Rule Library

Sigma Rules

1,487 rules found for "execution"

3,731Total
3,132Detection
457Emerging
139Hunting
Detectionmediumtest

Node Process Executions

Detects the execution of other scripts using the Node executable packaged with Adobe Creative Cloud

WindowsProcess Creation
Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems)Wed Apr 06windows
Detectionlowexperimental

Notepad Password Files Discovery

Detects the execution of Notepad to open a file that has the string "password" which may indicate unauthorized access to credentials or suspicious activity.

WindowsProcess Creation
The DFIR ReportFri Feb 21windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious Usage Of Active Directory Diagnostic Tool (ntdsutil.exe)

Detects execution of ntdsutil.exe to perform different actions such as restoring snapshots...etc.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Wed Sep 14windows
Detectionmediumtest

Invocation of Active Directory Diagnostic Tool (ntdsutil.exe)

Detects execution of ntdsutil.exe, which can be used for various attacks against the NTDS database (NTDS.DIT)

WindowsProcess Creation
Thomas PatzkeWed Jan 16windows
Detectionmediumtest

Driver/DLL Installation Via Odbcconf.EXE

Detects execution of "odbcconf" with "INSTALLDRIVER" which installs a new ODBC driver. Attackers abuse this to install and run malicious DLLs.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon May 22windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Driver/DLL Installation Via Odbcconf.EXE

Detects execution of "odbcconf" with the "INSTALLDRIVER" action where the driver doesn't contain a ".dll" extension. This is often used as a defense evasion method.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue May 23windows
Detectionhightest

Odbcconf.EXE Suspicious DLL Location

Detects execution of "odbcconf" where the path of the DLL being registered is located in a potentially suspicious location.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon May 22windows
Detectionmediumtest

New DLL Registered Via Odbcconf.EXE

Detects execution of "odbcconf" with "REGSVR" in order to register a new DLL (equivalent to running regsvr32). Attackers abuse this to install and run malicious DLLs.

WindowsProcess Creation
Kirill Kiryanov+4Mon May 22windows
Detectionhightest

Potentially Suspicious DLL Registered Via Odbcconf.EXE

Detects execution of "odbcconf" with the "REGSVR" action where the DLL in question doesn't contain a ".dll" extension. Which is often used as a method to evade defenses.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon May 22windows
Detectionmediumtest

Response File Execution Via Odbcconf.EXE

Detects execution of "odbcconf" with the "-f" flag in order to load a response file which might contain a malicious action.

WindowsProcess Creation
Kirill Kiryanov+4Mon May 22windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Response File Execution Via Odbcconf.EXE

Detects execution of "odbcconf" with the "-f" flag in order to load a response file with a non-".rsp" extension.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon May 22windows
Detectionmediumtest

Uncommon Child Process Spawned By Odbcconf.EXE

Detects an uncommon child process of "odbcconf.exe" binary which normally shouldn't have any child processes.

WindowsProcess Creation
Harjot SinghMon May 22windows
Detectionhightest

Potentially Suspicious Office Document Executed From Trusted Location

Detects the execution of an Office application that points to a document that is located in a trusted location. Attackers often used this to avoid macro security and execute their malicious code.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Wed Jun 21windows
Detectionhightest

OneNote.EXE Execution of Malicious Embedded Scripts

Detects the execution of malicious OneNote documents that contain embedded scripts. When a user clicks on a OneNote attachment and then on the malicious link inside the ".one" file, it exports and executes the malicious embedded script from specific directories.

WindowsProcess Creation
kostastsaleThu Feb 02windows
Detectionhightest

Outlook EnableUnsafeClientMailRules Setting Enabled

Detects an attacker trying to enable the outlook security setting "EnableUnsafeClientMailRules" which allows outlook to run applications or execute macros

WindowsProcess Creation
Markus Neis+1Thu Dec 27windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Execution From Outlook Temporary Folder

Detects a suspicious program execution in Outlook temp folder

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Oct 01windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Outlook Child Process

Detects a suspicious process spawning from an Outlook process.

WindowsProcess Creation
Michael Haag+4Mon Feb 28windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Remote Child Process From Outlook

Detects a suspicious child process spawning from Outlook where the image is located in a remote location (SMB/WebDav shares).

WindowsProcess Creation
Markus Neis+1Thu Dec 27windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Binary In User Directory Spawned From Office Application

Detects an executable in the users directory started from one of the Microsoft Office suite applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Publisher, Visio)

WindowsProcess Creation
Jason LynchTue Apr 02windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process

Detects a suspicious process spawning from one of the Microsoft Office suite products (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Publisher, Visio, etc.)

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+7Fri Apr 06windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Mpclient.DLL Sideloading Via OfflineScannerShell.EXE Execution

Detects execution of Windows Defender "OfflineScannerShell.exe" from its non standard directory. The "OfflineScannerShell.exe" binary is vulnerable to DLL side loading and will load any DLL named "mpclient.dll" from the current working directory.

