Rule Library

Sigma Rules

498 rules found for "Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)"

3,707Total
3,116Detection
451Emerging
137Hunting
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Advpack Call Via Rundll32.EXE

Detects execution of "rundll32" calling "advpack.dll" with potential obfuscated ordinal calls in order to leverage the "RegisterOCX" function

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense Evasion
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Wed May 17windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Rundll32 Invoking Inline VBScript

Detects suspicious process related to rundll32 based on command line that invokes inline VBScript as seen being used by UNC2452

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0005 · Defense EvasionT1055 · Process Injection
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Mar 05windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Key Manager Access

Detects the invocation of the Stored User Names and Passwords dialogue (Key Manager)

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0006 · Credential AccessT1555.004 · Windows Credential Manager
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Thu Apr 21windows
Detectionhightest

Mshtml.DLL RunHTMLApplication Suspicious Usage

Detects execution of commands that leverage the "mshtml.dll" RunHTMLApplication export to run arbitrary code via different protocol handlers (vbscript, javascript, file, http...)

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0002 · Execution
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+4Sun Aug 14windows
Detectionhightest

Rundll32 Execution Without CommandLine Parameters

Detects suspicious start of rundll32.exe without any parameters as found in CobaltStrike beacon activity

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1202 · Indirect Command Execution
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Thu May 27windows
Detectionhightest

Process Memory Dump Via Comsvcs.DLL

Detects a process memory dump via "comsvcs.dll" using rundll32, covering multiple different techniques (ordinal, minidump function, etc.)

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0006 · Credential AccessT1036 · MasqueradingT1003.001 · LSASS Memory+1
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+3Tue Feb 18windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Control Panel DLL Load

Detects suspicious Rundll32 execution from control.exe as used by Equation Group and Exploit Kits

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218.011 · Rundll32
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Sat Apr 15windows
Detectionhighstable

ShimCache Flush

Detects actions that clear the local ShimCache and remove forensic evidence

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0003 · PersistenceTA0005 · Defense EvasionT1112 · Modify Registry
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Mon Feb 01windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Rundll32 Activity Invoking Sys File

Detects suspicious process related to rundll32 based on command line that includes a *.sys file as seen being used by UNC2452

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218.011 · Rundll32
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Mar 05windows
Detectionmediumtest

Rundll32 Execution With Uncommon DLL Extension

Detects the execution of rundll32 with a command line that doesn't contain a common extension

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218.011 · Rundll32
Tim Shelton+2Thu Jan 13windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious WebDav Client Execution Via Rundll32.EXE

Detects "svchost.exe" spawning "rundll32.exe" with command arguments like C:\windows\system32\davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie. This could be an indicator of exfiltration or use of WebDav to launch code (hosted on WebDav Server) or potentially a sign of exploitation of CVE-2023-23397

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0010 · ExfiltrationT1048.003 · Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocolcve.2023-23397
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Thu Mar 16windows
Detectionlowtest

Scheduled Task Creation Via Schtasks.EXE

Detects the creation of scheduled tasks by user accounts via the "schtasks" utility.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionTA0003 · PersistenceTA0004 · Privilege EscalationT1053.005 · Scheduled Task+3
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Wed Jan 16windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation Involving Temp Folder

Detects the creation of scheduled tasks that involves a temporary folder and runs only once

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0002 · ExecutionTA0003 · PersistenceT1053.005 · Scheduled Task
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Thu Mar 11windows
Detectionmediumtest

Schedule Task Creation From Env Variable Or Potentially Suspicious Path Via Schtasks.EXE

Detects Schtask creations that point to a suspicious folder or an environment variable often used by malware

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0003 · PersistenceTA0002 · ExecutionT1053.005 · Scheduled Task
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Mon Feb 21windows
Detectionhightest

Schtasks From Suspicious Folders

Detects scheduled task creations that have suspicious action command and folder combinations

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0003 · PersistenceTA0002 · ExecutionT1053.005 · Scheduled Task
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Apr 15windows
Detectionhightest

