Rule Library

Sigma Rules

3,132 rules found for "sigma"

3,731Total
3,132Detection
457Emerging
139Hunting
Detectionhighexperimental

Legitimate Application Writing Files In Uncommon Location

Detects legitimate applications writing any type of file to uncommon or suspicious locations that are not typical for application data storage or execution. Adversaries may leverage legitimate applications (Living off the Land Binaries - LOLBins) to drop or download malicious files to uncommon locations on the system to evade detection by security solutions.

WindowsFile Event
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Wed Dec 10windows
Detectionhightest

Legitimate Application Dropped Script

Detects programs on a Windows system that should not write scripts to disk

WindowsFile Event
François Hubaut+1Sun Aug 21windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious LNK Double Extension File Created

Detects the creation of files with an "LNK" as a second extension. This is sometimes used by malware as a method to abuse the fact that Windows hides the "LNK" extension by default.

WindowsFile Event
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Mon Nov 07windows
Detectionmediumtest

PowerShell Profile Modification

Detects the creation or modification of a powershell profile which could indicate suspicious activity as the profile can be used as a mean of persistence

WindowsFile Event
HieuTT35+1Thu Oct 24windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious PROCEXP152.sys File Created In TMP

Detects the creation of the PROCEXP152.sys file in the application-data local temporary folder. This driver is used by Sysinternals Process Explorer but also by KDU (https://github.com/hfiref0x/KDU) or Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs), which uses KDU.

WindowsFile Event
xknow+1Mon Apr 08windows
Detectionhighexperimental

Suspicious Binaries and Scripts in Public Folder

Detects the creation of a file with a suspicious extension in the public folder, which could indicate potential malicious activity.

WindowsFile Event
The DFIR ReportThu Jan 23windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious File Creation Activity From Fake Recycle.Bin Folder

Detects file write event from/to a fake recycle bin folder that is often used as a staging directory for malware

WindowsFile Event
X__Junior (Nextron Systems)Wed Jul 12windows
Detectionhightest

Potential File Extension Spoofing Using Right-to-Left Override

Detects suspicious filenames that contain a right-to-left override character and a potentially spoofed file extensions.

WindowsFile Event
Jonathan Peters (Nextron Systems)+2Sun Nov 17windows
Detectionmediumtest

Drop Binaries Into Spool Drivers Color Folder

Detects the creation of suspcious binary files inside the "\windows\system32\spool\drivers\color\" as seen in the blog referenced below

WindowsFile Event
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Jul 28windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Startup Folder Persistence

Detects the creation of potentially malicious script and executable files in Windows startup folders, which is a common persistence technique used by threat actors. These files (.ps1, .vbs, .js, .bat, etc.) are automatically executed when a user logs in, making the Startup folder an attractive target for attackers. This technique is frequently observed in malvertising campaigns and malware distribution where attackers attempt to maintain long-term access to compromised systems.

WindowsFile Event
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Wed Aug 10windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Interactive PowerShell as SYSTEM

Detects the creation of files that indicator an interactive use of PowerShell in the SYSTEM user context

WindowsFile Event
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Dec 07windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Scheduled Task Write to System32 Tasks

Detects the creation of tasks from processes executed from suspicious locations

WindowsFile Event
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Nov 16windows
Detectionmediumtest

TeamViewer Remote Session

Detects the creation of log files during a TeamViewer remote session

WindowsFile Event
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Sun Jan 30windows
Detectionmediumtest

VsCode Powershell Profile Modification

Detects the creation or modification of a vscode related powershell profile which could indicate suspicious activity as the profile can be used as a mean of persistence

WindowsFile Event
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Wed Aug 24windows
Detectionmediumexperimental

Potentially Suspicious WDAC Policy File Creation

Detects suspicious Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) policy file creation from abnormal processes that could be abused by attacker to block EDR/AV components while allowing their own malicious code to run on the system.

WindowsFile Event
X__JuniorFri Feb 07windows
Detectionmediumtest

Windows Terminal Profile Settings Modification By Uncommon Process

Detects the creation or modification of the Windows Terminal Profile settings file "settings.json" by an uncommon process.

WindowsFile Event
François Hubaut+1Sat Jul 22windows
Detectionmediumtest

WinSxS Executable File Creation By Non-System Process

Detects the creation of binaries in the WinSxS folder by non-system processes

WindowsFile Event
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu May 11windows
Detectionmediumexperimental

ADExplorer Writing Complete AD Snapshot Into .dat File

Detects the dual use tool ADExplorer writing a complete AD snapshot into a .dat file. This can be used by attackers to extract data for Bloodhound, usernames for password spraying or use the meta data for social engineering. The snapshot doesn't contain password hashes but there have been cases, where administrators put passwords in the comment field.

WindowsFile Event
Arnim Rupp (Nextron Systems)+1Wed Jul 09windows
Detectionhightest

LiveKD Kernel Memory Dump File Created

Detects the creation of a file that has the same name as the default LiveKD kernel memory dump.

WindowsFile Event
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue May 16windows
Detectionmediumtest

LiveKD Driver Creation

Detects the creation of the LiveKD driver, which is used for live kernel debugging

WindowsFile Event
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue May 16windows
Detectionhightest

LiveKD Driver Creation By Uncommon Process

Detects the creation of the LiveKD driver by a process image other than "livekd.exe".

WindowsFile Event
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue May 16windows
Detectionhightest

Process Explorer Driver Creation By Non-Sysinternals Binary

Detects creation of the Process Explorer drivers by processes other than Process Explorer (procexp) itself. Hack tools or malware may use the Process Explorer driver to elevate privileges, drops it to disk for a few moments, runs a service using that driver and removes it afterwards.

