Rule Library

Sigma Rules

2,839 rules found

3,731Total
3,132Detection
457Emerging
139Hunting
Threat Huntmediumtest

WebDAV Temporary Local File Creation

Detects the creation of WebDAV temporary files with potentially suspicious extensions

WindowsFile Event
Micah BabinskiMon Aug 21windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Non-DLL Extension File Renamed With DLL Extension

Detects rename operations of files with non-DLL extensions to files with a DLL extension. This is often performed by malware in order to avoid initial detections based on extensions.

WindowsFile Rename
François HubautSat Feb 19windows
Threat Huntlowtest

Amsi.DLL Load By Uncommon Process

Detects loading of Amsi.dll by uncommon processes

WindowsImage Load (DLL)
François HubautSun Mar 12windows
Threat Huntlowexperimental

BITS Client BitsProxy DLL Loaded By Uncommon Process

Detects an uncommon process loading the "BitsProxy.dll". This DLL is used when the BITS COM instance or API is used. This detection can be used to hunt for uncommon processes loading this DLL in your environment. Which may indicate potential suspicious activity occurring.

WindowsImage Load (DLL)
UnicornOfHuntWed Jun 04windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Dbghelp/Dbgcore DLL Loaded By Uncommon/Suspicious Process

Detects the load of dbghelp/dbgcore DLL by a potentially uncommon or potentially suspicious process. The Dbghelp and Dbgcore DLLs export functions that allow for the dump of process memory. Tools like ProcessHacker, Task Manager and some attacker tradecraft use the MiniDumpWriteDump API found in dbghelp.dll or dbgcore.dll. As an example, SilentTrynity C2 Framework has a module that leverages this API to dump the contents of Lsass.exe and transfer it over the network back to the attacker's machine. Keep in mind that many legitimate Windows processes and services might load the aforementioned DLLs for debugging or other related purposes. Investigate the CommandLine and the Image location of the process loading the DLL.

WindowsImage Load (DLL)
Perez Diego+2Sun Oct 27windows
Threat Huntlowtest

System Drawing DLL Load

Detects processes loading "System.Drawing.ni.dll". This could be an indicator of potential Screen Capture.

WindowsImage Load (DLL)
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+1Sat May 02windows
Threat Huntlowtest

Task Scheduler DLL Loaded By Application Located In Potentially Suspicious Location

Detects the loading of the "taskschd.dll" module from a process that located in a potentially suspicious or uncommon directory. The loading of this DLL might indicate that the application have the capability to create a scheduled task via the "Schedule.Service" COM object. Investigation of the loading application and its behavior is required to determining if its malicious.

WindowsImage Load (DLL)
Swachchhanda Shrawan PoudelMon Sep 02windows
Threat Huntlowtest

Microsoft Excel Add-In Loaded

Detects Microsoft Excel loading an Add-In (.xll) file

WindowsImage Load (DLL)
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Fri May 12windows
Threat Huntlowtest

Microsoft Word Add-In Loaded

Detects Microsoft Word loading an Add-In (.wll) file which can be used by threat actors for initial access or persistence.

WindowsImage Load (DLL)
Steffen Rogge (dr0pd34d)Wed Jul 10windows
Threat Huntmediumexperimental

WerFaultSecure Loading DbgCore or DbgHelp - EDR-Freeze

Detects the loading of dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll by WerFaultSecure.exe, which has been observed in EDR-Freeze attacks to suspend processes and evade detection. However, this behavior has also been observed during normal software installations, so further investigation is required to confirm malicious activity. When threat hunting, look for this activity in conjunction with other suspicious processes starting, network connections, or file modifications that occur shortly after the DLL load. Pay special attention to timing - if other malicious activities occur during or immediately after this library loading, it may indicate EDR evasion attempts. Also correlate with any EDR/AV process suspension events or gaps in security monitoring during the timeframe.

WindowsImage Load (DLL)
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Thu Nov 27windows
Threat Huntlowtest

WMI Module Loaded By Uncommon Process

Detects WMI modules being loaded by an uncommon process

WindowsImage Load (DLL)
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)Sat Aug 10windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Dfsvc.EXE Network Connection To Non-Local IPs

Detects network connections from "dfsvc.exe" used to handled ClickOnce applications to non-local IPs

WindowsNetwork Connection
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Jun 12windows
Threat Hunthightest

Dfsvc.EXE Initiated Network Connection Over Uncommon Port

Detects an initiated network connection over uncommon ports from "dfsvc.exe". A utility used to handled ClickOnce applications.

WindowsNetwork Connection
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Jun 12windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Dllhost.EXE Initiated Network Connection To Non-Local IP Address

Detects Dllhost.EXE initiating a network connection to a non-local IP address. Aside from Microsoft own IP range that needs to be excluded. Network communication from Dllhost will depend entirely on the hosted DLL. An initial baseline is recommended before deployment.