Potential Persistence Via Powershell Search Order Hijacking - Task

Detects suspicious powershell execution via a schedule task where the command ends with an suspicious flags to hide the powershell instance instead of executeing scripts or commands. This could be a sign of persistence via PowerShell "Get-Variable" technique as seen being used in Colibri Loader

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0002 · ExecutionTA0003 · PersistenceT1053.005 · Scheduled Task+1
Martin Mueller+1Fri Apr 08windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Command Patterns In Scheduled Task Creation

Detects scheduled task creation using "schtasks" that contain potentially suspicious or uncommon commands

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0003 · PersistenceTA0002 · ExecutionT1053.005 · Scheduled Task
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Wed Feb 23windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Serv-U Process Pattern

Detects a suspicious process pattern which could be a sign of an exploited Serv-U service

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0006 · Credential AccessT1555 · Credentials from Password Storescve.2021-35211
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Wed Jul 14windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Splwow64 Without Params

Detects suspicious Splwow64.exe process without any command line parameters

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1202 · Indirect Command Execution
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 23windows
Detectionmediumtest

User Added to Local Administrators Group

Detects addition of users to the local administrator group via "Net" or "Add-LocalGroupMember".

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0003 · PersistenceT1098 · Account Manipulation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Fri Aug 12windows
Detectionhightest

User Added to Remote Desktop Users Group

Detects addition of users to the local Remote Desktop Users group via "Net" or "Add-LocalGroupMember".

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0001 · Initial AccessTA0003 · PersistenceTA0008 · Lateral MovementT1133 · External Remote Services+2
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Mon Dec 06windows
Detectionhightest

Phishing Pattern ISO in Archive

Detects cases in which an ISO files is opend within an archiver like 7Zip or Winrar, which is a sign of phishing as threat actors put small ISO files in archives as email attachments to bypass certain filters and protective measures (mark of web)

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0001 · Initial AccessT1566 · Phishing
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Jun 07windows
Detectionhightest

Bad Opsec Defaults Sacrificial Processes With Improper Arguments

Detects attackers using tooling with bad opsec defaults. E.g. spawning a sacrificial process to inject a capability into the process without taking into account how the process is normally run. One trivial example of this is using rundll32.exe without arguments as a sacrificial process (default in CS, now highlighted by c2lint), running WerFault without arguments (Kraken - credit am0nsec), and other examples.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218.011 · Rundll32
Oleg Kolesnikov invrep_de+3Fri Oct 23windows
Detectionhightest

Potential CommandLine Obfuscation Using Unicode Characters From Suspicious Image

Detects potential commandline obfuscation using unicode characters. Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1027 · Obfuscated Files or Information
François Hubaut+2Mon Sep 02windows
Detectionmediumtest

Copy From Or To Admin Share Or Sysvol Folder

Detects a copy command or a copy utility execution to or from an Admin share or remote

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0008 · Lateral MovementTA0009 · CollectionTA0010 · ExfiltrationT1039 · Data from Network Shared Drive+2
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+4Mon Dec 30windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious Copy From or To System Directory

Detects a suspicious copy operation that tries to copy a program from system (System32, SysWOW64, WinSxS) directories to another on disk. Often used to move LOLBINs such as 'certutil' or 'desktopimgdownldr' to a different location with a different name in order to bypass detections based on locations.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1036.003 · Rename System Utilities
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+3Fri Jul 03windows
Detectionhighstable

Potential Crypto Mining Activity

Detects command line parameters or strings often used by crypto miners

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0040 · ImpactT1496 · Resource Hijacking
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Oct 26windows
Detectionhightest

Raccine Uninstall

Detects commands that indicate a Raccine removal from an end system. Raccine is a free ransomware protection tool.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1562.001 · Disable or Modify Tools
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Thu Jan 21windows
Detectionhighstable

Suspicious Double Extension File Execution

Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or underlines to cloak the executable file in spear phishing campaigns

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0001 · Initial AccessT1566.001 · Spearphishing Attachment
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+2Wed Jun 26windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Download from Office Domain

Detects suspicious ways to download files from Microsoft domains that are used to store attachments in Emails or OneNote documents

