAT) from an unusual location (outside of 'C:\Program Files')

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Sep 19windows
Detectionmediumtest

Remote Access Tool - RURAT Execution From Unusual Location

Detects execution of Remote Utilities RAT (RURAT) from an unusual location (outside of 'C:\Program Files')

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Sep 19windows
Detectionmediumtest

Remote Access Tool - ScreenConnect Installation Execution

Detects ScreenConnect program starts that establish a remote access to a system.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Thu Feb 11windows
Detectionmediumtest

Remote Access Tool - ScreenConnect Potential Suspicious Remote Command Execution

Detects potentially suspicious child processes launched via the ScreenConnect client service.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Fri Feb 25windows
Detectionmediumtest

Remote Access Tool - Simple Help Execution

An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Fri Feb 23windows
Detectionhightest

Renamed AdFind Execution

Detects the use of a renamed Adfind.exe. AdFind continues to be seen across majority of breaches. It is used to domain trust discovery to plan out subsequent steps in the attack chain.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Sun Aug 21windows
Detectionmediumtest

Renamed AutoHotkey.EXE Execution

Detects execution of a renamed autohotkey.exe binary based on PE metadata fields

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Feb 07windows