Sigma Rules
1,487 rules found for "execution"
Suspicious Unsigned Thor Scanner Execution
Detects loading and execution of an unsigned thor scanner binary.
MMC Loading Script Engines DLLs
Detects when the Microsoft Management Console (MMC) loads the DLL libraries like vbscript, jscript etc which might indicate an attempt to execute malicious scripts within a trusted system process for bypassing application whitelisting or defense evasion.
Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack
Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the network and loading it for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario.
Suspicious WSMAN Provider Image Loads
Detects signs of potential use of the WSMAN provider from uncommon processes locally and remote execution.
Outbound Network Connection Initiated By Cmstp.EXE
Detects a network connection initiated by Cmstp.EXE Its uncommon for "cmstp.exe" to initiate an outbound network connection. Investigate the source of such requests to determine if they are malicious.
Outbound Network Connection Initiated By Microsoft Dialer
Detects outbound network connection initiated by Microsoft Dialer. The Microsoft Dialer, also known as Phone Dialer, is a built-in utility application included in various versions of the Microsoft Windows operating system. Its primary function is to provide users with a graphical interface for managing phone calls via a modem or a phone line connected to the computer. This is an outdated process in the current conext of it's usage and is a common target for info stealers for process injection, and is used to make C2 connections, common example is "Rhadamanthys"
Network Connection Initiated By Eqnedt32.EXE
Detects network connections from the Equation Editor process "eqnedt32.exe".
Network Connection Initiated via Finger.EXE
Detects network connections via finger.exe, which can be abused by threat actors to retrieve remote commands for execution on Windows devices. In one ClickFix malware campaign, adversaries leveraged the finger protocol to fetch commands from a remote server. Since the finger utility is not commonly used in modern Windows environments, its presence already raises suspicion. Investigating such network connections can also help identify potential malicious infrastructure used by threat actors
Network Connection Initiated Via Notepad.EXE
Detects a network connection that is initiated by the "notepad.exe" process. This might be a sign of process injection from a beacon process or something similar. Notepad rarely initiates a network communication except when printing documents for example.
Office Application Initiated Network Connection To Non-Local IP
Detects an office application (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) that initiate a network connection to a non-private IP addresses. This rule aims to detect traffic similar to one seen exploited in CVE-2021-42292. This rule will require an initial baseline and tuning that is specific to your organization.
Network Connection Initiated By Regsvr32.EXE
Detects a network connection initiated by "Regsvr32.exe"
Rundll32 Internet Connection
Detects a rundll32 that communicates with public IP addresses
Silenttrinity Stager Msbuild Activity
Detects a possible remote connections to Silenttrinity c2
Microsoft Sync Center Suspicious Network Connections
Detects suspicious connections from Microsoft Sync Center to non-private IPs.
Potential Remote PowerShell Session Initiated
Detects a process that initiated a network connection over ports 5985 or 5986 from a non-network service account. This could potentially indicates a remote PowerShell connection.
Outbound Network Connection To Public IP Via Winlogon
Detects a "winlogon.exe" process that initiate network communications with public IP addresses
HackTool - Credential Dumping Tools Named Pipe Created
Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via specific named pipe creation
Alternate PowerShell Hosts Pipe
Detects alternate PowerShell hosts potentially bypassing detections looking for powershell.exe
New PowerShell Instance Created
Detects the execution of PowerShell via the creation of a named pipe starting with PSHost
PUA - CSExec Default Named Pipe
Detects default CSExec pipe creation
PUA - PAExec Default Named Pipe
Detects PAExec default named pipe
PUA - RemCom Default Named Pipe
Detects default RemCom pipe creation
WMI Event Consumer Created Named Pipe
Detects the WMI Event Consumer service scrcons.exe creating a named pipe
PsExec Tool Execution From Suspicious Locations - PipeName
Detects PsExec default pipe creation where the image executed is located in a suspicious location. Which could indicate that the tool is being used in an attack
Nslookup PowerShell Download Cradle
Detects a powershell download cradle using nslookup. This cradle uses nslookup to extract payloads from DNS records.
PowerShell Downgrade Attack - PowerShell
Detects PowerShell downgrade attack by comparing the host versions with the actually used engine version 2.0
PowerShell Download Via Net.WebClient - PowerShell Classic
Detects PowerShell download activity, via the .DownloadFile() or .DownloadString() methods of the Net.WebClient class. This technique is often abused by attackers to download additional payloads.
PowerShell Called from an Executable Version Mismatch
Detects PowerShell called from an executable by the version mismatch method
Netcat The Powershell Version
Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network
Potential RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.EXE Abuse
Detects PowerShell module creation where the module Contents are set to "function Get-VMRemoteFXPhysicalVideoAdapter". This could be a sign of potential abuse of the "RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe" binary which is known to be vulnerable to module load-order hijacking.
Remote PowerShell Session (PS Classic)
Detects remote PowerShell sessions
Renamed Powershell Under Powershell Channel
Detects a renamed Powershell execution, which is a common technique used to circumvent security controls and bypass detection logic that's dependent on process names and process paths.
Suspicious Non PowerShell WSMAN COM Provider
Detects suspicious use of the WSMAN provider without PowerShell.exe as the host application.
Alternate PowerShell Hosts - PowerShell Module
Detects alternate PowerShell hosts potentially bypassing detections looking for powershell.exe
Bad Opsec Powershell Code Artifacts
focuses on trivial artifacts observed in variants of prevalent offensive ps1 payloads, including Cobalt Strike Beacon, PoshC2, Powerview, Letmein, Empire, Powersploit, and other attack payloads that often undergo minimal changes by attackers due to bad opsec.
Malicious PowerShell Scripts - PoshModule
Detects the execution of known offensive powershell scripts used for exploitation or reconnaissance
HackTool - Evil-WinRm Execution - PowerShell Module
Detects the execution of Evil-WinRM via PowerShell Module logs by leveraging the hardcoded strings inside the utility.
Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher - PowerShell Module
Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell
Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation - PowerShell Module
Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the code block cited in the reference section below
Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher - PowerShell Module
Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell
Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher - PowerShell Module
Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell
Invoke-Obfuscation COMPRESS OBFUSCATION - PowerShell Module
Detects Obfuscated Powershell via COMPRESS OBFUSCATION
Invoke-Obfuscation RUNDLL LAUNCHER - PowerShell Module
Detects Obfuscated Powershell via RUNDLL LAUNCHER
Invoke-Obfuscation Via Stdin - PowerShell Module
Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts
Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip - PowerShell Module
Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts
Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA - PowerShell Module
Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts
Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32 - PowerShell Module
Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts
Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION - PowerShell Module
Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER