Rule Library

Sigma Rules

1,483 rules found

3,731Total
3,132Detection
457Emerging
139Hunting
Emerging Threatmediumexperimental

Suspicious Creation of .library-ms File — Potential CVE-2025-24054 Exploit

Detects creation of '.library-ms' files, which may indicate exploitation of CVE-2025-24054. This vulnerability allows an attacker to trigger an automatic outbound SMB or WebDAV authentication request to a remote server upon archive extraction. If the system is unpatched, no user interaction is required beyond extracting a malicious archive—potentially exposing the user's NTLMv2-SSP hash to the attacker.

WindowsFile Event
Gene KazimiarovichSun Apr 202025
Emerging Threatmediumexperimental

Suspicious CrushFTP Child Process

Detects suspicious child processes spawned by the CrushFTP service that may indicate exploitation of remote code execution vulnerabilities such as CVE-2025-31161, where attackers can achieve RCE through crafted HTTP requests. The detection focuses on commonly abused Windows executables (like powershell.exe, cmd.exe etc.) that attackers typically use post-exploitation to execute malicious commands.

WindowsProcess Creation
Craig Sweeney+6Thu Apr 102025
Emerging Threatmediumexperimental

Potential SAP NetWeaver Webshell Creation - Linux

Detects the creation of suspicious files (jsp, java, class) in SAP NetWeaver directories, which may indicate exploitation attempts of vulnerabilities such as CVE-2025-31324.

LinuxFile Event
Elastic Security+1Mon Apr 282025
Emerging Threatmediumexperimental

Potential SAP NetWeaver Webshell Creation

Detects the creation of suspicious files (jsp, java, class) in SAP NetWeaver directories, which may indicate exploitation attempts of vulnerabilities such as CVE-2025-31324.

WindowsFile Event
Elastic Security+1Mon Apr 282025
Emerging Threatmediumexperimental

Suspicious Child Process of SAP NetWeaver - Linux

Detects suspicious child processes spawned by SAP NetWeaver on Linux systems that could indicate potential exploitation of vulnerability that allows arbitrary execution via webshells such as CVE-2025-31324.

LinuxProcess Creation
Elastic Security+1Mon Apr 282025
Emerging Threatmediumexperimental

Suspicious Child Process of SAP NetWeaver

Detects suspicious child processes spawned by SAP NetWeaver that could indicate potential exploitation of vulnerability that allows arbitrary execution via webshells such as CVE-2025-31324.

WindowsProcess Creation
Elastic Security+1Mon Apr 282025
Emerging Threatmediumexperimental

SharePoint ToolShell CVE-2025-53770 Exploitation - Web IIS

Detects access to vulnerable SharePoint components potentially being exploited in CVE-2025-53770 through IIS web server logs. CVE-2025-53770 is a zero-day vulnerability in SharePoint that allows remote code execution.

Web Server Log
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Mon Jul 212025
Emerging Threatmediumexperimental

Commvault QLogin with PublicSharingUser and GUID Password (CVE-2025-57788)

Detects a qlogin.exe command attempting to authenticate as the internal `_+_PublicSharingUser_` using a GUID as the password. This could be an indicator of an attacker exploiting CVE-2025-57788 to gain initial access using leaked credentials.

WindowsProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Mon Oct 202025
Emerging Threatmediumexperimental

Potential Exploitation of CVE-2025-5054 or CVE-2025-4598

Detects attempts of an attacker to enable core dumps for set-user-ID (SUID) processes by modifying the system file /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable, typically by setting its value to 1 or 2. Enabling this feature allows memory dumps (core dumps) of SUID processes, which usually run with elevated privileges. These dumps may contain sensitive information such as passwords, cryptographic keys or other secrets. CVE-2025-5054: Information leak via core dumps from SUID binaries using apport. CVE-2025-4598: Information disclosure in systemd-coredump due to insecure handling of SUID process memory dumps.

LinuxProcess Creation
Milad CheraghiTue Apr 282025
Threat Huntmediumtest

Mail Forwarding/Redirecting Activity In O365

Detects email forwarding or redirecting activity in O365 Audit logs.

