Rule Library

Sigma Rules

809 rules found for "privilege-escalation"

3,731Total
3,132Detection
457Emerging
139Hunting
Detectionmediumtest

Registry Modification of MS-settings Protocol Handler

Detects registry modifications to the 'ms-settings' protocol handler, which is frequently targeted for UAC bypass or persistence. Attackers can modify this registry to execute malicious code with elevated privileges by hijacking the command execution path.

WindowsProcess Creation
François Hubaut+1Mon Dec 20windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious New Service Creation

Detects creation of a new service via "sc" command or the powershell "new-service" cmdlet with suspicious binary paths

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Jul 14windows
Detectionmediumtest

Process Creation Using Sysnative Folder

Detects process creation events that use the Sysnative folder (common for CobaltStrike spawns)

WindowsProcess Creation
Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems)Tue Aug 23windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious SYSTEM User Process Creation

Detects a suspicious process creation as SYSTEM user (suspicious program or command line parameter)

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Mon Dec 20windows
Detectionhightest

Tasks Folder Evasion

The Tasks folder in system32 and syswow64 are globally writable paths. Adversaries can take advantage of this and load or influence any script hosts or ANY .NET Application in Tasks to load and execute a custom assembly into cscript, wscript, regsvr32, mshta, eventvwr

WindowsProcess Creation
SreemanMon Jan 13windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious Userinit Child Process

Detects a suspicious child process of userinit

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Mon Jun 17windows
Detectionhightest

Suspect Svchost Activity

It is extremely abnormal for svchost.exe to spawn without any CLI arguments and is normally observed when a malicious process spawns the process and injects code into the process memory space.

WindowsProcess Creation
David BurkettSat Dec 28windows
Detectionhighexperimental

Uncommon Svchost Command Line Parameter

Detects instances of svchost.exe running with an unusual or uncommon command line parameter by excluding known legitimate or common patterns. This could point at a file masquerading as svchost, a process injection, or hollowing of a legitimate svchost instance.

WindowsProcess Creation
Liran RavichFri Nov 14windows
Detectionmediumtest

Permission Check Via Accesschk.EXE

Detects the usage of the "Accesschk" utility, an access and privilege audit tool developed by SysInternal and often being abused by attacker to verify process privileges

WindowsProcess Creation
Teymur Kheirkhabarov+3Tue Oct 13windows
Detectionhighstable

Potential LSASS Process Dump Via Procdump

Detects potential credential harvesting attempts through LSASS memory dumps using ProcDump. This rule identifies suspicious command-line patterns that combine memory dump flags (-ma, -mm, -mp) with LSASS-related process markers. LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service) contains sensitive authentication data including plaintext passwords, NTLM hashes, and Kerberos tickets in memory. Attackers commonly dump LSASS memory to extract credentials for lateral movement and privilege escalation.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Oct 30windows
Detectionmediumtest

Sysinternals PsService Execution

Detects usage of Sysinternals PsService which can be abused for service reconnaissance and tampering

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Jun 16windows
Detectionmediumtest

Sysinternals PsSuspend Execution

Detects usage of Sysinternals PsSuspend which can be abused to suspend critical processes

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Mar 23windows
Detectionhightest

Potential Privilege Escalation To LOCAL SYSTEM

Detects unknown program using commandline flags usually used by tools such as PsExec and PAExec to start programs with SYSTEM Privileges

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Sat May 22windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious TSCON Start as SYSTEM

Detects a tscon.exe start as LOCAL SYSTEM

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Sat Mar 17windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious RDP Redirect Using TSCON

Detects a suspicious RDP session redirect using tscon.exe

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Sat Mar 17windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using ChangePK and SLUI

Detects an UAC bypass that uses changepk.exe and slui.exe (UACMe 61)

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 23windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using Disk Cleanup

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using scheduled tasks and variable expansion of cleanmgr.exe (UACMe 34)

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 30windows
Detectionhightest

Bypass UAC via CMSTP

Detect commandline usage of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (cmstp.exe) to install specially formatted local .INF files

WindowsProcess Creation
E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections+2Thu Oct 24windows
Detectionhighstable

CMSTP UAC Bypass via COM Object Access

Detects UAC Bypass Attempt Using Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer Autoelevate-capable COM Objects (e.g. UACMe ID of 41, 43, 58 or 65)

WindowsProcess Creation
Nik Seetharaman+1Wed Jul 31windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Tools Using ComputerDefaults

Detects tools such as UACMe used to bypass UAC with computerdefaults.exe (UACMe 59)

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Tue Aug 31windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using Consent and Comctl32 - Process

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using consent.exe and comctl32.dll (UACMe 22)

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 23windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using DismHost

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using DismHost DLL hijacking (UACMe 63)

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 30windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using Event Viewer RecentViews

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using Event Viewer RecentViews

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Nov 22windows
Detectionhightest

Bypass UAC via Fodhelper.exe

Identifies use of Fodhelper.exe to bypass User Account Control. Adversaries use this technique to execute privileged processes.

