Rule Library

Sigma Rules

3,116 rules found for "sigma"

3,707Total
3,116Detection
451Emerging
137Hunting
Detectionmediumtest

Potential ReflectDebugger Content Execution Via WerFault.EXE

Detects execution of "WerFault.exe" with the "-pr" commandline flag that is used to run files stored in the ReflectDebugger key which could be used to store the path to the malware in order to masquerade the execution flow

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionTA0005 · Defense EvasionT1036 · Masquerading
X__Junior (Nextron Systems)Fri Jun 30windows
Detectionhighexperimental

PPL Tampering Via WerFaultSecure

Detects potential abuse of WerFaultSecure.exe to dump Protected Process Light (PPL) processes like LSASS or to freeze security solutions (EDR/antivirus). This technique is used by tools such as EDR-Freeze and WSASS to bypass PPL protections and access sensitive information or disable security software. Distinct command line patterns help identify the specific tool: - WSASS usage typically shows: "WSASS.exe WerFaultSecure.exe [PID]" in ParentCommandLine - EDR-Freeze usage typically shows: "EDR-Freeze_[version].exe [PID] [timeout]" in ParentCommandLine Legitimate debugging operations using WerFaultSecure are rare in production environments and should be investigated.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1562.001 · Disable or Modify ToolsTA0006 · Credential AccessT1003.001 · LSASS Memory
Jason (https://github.com/0xbcf)Tue Sep 23windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Child Process Of Wermgr.EXE

Detects suspicious Windows Error Reporting manager (wermgr.exe) child process

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0004 · Privilege EscalationT1055 · Process InjectionT1036 · Masquerading
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Oct 14windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Execution Location Of Wermgr.EXE

Detects suspicious Windows Error Reporting manager (wermgr.exe) execution location.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · Execution
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Oct 14windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious File Download From IP Via Wget.EXE

Detects potentially suspicious file downloads directly from IP addresses using Wget.exe

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · Execution
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Jul 27windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious File Download From File Sharing Domain Via Wget.EXE

Detects potentially suspicious file downloads from file sharing domains using wget.exe

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · Execution
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Fri May 05windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious File Download From IP Via Wget.EXE - Paths

Detects potentially suspicious file downloads directly from IP addresses and stored in suspicious locations using Wget.exe

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · Execution
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Fri Feb 23windows
Detectionlowtest

Suspicious Where Execution

Adversaries may enumerate browser bookmarks to learn more about compromised hosts. Browser bookmarks may reveal personal information about users (ex: banking sites, interests, social media, etc.) as well as details about internal network resources such as servers, tools/dashboards, or other related infrastructure.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0007 · DiscoveryT1217 · Browser Information Discovery
François Hubaut+1Mon Dec 13windows
Detectionmediumtest

Enumerate All Information With Whoami.EXE

Detects the execution of "whoami.exe" with the "/all" flag

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0007 · DiscoveryT1033 · System Owner/User Discovery2016-03-001 · CAR 2016-03-001
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Mon Dec 04windows
Detectionhightest

Whoami.EXE Execution From Privileged Process

Detects the execution of "whoami.exe" by privileged accounts that are often abused by threat actors

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0007 · DiscoveryT1033 · System Owner/User Discovery
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Fri Jan 28windows
Detectionmediumtest

Group Membership Reconnaissance Via Whoami.EXE

Detects the execution of whoami.exe with the /group command line flag to show group membership for the current user, account type, security identifiers (SID), and attributes.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0007 · DiscoveryT1033 · System Owner/User Discovery
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Feb 28windows
Detectionmediumtest

Whoami.EXE Execution With Output Option

Detects the execution of "whoami.exe" with the "/FO" flag to choose CSV as output format or with redirection options to export the results to a file for later use.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0007 · DiscoveryT1033 · System Owner/User Discovery2016-03-001 · CAR 2016-03-001
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Feb 28windows
Detectionmediumtest

Whoami.EXE Execution Anomaly

Detects the execution of whoami.exe with suspicious parent processes.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0007 · DiscoveryT1033 · System Owner/User Discovery2016-03-001 · CAR 2016-03-001
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Thu Aug 12windows
Detectionhightest

Security Privileges Enumeration Via Whoami.EXE

Detects a whoami.exe executed with the /priv command line flag instructing the tool to show all current user privileges. This is often used after a privilege escalation attempt.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0007 · DiscoveryT1033 · System Owner/User Discovery
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Wed May 05windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious WindowsTerminal Child Processes

Detects suspicious children spawned via the Windows Terminal application which could be a sign of persistence via WindowsTerminal (see references section)

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionTA0003 · Persistence
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Jul 25windows
Detectionmediumtest

Add New Download Source To Winget

Detects usage of winget to add new additional download sources

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0002 · ExecutionT1059 · Command and Scripting Interpreter
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Apr 17windows
Detectionhightest