Microsoft 365audit
RedCanary Team+1Wed Oct 11cloud
Threat Huntmediumexperimental

Inbox Rules Creation Or Update Activity in O365

Detects inbox rule creation or update via O365 Audit logs, a technique commonly observed in Business Email Compromise (BEC) attacks to hide emails. The usage of inbox rules can be a sign of a compromised mailbox, where an attacker is attempting to evade detections by suppressing or redirecting incoming emails. Analysts should review these rules in context, validate whether they reflect normal user behavior, and correlate with other indicators such as unusual login activity or recent mailbox rule modifications.

Microsoft 365audit
Marco Pedrinazzi (InTheCyber)Fri Jan 09cloud
Threat Huntmediumtest

Python Path Configuration File Creation - Linux

Detects creation of a Python path configuration file (.pth) in Python library folders, which can be maliciously abused for code execution and persistence. Modules referenced by these files are run at every Python startup (v3.5+), regardless of whether the module is imported by the calling script. Default paths are '\lib\site-packages\*.pth' (Windows) and '/lib/pythonX.Y/site-packages/*.pth' (Unix and macOS).

LinuxFile Event
Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)Thu Apr 25linux
Threat Huntmediumtest

Terminate Linux Process Via Kill

Detects usage of command line tools such as "kill", "pkill" or "killall" to terminate or signal a running process.

LinuxProcess Creation
Tuan Le (NCSGroup)Thu Mar 16linux
Threat Huntmediumtest

Python Path Configuration File Creation - MacOS

Detects creation of a Python path configuration file (.pth) in Python library folders, which can be maliciously abused for code execution and persistence. Modules referenced by these files are run at every Python startup (v3.5+), regardless of whether the module is imported by the calling script. Default paths are '\lib\site-packages\*.pth' (Windows) and '/lib/pythonX.Y/site-packages/*.pth' (Unix and macOS).

macOSFile Event
Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)Thu Apr 25macos
Threat Huntmediumtest

Clipboard Data Collection Via Pbpaste

Detects execution of the "pbpaste" utility, which retrieves the contents of the clipboard (a.k.a. pasteboard) and writes them to the standard output (stdout). The utility is often used for creating new files with the clipboard content or for piping clipboard contents to other commands. It can also be used in shell scripts that may require clipboard content as input. Attackers can abuse this utility in order to collect data from the user clipboard, which may contain passwords or sensitive information. Use this rule to hunt for potential abuse of the utility by looking at the parent process and any potentially suspicious command line content.

macOSProcess Creation
Daniel CortezTue Jul 30macos
Threat Huntmediumexperimental

Low Reputation Effective Top-Level Domain (eTLD)

Detects DNS queries to domains within known low reputation eTLDs. This rule uses AlphaSOC's threat intelligence data and is updated on a monthly basis.

dns
Norbert Jaśniewicz (AlphaSOC)Mon Aug 04network
Threat Huntmediumtest

.Class Extension URI Ending Request

Detects requests to URI ending with the ".class" extension in proxy logs. This could rules can be used to hunt for potential downloads of Java classes as seen for example in Log4shell exploitation attacks against Log4j.

Proxy Log
Andreas HunkelerTue Dec 21web
Threat Huntmediumtest

Potential Remote WMI ActiveScriptEventConsumers Activity

Detect potential adversaries leveraging WMI ActiveScriptEventConsumers remotely to move laterally in a network. This event is best correlated and used as an enrichment to determine the potential lateral movement activity.

Windowssecurity
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+1Wed Sep 02windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

CreateRemoteThread API and LoadLibrary

Detects potential use of CreateRemoteThread api and LoadLibrary function to inject DLL into a process

WindowsRemote Thread Creation
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)Sun Aug 11windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Remote Thread Creation Via PowerShell

Detects the creation of a remote thread from a Powershell process to another process

WindowsRemote Thread Creation
Nikita Nazarov+1Tue Oct 06windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Remote Thread Created In Shell Application

Detects remote thread creation in command shell applications, such as "Cmd.EXE" and "PowerShell.EXE". It is a common technique used by malware, such as IcedID, to inject malicious code and execute it within legitimate processes.

WindowsRemote Thread Creation
Splunk Research TeamMon Jul 29windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Access To Sysvol Policies Share By Uncommon Process

Detects file access requests to the Windows Sysvol Policies Share by uncommon processes

Windowsfile_access
François HubautThu Dec 21windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Python Path Configuration File Creation - Windows

Detects creation of a Python path configuration file (.pth) in Python library folders, which can be maliciously abused for code execution and persistence. Modules referenced by these files are run at every Python startup (v3.5+), regardless of whether the module is imported by the calling script. Default paths are '\lib\site-packages\*.pth' (Windows) and '/lib/pythonX.Y/site-packages/*.pth' (Unix and macOS).