WindowsNetwork Connection
bartblazeMon Jul 13windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

HH.EXE Initiated HTTP Network Connection

Detects a network connection initiated by the "hh.exe" process to HTTP destination ports, which could indicate the execution/download of remotely hosted .chm files.

WindowsNetwork Connection
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Wed Oct 05windows
Threat Huntlowtest

Msiexec.EXE Initiated Network Connection Over HTTP

Detects a network connection initiated by an "Msiexec.exe" process over port 80 or 443. Adversaries might abuse "msiexec.exe" to install and execute remotely hosted packages. Use this rule to hunt for potentially anomalous or suspicious communications.

WindowsNetwork Connection
François HubautSun Jan 16windows
Threat Huntlowtest

Network Connection Initiated By PowerShell Process

Detects a network connection that was initiated from a PowerShell process. Often times malicious powershell scripts download additional payloads or communicate back to command and control channels via uncommon ports or IPs. Use this rule as a basis for hunting for anomalies.

WindowsNetwork Connection
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Mon Mar 13windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Potentially Suspicious Azure Front Door Connection

Detects connections with Azure Front Door (known legitimate service that can be leveraged for C2) that fall outside of known benign behavioral baseline (not using common apps or common azurefd.net endpoints)

WindowsNetwork Connection
Isaac DunhamThu Nov 07windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Network Connection Initiated From Users\Public Folder

Detects a network connection initiated from a process located in the "C:\Users\Public" folder. Attacker are known to drop their malicious payloads and malware in this directory as its writable by everyone. Use this rule to hunt for potential suspicious or uncommon activity in your environement.

WindowsNetwork Connection
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri May 31windows
Threat Huntlowtest

PsExec Default Named Pipe

Detects PsExec service default pipe creation

WindowsNamed Pipe Created
Thomas PatzkeMon Jun 12windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Uncommon PowerShell Hosts

Detects alternate PowerShell hosts potentially bypassing detections looking for powershell.exe

WindowsPowerShell Classic
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)Sun Aug 11windows
Threat Huntlowtest

bXOR Operator Usage In PowerShell Command Line - PowerShell Classic

Detects powershell execution with that make use of to the bxor (Bitwise XOR). Attackers might use as an alternative obfuscation method to Base64 encoded commands. Investigate the CommandLine and process tree to determine if the activity is malicious.

WindowsPowerShell Classic
Teymur Kheirkhabarov+1Mon Jun 29windows
Threat Huntlowtest

Local Firewall Rules Enumeration Via NetFirewallRule Cmdlet

Detects execution of "Get-NetFirewallRule" or "Show-NetFirewallRule" to enumerate the local firewall rules on a host.

WindowsPowerShell Module
Christopher Peacock+1Thu Jul 13windows
Threat Huntlowtest

Compress-Archive Cmdlet Execution

Detects PowerShell scripts that make use of the "Compress-Archive" cmdlet in order to compress folders and files. An adversary might compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network.

WindowsPowerShell Script
Timur Zinniatullin+1Mon Oct 21windows
Threat Huntmediumexperimental

Mail Forwarding/Redirecting Activity Via ExchangePowerShell Cmdlet

Detects email forwarding or redirecting activity via ExchangePowerShell Cmdlet

WindowsPowerShell Script
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Sun Mar 01windows
Threat Huntmediumexperimental

Inbox Rules Creation Or Update Activity Via ExchangePowerShell Cmdlet

Detects inbox rule creation or update via ExchangePowerShell cmdlet, a technique commonly observed in Business Email Compromise (BEC) attacks to hide emails. The usage of inbox rules can be a sign of a compromised mailbox, where an attacker is attempting to evade detections by suppressing or redirecting incoming emails. Analysts should review these rules in context, validate whether they reflect normal user behavior, and correlate with other indicators such as unusual login activity or recent mailbox rule modifications.

WindowsPowerShell Script
Marco Pedrinazzi (InTheCyber)Tue Feb 10windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Windows Mail App Mailbox Access Via PowerShell Script

Detects PowerShell scripts that try to access the default Windows MailApp MailBox. This indicates manipulation of or access to the stored emails of a user. E.g. this could be used by an attacker to exfiltrate or delete the content of the emails.

WindowsPowerShell Script
François HubautSat Jul 08windows
Threat Huntlowtest

New Windows Firewall Rule Added Via New-NetFirewallRule Cmdlet - ScriptBlock

Detects when a powershell script contains calls to the "New-NetFirewallRule" cmdlet in order to add a new firewall rule with an "Allow" action.

WindowsPowerShell Script
François HubautFri May 10windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

SMB over QUIC Via PowerShell Script

Detects the mounting of Windows SMB shares over QUIC, which can be an unexpected event in some enterprise environments

WindowsPowerShell Script
François HubautFri Jul 21windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Potential Registry Reconnaissance Via PowerShell Script

Detects PowerShell scripts with potential registry reconnaissance capabilities. Adversaries may interact with the Windows registry to gather information about the system credentials, configuration, and installed software.

