Detectionhightest

Possible Shadow Credentials Added

Detects possible addition of shadow credentials to an active directory object.

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Launch
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Elastic SecurityCreated Mon Oct 17f598ea0c-c25a-4f72-a219-50c44411c791windows
Log Source
Windowssecurity
ProductWindows← raw: windows
Servicesecurity← raw: security

Definition

The "Audit Directory Service Changes" logging policy must be configured in order to receive events. Audit events are generated only for objects with configured system access control lists (SACLs). Audit events are generated only for objects with configured system access control lists (SACLs) and only when accessed in a manner that matches their SACL settings. This policy covers the following events ids - 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141. Note that the default policy does not cover User objects. For that a custom AuditRule need to be setup (See https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule)

Detection Logic
Detection Logic1 selector
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5136
        AttributeLDAPDisplayName: 'msDS-KeyCredentialLink'
        # If you experience a lot of FP you could uncomment the selection below
        # There could be other cases for other tooling add them accordingly
        # AttributeValue|contains: 'B:828'
        # OperationType: '%%14674' # Value Added
    # As stated in the FP sections it's better to filter out the expected accounts that perform this operation to tighten the logic
    # Uncomment the filter below and add the account name (or any other specific field) accordingly
    # Don't forget to add it to the condition section below
    # filter:
        # SubjectUserName: "%name%"
    condition: selection
False Positives

Modifications in the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute can be done legitimately by the Azure AD Connect synchronization account or the ADFS service account. These accounts can be added as Exceptions. (From elastic FP section)

Rule Metadata
Rule ID
f598ea0c-c25a-4f72-a219-50c44411c791
Status
test
Level
high
Type
Detection
Created
Mon Oct 17
Path
rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_possible_shadow_credentials_added.yml
Raw Tags
attack.persistenceattack.defense-evasionattack.credential-accessattack.t1556
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