WindowsFile Event
Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)+1Thu Apr 25windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Suspicious Creation TXT File in User Desktop

Detects creation of .txt files in user desktop folders via cmd.exe. This behavior may indicate ransomware deploying ransom notes, but can also occur during legitimate administrative tasks. Analysts should investigate for suspicious filenames (e.g., "RANSOM", "DECRYPT", "READ_ME"), bulk file creation patterns, or concurrent encryption activity to determine if this is part of a ransomware attack.

WindowsFile Event
François HubautSun Dec 26windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

VsCode Code Tunnel Execution File Indicator

Detects the creation of a file with the name "code_tunnel.json" which indicate execution and usage of VsCode tunneling utility. Attackers can abuse this functionality to establish a C2 channel

WindowsFile Event
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Wed Oct 25windows
Threat Huntmediumexperimental

WDAC Policy File Creation In CodeIntegrity Folder

Attackers can craft a custom Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) policy that blocks Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) components while allowing their own malicious code. The policy is placed in the privileged Windows Code Integrity folder (C:\Windows\System32\CodeIntegrity\). Upon reboot, the policy prevents EDR drivers from loading, effectively bypassing security measures and may further enable undetected lateral movement within an Active Directory environment.

WindowsFile Event
Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)Thu Jan 30windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

WebDAV Temporary Local File Creation

Detects the creation of WebDAV temporary files with potentially suspicious extensions

WindowsFile Event
Micah BabinskiMon Aug 21windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Non-DLL Extension File Renamed With DLL Extension

Detects rename operations of files with non-DLL extensions to files with a DLL extension. This is often performed by malware in order to avoid initial detections based on extensions.

WindowsFile Rename
François HubautSat Feb 19windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Dbghelp/Dbgcore DLL Loaded By Uncommon/Suspicious Process

Detects the load of dbghelp/dbgcore DLL by a potentially uncommon or potentially suspicious process. The Dbghelp and Dbgcore DLLs export functions that allow for the dump of process memory. Tools like ProcessHacker, Task Manager and some attacker tradecraft use the MiniDumpWriteDump API found in dbghelp.dll or dbgcore.dll. As an example, SilentTrynity C2 Framework has a module that leverages this API to dump the contents of Lsass.exe and transfer it over the network back to the attacker's machine. Keep in mind that many legitimate Windows processes and services might load the aforementioned DLLs for debugging or other related purposes. Investigate the CommandLine and the Image location of the process loading the DLL.

WindowsImage Load (DLL)
Perez Diego+2Sun Oct 27windows
Threat Huntmediumexperimental

WerFaultSecure Loading DbgCore or DbgHelp - EDR-Freeze

Detects the loading of dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll by WerFaultSecure.exe, which has been observed in EDR-Freeze attacks to suspend processes and evade detection. However, this behavior has also been observed during normal software installations, so further investigation is required to confirm malicious activity. When threat hunting, look for this activity in conjunction with other suspicious processes starting, network connections, or file modifications that occur shortly after the DLL load. Pay special attention to timing - if other malicious activities occur during or immediately after this library loading, it may indicate EDR evasion attempts. Also correlate with any EDR/AV process suspension events or gaps in security monitoring during the timeframe.

WindowsImage Load (DLL)
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Thu Nov 27windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Dfsvc.EXE Network Connection To Non-Local IPs

Detects network connections from "dfsvc.exe" used to handled ClickOnce applications to non-local IPs

WindowsNetwork Connection
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Jun 12windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Dllhost.EXE Initiated Network Connection To Non-Local IP Address

Detects Dllhost.EXE initiating a network connection to a non-local IP address. Aside from Microsoft own IP range that needs to be excluded. Network communication from Dllhost will depend entirely on the hosted DLL. An initial baseline is recommended before deployment.

WindowsNetwork Connection
bartblazeMon Jul 13windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

HH.EXE Initiated HTTP Network Connection

Detects a network connection initiated by the "hh.exe" process to HTTP destination ports, which could indicate the execution/download of remotely hosted .chm files.

