Rule Library

Sigma Rules

3,116 rules found

3,707Total
3,116Detection
451Emerging
137Hunting
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Rundll32 Activity Invoking Sys File

Detects suspicious process related to rundll32 based on command line that includes a *.sys file as seen being used by UNC2452

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218.011 · Rundll32
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Mar 05windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potentially Suspicious Rundll32.EXE Execution of UDL File

Detects the execution of rundll32.exe with the oledb32.dll library to open a UDL file. Threat actors can abuse this technique as a phishing vector to capture authentication credentials or other sensitive data.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0002 · ExecutionTA0011 · Command and ControlT1218.011 · Rundll32+1
kostastsaleFri Aug 16windows
Detectionhightest

Rundll32 UNC Path Execution

Detects rundll32 execution where the DLL is located on a remote location (share)

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0002 · ExecutionTA0008 · Lateral MovementT1021.002 · SMB/Windows Admin Shares+1
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Wed Aug 10windows
Detectionmediumtest

Rundll32 Execution With Uncommon DLL Extension

Detects the execution of rundll32 with a command line that doesn't contain a common extension

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218.011 · Rundll32
Tim Shelton+2Thu Jan 13windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious Workstation Locking via Rundll32

Detects a suspicious call to the user32.dll function that locks the user workstation

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense Evasion
François HubautSat Jun 04windows
Detectionmediumtest

WebDav Client Execution Via Rundll32.EXE

Detects "svchost.exe" spawning "rundll32.exe" with command arguments like "C:\windows\system32\davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie". This could be an indicator of exfiltration or use of WebDav to launch code (hosted on a WebDav server).

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0010 · ExfiltrationT1048.003 · Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+1Sat May 02windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious WebDav Client Execution Via Rundll32.EXE

Detects "svchost.exe" spawning "rundll32.exe" with command arguments like C:\windows\system32\davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie. This could be an indicator of exfiltration or use of WebDav to launch code (hosted on WebDav Server) or potentially a sign of exploitation of CVE-2023-23397

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0010 · ExfiltrationT1048.003 · Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocolcve.2023-23397
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Thu Mar 16windows
Detectionhightest

Rundll32 Execution Without Parameters

Detects rundll32 execution without parameters as observed when running Metasploit windows/smb/psexec exploit module

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0008 · Lateral MovementT1021.002 · SMB/Windows Admin SharesT1570 · Lateral Tool TransferTA0002 · Execution+1
Bartlomiej Czyz+1Sun Jan 31windows
Detectionlowtest

Run Once Task Execution as Configured in Registry

This rule detects the execution of Run Once task as configured in the registry

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0003 · PersistenceTA0005 · Defense EvasionT1112 · Modify Registry
Avneet Singh+2Sun Oct 18windows
Detectionhightest

Possible Privilege Escalation via Weak Service Permissions

Detection of sc.exe utility spawning by user with Medium integrity level to change service ImagePath or FailureCommand

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0003 · PersistenceTA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0004 · Privilege EscalationT1574.011 · Services Registry Permissions Weakness
Teymur KheirkhabarovSat Oct 26windows
Detectionlowtest

New Service Creation Using Sc.EXE

Detects the creation of a new service using the "sc.exe" utility.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0003 · PersistenceTA0004 · Privilege EscalationT1543.003 · Windows Service
Timur Zinniatullin+2Mon Feb 20windows
Detectionmediumtest

Service StartupType Change Via Sc.EXE

Detect the use of "sc.exe" to change the startup type of a service to "disabled" or "demand"

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionTA0005 · Defense EvasionT1562.001 · Disable or Modify Tools
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 01windows
Detectionmediumtest

New Kernel Driver Via SC.EXE

Detects creation of a new service (kernel driver) with the type "kernel"

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0003 · PersistenceTA0004 · Privilege EscalationT1543.003 · Windows Service
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Jul 14windows
Detectionlowtest

Interesting Service Enumeration Via Sc.EXE

Detects the enumeration and query of interesting and in some cases sensitive services on the system via "sc.exe". Attackers often try to enumerate the services currently running on a system in order to find different attack vectors.