Add Insecure Download Source To Winget

Detects usage of winget to add a new insecure (http) download source. Winget will not allow the addition of insecure sources, hence this could indicate potential suspicious activity (or typos)

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0002 · ExecutionT1059 · Command and Scripting Interpreter
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Apr 17windows
Detectionmediumtest

Add Potential Suspicious New Download Source To Winget

Detects usage of winget to add new potentially suspicious download sources

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0002 · ExecutionT1059 · Command and Scripting Interpreter
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Apr 17windows
Detectionmediumtest

Install New Package Via Winget Local Manifest

Detects usage of winget to install applications via manifest file. Adversaries can abuse winget to download payloads remotely and execute them. The manifest option enables you to install an application by passing in a YAML file directly to the client. Winget can be used to download and install exe, msi or msix files later.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0002 · ExecutionT1059 · Command and Scripting Interpreter
Sreeman+2Tue Apr 21windows
Detectionmediumtest

Winrar Compressing Dump Files

Detects execution of WinRAR in order to compress a file with a ".dmp"/".dump" extension, which could be a step in a process of dump file exfiltration.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0009 · CollectionT1560.001 · Archive via Utility
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Jan 04windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potentially Suspicious Child Process Of WinRAR.EXE

Detects potentially suspicious child processes of WinRAR.exe.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionT1203 · Exploitation for Client Execution
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Aug 31windows
Detectionmediumtest

WinRAR Execution in Non-Standard Folder

Detects a suspicious WinRAR execution in a folder which is not the default installation folder

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0009 · CollectionT1560.001 · Archive via Utility
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Wed Nov 17windows
Detectionmediumtest

AWL Bypass with Winrm.vbs and Malicious WsmPty.xsl/WsmTxt.xsl

Detects execution of attacker-controlled WsmPty.xsl or WsmTxt.xsl via winrm.vbs and copied cscript.exe (can be renamed)

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1216 · System Script Proxy Execution
Julia Fomina+1Tue Oct 06windows
Detectionmediumtest

Remote Code Execute via Winrm.vbs

Detects an attempt to execute code or create service on remote host via winrm.vbs.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1216 · System Script Proxy Execution
Julia Fomina+1Wed Oct 07windows
Detectionmediumtest

Remote PowerShell Session Host Process (WinRM)

Detects remote PowerShell sections by monitoring for wsmprovhost (WinRM host process) as a parent or child process (sign of an active PowerShell remote session).

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionTA0008 · Lateral MovementT1059.001 · PowerShellT1021.006 · Windows Remote Management
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)Thu Sep 12windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Processes Spawned by WinRM

Detects suspicious processes including shells spawnd from WinRM host process

WindowsProcess Creation
T1190 · Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationTA0001 · Initial AccessTA0003 · PersistenceTA0004 · Privilege Escalation
Andreas Hunkeler+1Thu May 20windows
Detectionhighexperimental

Winrs Local Command Execution

Detects the execution of Winrs.exe where it is used to execute commands locally. Commands executed this way are launched under Winrshost.exe and can represent proxy execution used for defense evasion or lateral movement.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0008 · Lateral MovementTA0005 · Defense EvasionT1021.006 · Windows Remote ManagementT1218 · System Binary Proxy Execution
Liran Ravich+1Wed Oct 22windows
Detectionmediumexperimental

Potential Lateral Movement via Windows Remote Shell

Detects a child process spawned by 'winrshost.exe', which suggests remote command execution through Windows Remote Shell (WinRs) and may indicate potential lateral movement activity.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0008 · Lateral MovementT1021.006 · Windows Remote Management
Liran RavichWed Oct 22windows
Detectionmediumtest

Compress Data and Lock With Password for Exfiltration With WINZIP

An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party utilities

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0009 · CollectionT1560.001 · Archive via Utility
François HubautTue Jul 27windows
Detectionmediumexperimental

Wlrmdr.EXE Uncommon Argument Or Child Process

Detects the execution of "Wlrmdr.exe" with the "-u" command line flag which allows anything passed to it to be an argument of the ShellExecute API, which would allow an attacker to execute arbitrary binaries. This detection also focuses on any uncommon child processes spawned from "Wlrmdr.exe" as a supplement for those that posses "ParentImage" telemetry.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218 · System Binary Proxy Execution
François Hubaut+1Wed Feb 16windows
Detectioncriticaltest

WMI Backdoor Exchange Transport Agent

Detects a WMI backdoor in Exchange Transport Agents via WMI event filters

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0003 · PersistenceT1546.003 · Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Oct 11windows
Detectionmediumexperimental

Password Set to Never Expire via WMI

Detects the use of wmic.exe to modify user account settings and explicitly disable password expiration.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0002 · ExecutionTA0003 · PersistenceT1047 · Windows Management Instrumentation+1
Daniel Koifman (KoifSec)Wed Jul 30windows
Detectionmediumtest