WindowsNetwork Connection
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Wed Oct 05windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Potentially Suspicious Azure Front Door Connection

Detects connections with Azure Front Door (known legitimate service that can be leveraged for C2) that fall outside of known benign behavioral baseline (not using common apps or common azurefd.net endpoints)

WindowsNetwork Connection
Isaac DunhamThu Nov 07windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Network Connection Initiated From Users\Public Folder

Detects a network connection initiated from a process located in the "C:\Users\Public" folder. Attacker are known to drop their malicious payloads and malware in this directory as its writable by everyone. Use this rule to hunt for potential suspicious or uncommon activity in your environement.

WindowsNetwork Connection
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri May 31windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Uncommon PowerShell Hosts

Detects alternate PowerShell hosts potentially bypassing detections looking for powershell.exe

WindowsPowerShell Classic
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)Sun Aug 11windows
Threat Huntmediumexperimental

Mail Forwarding/Redirecting Activity Via ExchangePowerShell Cmdlet

Detects email forwarding or redirecting activity via ExchangePowerShell Cmdlet

WindowsPowerShell Script
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Sun Mar 01windows
Threat Huntmediumexperimental

Inbox Rules Creation Or Update Activity Via ExchangePowerShell Cmdlet

Detects inbox rule creation or update via ExchangePowerShell cmdlet, a technique commonly observed in Business Email Compromise (BEC) attacks to hide emails. The usage of inbox rules can be a sign of a compromised mailbox, where an attacker is attempting to evade detections by suppressing or redirecting incoming emails. Analysts should review these rules in context, validate whether they reflect normal user behavior, and correlate with other indicators such as unusual login activity or recent mailbox rule modifications.

WindowsPowerShell Script
Marco Pedrinazzi (InTheCyber)Tue Feb 10windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Windows Mail App Mailbox Access Via PowerShell Script

Detects PowerShell scripts that try to access the default Windows MailApp MailBox. This indicates manipulation of or access to the stored emails of a user. E.g. this could be used by an attacker to exfiltrate or delete the content of the emails.

WindowsPowerShell Script
François HubautSat Jul 08windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

SMB over QUIC Via PowerShell Script

Detects the mounting of Windows SMB shares over QUIC, which can be an unexpected event in some enterprise environments

WindowsPowerShell Script
François HubautFri Jul 21windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Potential Registry Reconnaissance Via PowerShell Script

Detects PowerShell scripts with potential registry reconnaissance capabilities. Adversaries may interact with the Windows registry to gather information about the system credentials, configuration, and installed software.

WindowsPowerShell Script
François HubautSun Jul 02windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Potential Data Exfiltration Over SMTP Via Send-MailMessage Cmdlet

Detects the execution of a PowerShell script with a call to the "Send-MailMessage" cmdlet along with the "-Attachments" flag. This could be a potential sign of data exfiltration via Email. Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.

WindowsPowerShell Script
François HubautMon Sep 26windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Powershell Token Obfuscation - Powershell

Detects TOKEN OBFUSCATION technique from Invoke-Obfuscation in Powershell scripts. Use this rule as a threat-hunting baseline to find obfuscated scripts in your environment. Once tested and tuned, consider deploying a production detection rule based on this hunting rule.

WindowsPowerShell Script
François HubautTue Dec 27windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

WinAPI Library Calls Via PowerShell Scripts

Detects calls to WinAPI libraries from PowerShell scripts. Attackers can often leverage these APIs to avoid detection based on typical PowerShell function calls. Use this rule as a basis to hunt for interesting scripts.

WindowsPowerShell Script
Nikita Nazarov+2Fri Jul 21windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

WinAPI Function Calls Via PowerShell Scripts

Detects calls to WinAPI functions from PowerShell scripts. Attackers can often leverage these APIs to avoid detection based on typical PowerShell function calls. Use this rule as a basis to hunt for interesting scripts.

WindowsPowerShell Script
Nikita Nazarov+2Fri Jul 21windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Potential Credential Dumping Attempt Via PowerShell

Detects a PowerShell process requesting access to "lsass.exe", which can be indicative of potential credential dumping attempts

WindowsProcess Access
oscd.community+1Tue Oct 06windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

LSASS Access From Program In Potentially Suspicious Folder

Detects process access to LSASS memory with suspicious access flags and from a potentially suspicious folder

WindowsProcess Access
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Sat Nov 27windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Uncommon GrantedAccess Flags On LSASS

Detects process access to LSASS memory with uncommon access flags 0x410 and 0x01410

WindowsProcess Access
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Sun Mar 13windows