WindowsProcess Creation
T1003 · OS Credential DumpingTA0006 · Credential Access
Swachchhanda Shrawan PoudelMon Feb 12windows
Detectionhightest

Allow Service Access Using Security Descriptor Tampering Via Sc.EXE

Detects suspicious DACL modifications to allow access to a service from a suspicious trustee. This can be used to override access restrictions set by previous ACLs.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0003 · PersistenceT1543.003 · Windows Service
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Feb 28windows
Detectionhightest

Deny Service Access Using Security Descriptor Tampering Via Sc.EXE

Detects suspicious DACL modifications to deny access to a service that affects critical trustees. This can be used to hide services or make them unstoppable.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0003 · PersistenceT1543.003 · Windows Service
Jonhnathan Ribeiro+1Fri Oct 16windows
Detectionhightest

Service DACL Abuse To Hide Services Via Sc.EXE

Detects usage of the "sc.exe" utility adding a new service with special permission seen used by threat actors which makes the service hidden and unremovable.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0003 · PersistenceTA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0004 · Privilege EscalationT1574.011 · Services Registry Permissions Weakness
Andreas HunkelerMon Dec 20windows
Detectionmediumtest

Service Security Descriptor Tampering Via Sc.EXE

Detection of sc.exe utility adding a new service with special permission which hides that service.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0003 · PersistenceTA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0004 · Privilege EscalationT1574.011 · Services Registry Permissions Weakness
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Feb 28windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Service Path Modification

Detects service path modification via the "sc" binary to a suspicious command or path

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0003 · PersistenceTA0004 · Privilege EscalationT1543.003 · Windows Service
Victor Sergeev+2Mon Oct 21windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Persistence Attempt Via Existing Service Tampering

Detects the modification of an existing service in order to execute an arbitrary payload when the service is started or killed as a potential method for persistence.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0003 · PersistenceT1543.003 · Windows Service+1
SreemanTue Sep 29windows
Detectionlowtest

Stop Windows Service Via Sc.EXE

Detects the stopping of a Windows service via the "sc.exe" utility

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0040 · ImpactT1489 · Service Stop
Jakob Weinzettl+2Sun Mar 05windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Schtasks Execution AppData Folder

Detects the creation of a schtask that executes a file from C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0002 · ExecutionTA0003 · PersistenceT1053.005 · Scheduled Task+1
Martin Mueller+1Tue Mar 15windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Modification Of Scheduled Tasks

Detects when an attacker tries to modify an already existing scheduled tasks to run from a suspicious location Attackers can create a simple looking task in order to avoid detection on creation as it's often the most focused on Instead they modify the task after creation to include their malicious payload

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0003 · PersistenceTA0002 · ExecutionT1053.005 · Scheduled Task
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Jul 28windows
Detectionlowtest

Scheduled Task Creation Via Schtasks.EXE

Detects the creation of scheduled tasks by user accounts via the "schtasks" utility.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionTA0003 · PersistenceTA0004 · Privilege EscalationT1053.005 · Scheduled Task+3
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Wed Jan 16windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation Involving Temp Folder

Detects the creation of scheduled tasks that involves a temporary folder and runs only once

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0002 · ExecutionTA0003 · PersistenceT1053.005 · Scheduled Task
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Thu Mar 11windows
Detectionmediumexperimental

Scheduled Task Creation with Curl and PowerShell Execution Combo

Detects the creation of a scheduled task using schtasks.exe, potentially in combination with curl for downloading payloads and PowerShell for executing them. This facilitates executing malicious payloads or connecting with C&C server persistently without dropping the malware sample on the host.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0002 · ExecutionTA0003 · PersistenceT1053.005 · Scheduled Task+4
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Wed Feb 05windows
Detectionhightest

Delete Important Scheduled Task

Detects when adversaries stop services or processes by deleting their respective scheduled tasks in order to conduct data destructive activities

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0040 · ImpactT1489 · Service Stop
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Fri Sep 09windows
Detectionhightest

Delete All Scheduled Tasks

Detects the usage of schtasks with the delete flag and the asterisk symbol to delete all tasks from the schedule of the local computer, including tasks scheduled by other users.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0040 · ImpactT1489 · Service Stop
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Fri Sep 09windows
Detectionhightest

Disable Important Scheduled Task

Detects when adversaries stop services or processes by disabling their respective scheduled tasks in order to conduct data destructive activities

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0040 · ImpactT1489 · Service Stop
François Hubaut+2Sun Dec 26windows
Detectionmediumtest

Schedule Task Creation From Env Variable Or Potentially Suspicious Path Via Schtasks.EXE

Detects Schtask creations that point to a suspicious folder or an environment variable often used by malware

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0003 · PersistenceTA0002 · ExecutionT1053.005 · Scheduled Task
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Mon Feb 21windows
Detectionhightest

Schtasks From Suspicious Folders

Detects scheduled task creations that have suspicious action command and folder combinations

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0003 · PersistenceTA0002 · ExecutionT1053.005 · Scheduled Task
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Apr 15windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious Scheduled Task Name As GUID

Detects creation of a scheduled task with a GUID like name

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0003 · PersistenceTA0002 · ExecutionT1053.005 · Scheduled Task
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Oct 31windows
Detectionhightest