WMI Persistence - Script Event Consumer

Detects WMI script event consumers

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0003 · PersistenceTA0004 · Privilege EscalationT1546.003 · Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription
Thomas PatzkeWed Mar 07windows
Detectionhightest

New ActiveScriptEventConsumer Created Via Wmic.EXE

Detects WMIC executions in which an event consumer gets created. This could be used to establish persistence

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0003 · PersistenceT1546.003 · Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Jun 25windows
Detectionhightest

Potential Windows Defender Tampering Via Wmic.EXE

Detects potential tampering with Windows Defender settings such as adding exclusion using wmic

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0002 · ExecutionT1047 · Windows Management InstrumentationT1562 · Impair Defenses
François HubautSun Dec 11windows
Detectionmediumtest

New Process Created Via Wmic.EXE

Detects new process creation using WMIC via the "process call create" flag

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionT1047 · Windows Management Instrumentation2016-03-002 · CAR 2016-03-002
Michael Haag+3Wed Jan 16windows
Detectionmediumtest

Computer System Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE

Detects execution of wmic utility with the "computersystem" flag in order to obtain information about the machine such as the domain, username, model, etc.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0007 · DiscoveryTA0002 · ExecutionT1047 · Windows Management Instrumentation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Sep 08windows
Detectionmediumtest

Hardware Model Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE

Detects the execution of WMIC with the "csproduct" which is used to obtain information such as hardware models and vendor information

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionT1047 · Windows Management Instrumentation2016-03-002 · CAR 2016-03-002
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Feb 14windows
Detectionlowtest

Local Groups Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE

Detects the execution of "wmic" with the "group" flag. Adversaries may attempt to find local system groups and permission settings. The knowledge of local system permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as the users found within the local administrators group.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0007 · DiscoveryT1069.001 · Local Groups
François HubautSun Dec 12windows
Detectionmediumtest

Windows Hotfix Updates Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE

Detects the execution of wmic with the "qfe" flag in order to obtain information about installed hotfix updates on the system. This is often used by pentester and attacker enumeration scripts

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionT1047 · Windows Management Instrumentation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Jun 20windows
Detectionmediumtest

Process Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE

Detects the execution of "wmic" with the "process" flag, which adversary might use to list processes running on the compromised host or list installed software hotfixes and patches.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionT1047 · Windows Management Instrumentation
François HubautSat Jan 01windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Product Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE

Detects the execution of WMIC in order to get a list of firewall and antivirus products

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionT1047 · Windows Management Instrumentation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Feb 14windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Product Class Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE

Detects the execution of WMIC in order to get a list of firewall, antivirus and antispywware products. Adversaries often enumerate security products installed on a system to identify security controls and potential ways to evade detection or disable protection mechanisms. This information helps them plan their next attack steps and choose appropriate techniques to bypass security measures.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionT1047 · Windows Management InstrumentationTA0007 · DiscoveryT1082 · System Information Discovery
Michael Haag+4Tue Feb 14windows
Detectionmediumtest

Service Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE

An adversary might use WMI to check if a certain remote service is running on a remote device. When the test completes, a service information will be displayed on the screen if it exists. A common feedback message is that "No instance(s) Available" if the service queried is not running. A common error message is "Node - (provided IP or default) ERROR Description =The RPC server is unavailable" if the provided remote host is unreachable

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionT1047 · Windows Management Instrumentation
François Hubaut+1Tue Feb 14windows
Detectionmediumtest

Uncommon System Information Discovery Via Wmic.EXE

Detects the use of the WMI command-line (WMIC) utility to identify and display various system information, including OS, CPU, GPU, and disk drive names; memory capacity; display resolution; and baseboard, BIOS, and GPU driver products/versions. Some of these commands were used by Aurora Stealer in late 2022/early 2023.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0007 · DiscoveryT1082 · System Information Discovery
TropChaudThu Jan 26windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Unquoted Service Path Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE

Detects known WMI recon method to look for unquoted service paths using wmic. Often used by pentester and attacker enumeration scripts

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionT1047 · Windows Management Instrumentation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Jun 20windows
Detectionmediumtest

System Disk And Volume Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE

An adversary might use WMI to discover information about the system, such as the volume name, size, free space, and other disk information. This can be done using the 'wmic' command-line utility and has been observed being used by threat actors such as Volt Typhoon.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionTA0007 · DiscoveryT1047 · Windows Management InstrumentationT1082 · System Information Discovery
Stephen Lincoln (AttackIQ)Fri Feb 02windows
Detectionmediumtest

WMIC Remote Command Execution

Detects the execution of WMIC to query information on a remote system

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionT1047 · Windows Management Instrumentation
François Hubaut+1Tue Feb 14windows