WindowsFile Event
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri May 05windows
Detectionmediumtest

Process Monitor Driver Creation By Non-Sysinternals Binary

Detects creation of the Process Monitor driver by processes other than Process Monitor (procmon) itself.

WindowsFile Event
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Fri May 05windows
Detectionlowtest

PsExec Service File Creation

Detects default PsExec service filename which indicates PsExec service installation and execution

WindowsFile Event
Thomas PatzkeMon Jun 12windows
Detectionhightest

PSEXEC Remote Execution File Artefact

Detects creation of the PSEXEC key file. Which is created anytime a PsExec command is executed. It gets written to the file system and will be recorded in the USN Journal on the target system

WindowsFile Event
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Sat Jan 21windows
Detectionhightest

Potential Privilege Escalation Attempt Via .Exe.Local Technique

Detects potential privilege escalation attempt via the creation of the "*.Exe.Local" folder inside the "System32" directory in order to sideload "comctl32.dll"

WindowsFile Event
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Fri Dec 16windows
Detectionhightest

LSASS Process Memory Dump Creation Via Taskmgr.EXE

Detects the creation of an "lsass.dmp" file by the taskmgr process. This indicates a manual dumping of the LSASS.exe process memory using Windows Task Manager.

WindowsFile Event
Swachchhanda Shrawan PoudelThu Oct 19windows
Detectionhightest

Hijack Legit RDP Session to Move Laterally

Detects the usage of tsclient share to place a backdoor on the RDP source machine's startup folder

WindowsFile Event
Samir BousseadenThu Feb 21windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using Consent and Comctl32 - File

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using consent.exe and comctl32.dll (UACMe 22)

WindowsFile Event
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 23windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using .NET Code Profiler on MMC

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using .NET Code Profiler and mmc.exe DLL hijacking (UACMe 39)

WindowsFile Event
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 30windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using EventVwr

Detects the pattern of a UAC bypass using Windows Event Viewer

WindowsFile Event
Antonio Cocomazzi+1Wed Apr 27windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using IDiagnostic Profile - File

Detects the creation of a file by "dllhost.exe" in System32 directory part of "IDiagnosticProfileUAC" UAC bypass technique

WindowsFile Event
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Sun Jul 03windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using IEInstal - File

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using IEInstal.exe (UACMe 64)

WindowsFile Event
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 30windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using MSConfig Token Modification - File

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using a msconfig GUI hack (UACMe 55)

WindowsFile Event
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 30windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using NTFS Reparse Point - File

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using NTFS reparse point and wusa.exe DLL hijacking (UACMe 36)

WindowsFile Event
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 30windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Abusing Winsat Path Parsing - File

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using a path parsing issue in winsat.exe (UACMe 52)

WindowsFile Event
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 30windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using Windows Media Player - File

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using Windows Media Player osksupport.dll (UACMe 32)

WindowsFile Event
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 23windows
Detectionmediumtest

VHD Image Download Via Browser

Detects creation of ".vhd"/".vhdx" files by browser processes. Malware can use mountable Virtual Hard Disk ".vhd" files to encapsulate payloads and evade security controls.

WindowsFile Event
François Hubaut+2Mon Oct 25windows
Detectionmediumtest

Visual Studio Code Tunnel Remote File Creation

Detects the creation of file by the "node.exe" process in the ".vscode-server" directory. Could be a sign of remote file creation via VsCode tunnel feature

WindowsFile Event
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Wed Oct 25windows
Detectionhightest

Renamed VsCode Code Tunnel Execution - File Indicator

Detects the creation of a file with the name "code_tunnel.json" which indicate execution and usage of VsCode tunneling utility by an "Image" or "Process" other than VsCode.

WindowsFile Event
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Wed Oct 25windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Webshell Creation On Static Website

Detects the creation of files with certain extensions on a static web site. This can be indicative of potential uploads of a web shell.

WindowsFile Event
Beyu Denis+3Tue Oct 22windows
Detectionmediumtest

Creation of WerFault.exe/Wer.dll in Unusual Folder

Detects the creation of a file named "WerFault.exe" or "wer.dll" in an uncommon folder, which could be a sign of WerFault DLL hijacking.

WindowsFile Event
François HubautMon May 09windows
Detectionhighexperimental

WinRAR Creating Files in Startup Locations

Detects WinRAR creating files in Windows startup locations, which may indicate an attempt to establish persistence by adding malicious files to the Startup folder. This kind of behaviour has been associated with exploitation of WinRAR path traversal vulnerability CVE-2025-6218 or CVE-2025-8088.

WindowsFile Event
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Wed Jul 16windows
Detectionmediumtest

AWL Bypass with Winrm.vbs and Malicious WsmPty.xsl/WsmTxt.xsl - File

Detects execution of attacker-controlled WsmPty.xsl or WsmTxt.xsl via winrm.vbs and copied cscript.exe (can be renamed)

WindowsFile Event
Julia Fomina+1Tue Oct 06windows
Detectioncriticaltest

Wmiexec Default Output File

Detects the creation of the default output filename used by the wmiexec tool

WindowsFile Event
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Jun 02windows
Detectioncriticaltest

Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack - File

Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the network and loading it for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario.

WindowsFile Event
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+1Mon Oct 12windows
Detectionhightest

WMI Persistence - Script Event Consumer File Write

Detects file writes of WMI script event consumer

WindowsFile Event
Thomas PatzkeWed Mar 07windows
Detectionhightest

UEFI Persistence Via Wpbbin - FileCreation

Detects creation of a file named "wpbbin" in the "%systemroot%\system32\" directory. Which could be indicative of UEFI based persistence method

WindowsFile Event
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Jul 18windows