Uncommon One Time Only Scheduled Task At 00:00

Detects scheduled task creation events that include suspicious actions, and is run once at 00:00

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionTA0003 · PersistenceTA0004 · Privilege EscalationT1053.005 · Scheduled Task
Martin MuellerFri Jul 15windows
Detectionhighexperimental

Potential SSH Tunnel Persistence Install Using A Scheduled Task

Detects the creation of new scheduled tasks via commandline, using Schtasks.exe. This rule detects tasks creating that call OpenSSH, which may indicate the creation of reverse SSH tunnel to the attacker's server.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0003 · PersistenceTA0002 · ExecutionT1053.005 · Scheduled Task+1
Rory DuncanMon Jul 14windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Persistence Via Microsoft Compatibility Appraiser

Detects manual execution of the "Microsoft Compatibility Appraiser" task via schtasks. In order to trigger persistence stored in the "\AppCompatFlags\TelemetryController" registry key.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0002 · ExecutionTA0003 · PersistenceT1053.005 · Scheduled Task
SreemanTue Sep 29windows
Detectionhightest

Potential Persistence Via Powershell Search Order Hijacking - Task

Detects suspicious powershell execution via a schedule task where the command ends with an suspicious flags to hide the powershell instance instead of executeing scripts or commands. This could be a sign of persistence via PowerShell "Get-Variable" technique as seen being used in Colibri Loader

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0002 · ExecutionTA0003 · PersistenceT1053.005 · Scheduled Task+1
Martin Mueller+1Fri Apr 08windows
Detectionmediumtest

Scheduled Task Executing Payload from Registry

Detects the creation of a schtasks that potentially executes a payload stored in the Windows Registry using PowerShell.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0002 · ExecutionTA0003 · PersistenceT1053.005 · Scheduled Task+1
X__Junior (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Jul 18windows
Detectionhightest

Scheduled Task Executing Encoded Payload from Registry

Detects the creation of a schtask that potentially executes a base64 encoded payload stored in the Windows Registry using PowerShell.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0002 · ExecutionTA0003 · PersistenceT1053.005 · Scheduled Task+1
Martin Mueller+3Sat Feb 12windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Schtasks Schedule Types

Detects scheduled task creations or modification on a suspicious schedule type

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0003 · PersistenceTA0002 · ExecutionT1053.005 · Scheduled Task
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Fri Sep 09windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious Schtasks Schedule Type With High Privileges

Detects scheduled task creations or modification to be run with high privileges on a suspicious schedule type

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0003 · PersistenceTA0002 · ExecutionT1053.005 · Scheduled Task
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Wed Aug 31windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation via Masqueraded XML File

Detects the creation of a scheduled task using the "-XML" flag with a file without the '.xml' extension. This behavior could be indicative of potential defense evasion attempt during persistence

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0002 · ExecutionTA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0003 · Persistence+2
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel+1Thu Apr 20windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Command Patterns In Scheduled Task Creation

Detects scheduled task creation using "schtasks" that contain potentially suspicious or uncommon commands

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0003 · PersistenceTA0002 · ExecutionT1053.005 · Scheduled Task
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Wed Feb 23windows
Detectionhightest

Schtasks Creation Or Modification With SYSTEM Privileges

Detects the creation or update of a scheduled task to run with "NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM" privileges

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0002 · ExecutionTA0003 · PersistenceT1053.005 · Scheduled Task
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Jul 28windows
Detectionhighexperimental

Scheduled Task Creation Masquerading as System Processes

Detects the creation of scheduled tasks that involve system processes, which may indicate malicious actors masquerading as or abusing these processes to execute payloads or maintain persistence.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0002 · ExecutionTA0003 · PersistenceT1053.005 · Scheduled Task+3
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Wed Feb 05windows
Detectionhightest

Script Event Consumer Spawning Process

Detects a suspicious child process of Script Event Consumer (scrcons.exe).

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionT1047 · Windows Management Instrumentation
Sittikorn SMon Jun 21windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Shim Database Persistence via Sdbinst.EXE

Detects installation of a new shim using sdbinst.exe. Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0003 · PersistenceTA0004 · Privilege EscalationT1546.011 · Application Shimming
Markus NeisWed Jan 16windows
Detectionmediumtest

Uncommon Extension Shim Database Installation Via Sdbinst.EXE

Detects installation of a potentially suspicious new shim with an uncommon extension using sdbinst.exe. Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0003 · PersistenceTA0004 · Privilege EscalationT1546.011 · Application Shimming
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Aug 01windows
Detectionmediumtest

Sdclt Child Processes

A General detection for sdclt spawning new processes. This could be an indicator of sdclt being used for bypass UAC techniques.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0004 · Privilege EscalationT1548.002 · Bypass User Account Control
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+1Sat May 02windows