WindowsProcess Creation
E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections+2Thu Oct 24windows
Detectionmediumtest

UAC Bypass via Windows Firewall Snap-In Hijack

Detects attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by hijacking the Microsoft Management Console (MMC) Windows Firewall snap-in

WindowsProcess Creation
Tim Rauch+1Tue Sep 27windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass via ICMLuaUtil

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using ICMLuaUtil Elevated COM interface

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Sep 13windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using IDiagnostic Profile

Detects the "IDiagnosticProfileUAC" UAC bypass technique

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Sun Jul 03windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using IEInstal - Process

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using IEInstal.exe (UACMe 64)

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 30windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using MSConfig Token Modification - Process

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using a msconfig GUI hack (UACMe 55)

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 30windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using NTFS Reparse Point - Process

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using NTFS reparse point and wusa.exe DLL hijacking (UACMe 36)

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 30windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using PkgMgr and DISM

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using pkgmgr.exe and dism.exe (UACMe 23)

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 23windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential UAC Bypass Via Sdclt.EXE

A General detection for sdclt being spawned as an elevated process. This could be an indicator of sdclt being used for bypass UAC techniques.

WindowsProcess Creation
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+1Sat May 02windows
Detectioncriticaltest

TrustedPath UAC Bypass Pattern

Detects indicators of a UAC bypass method by mocking directories

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Aug 27windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Abusing Winsat Path Parsing - Process

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using a path parsing issue in winsat.exe (UACMe 52)

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 30windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using Windows Media Player - Process

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using Windows Media Player osksupport.dll (UACMe 32)

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 23windows
Detectionhightest

Bypass UAC via WSReset.exe

Detects use of WSReset.exe to bypass User Account Control (UAC). Adversaries use this technique to execute privileged processes.

WindowsProcess Creation
E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections+3Thu Oct 24windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass WSReset

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass via WSReset usable by default sysmon-config

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 23windows
Detectionhightest

Uncommon Userinit Child Process

Detects uncommon "userinit.exe" child processes, which could be a sign of uncommon shells or login scripts used for persistence.

WindowsProcess Creation
Tom Ueltschi+1Sat Jan 12windows
Detectionhighexperimental

User Shell Folders Registry Modification via CommandLine

Detects modifications to User Shell Folders registry values via reg.exe or PowerShell, which could indicate persistence attempts. Attackers may modify User Shell Folders registry values to point to malicious executables or scripts that will be executed during startup. This technique is often used to maintain persistence on a compromised system by ensuring that malicious payloads are executed automatically.

WindowsProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Mon Jan 05windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Child Process Of Wermgr.EXE

Detects suspicious Windows Error Reporting manager (wermgr.exe) child process

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Oct 14windows
Detectionhightest

Whoami.EXE Execution From Privileged Process

Detects the execution of "whoami.exe" by privileged accounts that are often abused by threat actors

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Fri Jan 28windows
Detectionhightest

Security Privileges Enumeration Via Whoami.EXE

Detects a whoami.exe executed with the /priv command line flag instructing the tool to show all current user privileges. This is often used after a privilege escalation attempt.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Wed May 05windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Processes Spawned by WinRM

Detects suspicious processes including shells spawnd from WinRM host process

WindowsProcess Creation
Andreas Hunkeler+1Thu May 20windows
Detectionhightest

New ActiveScriptEventConsumer Created Via Wmic.EXE

Detects WMIC executions in which an event consumer gets created. This could be used to establish persistence

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Jun 25windows
Detectionmediumtest

Windows Hotfix Updates Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE

Detects the execution of wmic with the "qfe" flag in order to obtain information about installed hotfix updates on the system. This is often used by pentester and attacker enumeration scripts

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Jun 20windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Unquoted Service Path Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE

Detects known WMI recon method to look for unquoted service paths using wmic. Often used by pentester and attacker enumeration scripts

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Jun 20windows
Detectionmediumtest

Service Started/Stopped Via Wmic.EXE

Detects usage of wmic to start or stop a service

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Jun 20windows
Detectioncriticaltest

WMI Backdoor Exchange Transport Agent

Detects a WMI backdoor in Exchange Transport Agents via WMI event filters

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Oct 11windows