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0011 · Command and ControlTA0042 · Resource DevelopmentT1105 · Ingress Tool TransferT1608 · Stage Capabilities
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Mon Dec 27windows
Detectioncriticaltest

DumpStack.log Defender Evasion

Detects the use of the filename DumpStack.log to evade Microsoft Defender

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense Evasion
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Thu Jan 06windows
Detectionhightest

ETW Trace Evasion Activity

Detects command line activity that tries to clear or disable any ETW trace log which could be a sign of logging evasion.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1070 · Indicator RemovalT1562.006 · Indicator Blocking2016-04-002 · CAR 2016-04-002
@neu5ron+3Fri Mar 22windows
Detectionhightest

Potentially Suspicious Execution From Parent Process In Public Folder

Detects a potentially suspicious execution of a parent process located in the "\Users\Public" folder executing a child process containing references to shell or scripting binaries and commandlines.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0002 · ExecutionT1564 · Hide ArtifactsT1059 · Command and Scripting Interpreter
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Fri Feb 25windows
Detectionhightest

Process Execution From A Potentially Suspicious Folder

Detects a potentially suspicious execution from an uncommon folder.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1036 · Masquerading
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Wed Jan 16windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Process Patterns NTDS.DIT Exfil

Detects suspicious process patterns used in NTDS.DIT exfiltration

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0006 · Credential AccessT1003.003 · NTDS
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Mar 11windows
Detectionmediumtest

Obfuscated IP Download Activity

Detects use of an encoded/obfuscated version of an IP address (hex, octal...) in an URL combined with a download command

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0007 · Discovery
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Wed Aug 03windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Process Parents

Detects suspicious parent processes that should not have any children or should only have a single possible child program

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1036 · Masquerading
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Mon Mar 21windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious RunAs-Like Flag Combination

Detects suspicious command line flags that let the user set a target user and command as e.g. seen in PsExec-like tools

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege Escalation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Nov 11windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Program Names

Detects suspicious patterns in program names or folders that are often found in malicious samples or hacktools

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionT1059 · Command and Scripting Interpreter
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Feb 11windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Redirection to Local Admin Share

Detects a suspicious output redirection to the local admins share, this technique is often found in malicious scripts or hacktool stagers

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0010 · ExfiltrationT1048 · Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Sun Jan 16windows
Detectionhightest

Script Interpreter Execution From Suspicious Folder

Detects a suspicious script execution in temporary folders or folders accessible by environment variables

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionT1059 · Command and Scripting Interpreter
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Feb 08windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Script Execution From Temp Folder

Detects a suspicious script executions from temporary folder

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionT1059 · Command and Scripting Interpreter
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+2Wed Jul 14windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Service Binary Directory

Detects a service binary running in a suspicious directory

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1202 · Indirect Command Execution
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Mar 09windows
Detectionhighstable

Shadow Copies Deletion Using Operating Systems Utilities

Shadow Copies deletion using operating systems utilities

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0040 · ImpactT1070 · Indicator RemovalT1490 · Inhibit System Recovery
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+5Tue Oct 22windows
Detectionhightest

Windows Shell/Scripting Processes Spawning Suspicious Programs

Detects suspicious child processes of a Windows shell and scripting processes such as wscript, rundll32, powershell, mshta...etc.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionTA0005 · Defense EvasionT1059.005 · Visual BasicT1059.001 · PowerShell+1
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Fri Apr 06windows
Detectionhightest

System File Execution Location Anomaly

Detects the execution of a Windows system binary that is usually located in the system folder from an uncommon location.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1036 · Masquerading
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+4Mon Nov 27windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious SYSTEM User Process Creation

Detects a suspicious process creation as SYSTEM user (suspicious program or command line parameter)

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0006 · Credential AccessTA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0004 · Privilege EscalationT1134 · Access Token Manipulation+2
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Mon Dec 20windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious Userinit Child Process

Detects a suspicious child process of userinit

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0005 · Defense EvasionT1055 · Process Injection
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Mon Jun 17windows