Deployment Deleted From Kubernetes Cluster
Detects the removal of a deployment from a Kubernetes cluster. This could indicate disruptive activity aiming to impact business operations.
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Detects the removal of a deployment from a Kubernetes cluster. This could indicate disruptive activity aiming to impact business operations.
Detects when events are deleted in Kubernetes. An adversary may delete Kubernetes events in an attempt to evade detection.
Detects attempts to execute remote commands, within a Pod's container using e.g. the "kubectl exec" command.
Detects creation of a container with a hostPath mount. A hostPath volume mounts a directory or a file from the node to the container. Attackers who have permissions to create a new pod in the cluster may create one with a writable hostPath volume and chroot to escape to the underlying node.
Detects deployments of pods within the kube-system namespace, which could be intended to imitate system pods. System pods, created by controllers such as Deployments or DaemonSets have random suffixes in their names. Attackers can use this fact and name their backdoor pods as if they were created by these controllers to avoid detection. Deployment of such a backdoor container e.g. named kube-proxy-bv61v, could be attempted in the kube-system namespace alongside the other administrative containers.