WindowsPowerShell Script
François HubautSun Jul 02windows
Threat Huntlowtest

Use Of Remove-Item to Delete File - ScriptBlock

PowerShell Remove-Item with -Path to delete a file or a folder with "-Recurse"

WindowsPowerShell Script
François HubautSat Jan 15windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Potential Data Exfiltration Over SMTP Via Send-MailMessage Cmdlet

Detects the execution of a PowerShell script with a call to the "Send-MailMessage" cmdlet along with the "-Attachments" flag. This could be a potential sign of data exfiltration via Email. Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.

WindowsPowerShell Script
François HubautMon Sep 26windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Powershell Token Obfuscation - Powershell

Detects TOKEN OBFUSCATION technique from Invoke-Obfuscation in Powershell scripts. Use this rule as a threat-hunting baseline to find obfuscated scripts in your environment. Once tested and tuned, consider deploying a production detection rule based on this hunting rule.

WindowsPowerShell Script
François HubautTue Dec 27windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

WinAPI Library Calls Via PowerShell Scripts

Detects calls to WinAPI libraries from PowerShell scripts. Attackers can often leverage these APIs to avoid detection based on typical PowerShell function calls. Use this rule as a basis to hunt for interesting scripts.

WindowsPowerShell Script
Nikita Nazarov+2Fri Jul 21windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

WinAPI Function Calls Via PowerShell Scripts

Detects calls to WinAPI functions from PowerShell scripts. Attackers can often leverage these APIs to avoid detection based on typical PowerShell function calls. Use this rule as a basis to hunt for interesting scripts.

WindowsPowerShell Script
Nikita Nazarov+2Fri Jul 21windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Potential Credential Dumping Attempt Via PowerShell

Detects a PowerShell process requesting access to "lsass.exe", which can be indicative of potential credential dumping attempts

WindowsProcess Access
oscd.community+1Tue Oct 06windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

LSASS Access From Program In Potentially Suspicious Folder

Detects process access to LSASS memory with suspicious access flags and from a potentially suspicious folder

WindowsProcess Access
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Sat Nov 27windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Uncommon GrantedAccess Flags On LSASS

Detects process access to LSASS memory with uncommon access flags 0x410 and 0x01410

WindowsProcess Access
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Sun Mar 13windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Potential Shellcode Injection

Detects potential shellcode injection as seen used by tools such as Metasploit's migrate and Empire's psinject.

WindowsProcess Access
Bhabesh RajFri Mar 11windows
Threat Huntlowtest

Password Protected Compressed File Extraction Via 7Zip

Detects usage of 7zip utilities (7z.exe, 7za.exe and 7zr.exe) to extract password protected zip files.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Fri Mar 10windows
Threat Huntlowtest

Set Files as System Files Using Attrib.EXE

Detects the execution of "attrib" with the "+s" flag to mark files as system files

WindowsProcess Creation
François HubautFri Feb 04windows
Threat Huntinformationaltest

Potential BOINC Software Execution (UC-Berkeley Signature)

Detects the use of software that is related to the University of California, Berkeley via metadata information. This indicates it may be related to BOINC software and can be used maliciously if unauthorized.

WindowsProcess Creation
Matt Anderson (Huntress)Tue Jul 23windows
Threat Huntlowtest

CMD Shell Output Redirect

Detects the use of the redirection character ">" to redirect information on the command line. This technique is sometimes used by malicious actors in order to redirect the output of reconnaissance commands such as "hostname" and "dir" to files for future exfiltration.

WindowsProcess Creation
François HubautSat Jan 22windows
Threat Huntlowtest

Potential File Override/Append Via SET Command

Detects the use of the "SET" internal command of Cmd.EXE with the /p flag followed directly by an "=" sign. Attackers used this technique along with an append redirection operator ">>" in order to update the content of a file indirectly. Ex: cmd /c >> example.txt set /p="test data". This will append "test data" to contents of "example.txt". The typical use case of the "set /p=" command is to prompt the user for input.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Thu Aug 22windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Headless Process Launched Via Conhost.EXE

Detects the launch of a child process via "conhost.exe" with the "--headless" flag. The "--headless" flag hides the windows from the user upon execution.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Jul 23windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE - Hunting

Detects execution of "csc.exe" to compile .NET code. Attackers often leverage this to compile code on the fly and use it in other stages.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Wed Aug 02windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

File Download Via Curl.EXE

Detects file download using curl.exe

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Jul 05windows
Threat Huntlowtest

Curl.EXE Execution

Detects a curl process start on Windows, which could indicates a file download from a remote location or a simple web request to a remote server

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Jul 05windows