WindowsProcess Creation
François HubautSun Mar 06windows
Detectionmediumtest

PDQ Deploy Remote Adminstartion Tool Execution

Detect use of PDQ Deploy remote admin tool

WindowsProcess Creation
François HubautSat Oct 01windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potentially Suspicious Execution Of PDQDeployRunner

Detects suspicious execution of "PDQDeployRunner" which is part of the PDQDeploy service stack that is responsible for executing commands and packages on a remote machines

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Fri Jul 22windows
Detectionmediumtest

Perl Inline Command Execution

Detects execution of perl using the "-e"/"-E" flags. This is could be used as a way to launch a reverse shell or execute live perl code.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Jan 02windows
Detectionmediumtest

Php Inline Command Execution

Detects execution of php using the "-r" flag. This is could be used as a way to launch a reverse shell or execute live php code.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Jan 02windows
Detectionmediumtest

PktMon.EXE Execution

Detects execution of PktMon, a tool that captures network packets.

WindowsProcess Creation
François HubautThu Mar 17windows
Detectionhightest

Potential RDP Tunneling Via Plink

Execution of plink to perform data exfiltration and tunneling

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Thu Aug 04windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious Powercfg Execution To Change Lock Screen Timeout

Detects suspicious execution of 'Powercfg.exe' to change lock screen timeout

WindowsProcess Creation
François HubautFri Nov 18windows
Detectionhightest

AADInternals PowerShell Cmdlets Execution - ProccessCreation

Detects ADDInternals Cmdlet execution. A tool for administering Azure AD and Office 365. Which can be abused by threat actors to attack Azure AD or Office 365.

WindowsProcess Creation
Austin Songer+2Fri Dec 23windows
Detectionmediumtest

Add Windows Capability Via PowerShell Cmdlet

Detects usage of the "Add-WindowsCapability" cmdlet to add Windows capabilities. Notable capabilities could be "OpenSSH" and others.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Sun Jan 22windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Encoded PowerShell Command Line

Detects suspicious powershell process starts with base64 encoded commands (e.g. Emotet)

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+5Mon Sep 03windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious PowerShell Encoded Command Patterns

Detects PowerShell command line patterns in combincation with encoded commands that often appear in malware infection chains

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue May 24windows
Detectionhightest

PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet

Detects usage of a base64 encoded "FromBase64String" cmdlet in a process command line

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Sat Aug 24windows
Detectionhightest

Malicious Base64 Encoded PowerShell Keywords in Command Lines

Detects base64 encoded strings used in hidden malicious PowerShell command lines

WindowsProcess Creation
John LambertWed Jan 16windows
Detectionhightest

PowerShell Base64 Encoded IEX Cmdlet

Detects usage of a base64 encoded "IEX" cmdlet in a process command line

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Aug 23windows
Detectionhightest

PowerShell Base64 Encoded Invoke Keyword

Detects UTF-8 and UTF-16 Base64 encoded powershell 'Invoke-' calls

WindowsProcess Creation
Martin Mueller+1Fri May 20windows
Detectionhightest

PowerShell Base64 Encoded Reflective Assembly Load

Detects base64 encoded .NET reflective loading of Assembly

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Mar 01windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Encoded And Obfuscated Reflection Assembly Load Function Call

Detects suspicious base64 encoded and obfuscated "LOAD" keyword used in .NET "reflection.assembly"

WindowsProcess Creation
Martin MuellerTue Mar 01windows
Detectionhightest

PowerShell Base64 Encoded WMI Classes

Detects calls to base64 encoded WMI class such as "Win32_ShadowCopy", "Win32_ScheduledJob", etc.

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)+1Mon Jan 30windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Process Execution Proxy Via CL_Invocation.ps1

Detects calls to "SyncInvoke" that is part of the "CL_Invocation.ps1" script to proxy execution using "System.Diagnostics.Process"

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+2Wed Oct 14windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Script Proxy Execution Via CL_Mutexverifiers.ps1

Detects the use of the Microsoft signed script "CL_mutexverifiers" to proxy the execution of additional PowerShell script commands

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+3Sat May 21windows
Detectionmediumtest

ConvertTo-SecureString Cmdlet Usage Via CommandLine

Detects usage of the "ConvertTo-SecureString" cmdlet via the commandline. Which is fairly uncommon and could indicate potential suspicious activity

WindowsProcess Creation
Teymur Kheirkhabarov+3Sun Oct 11windows
Detectionhightest

Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via Reversed Commands

Detects the presence of reversed PowerShell commands in the CommandLine. This is often used as a method of obfuscation by attackers

WindowsProcess Creation
Teymur Kheirkhabarov+3Sun Oct 11windows
Detectionhightest

Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation

Detects the PowerShell command lines with special characters

WindowsProcess Creation
Teymur Kheirkhabarov+3Thu Oct 15windows
Detectionhighexperimental

Obfuscated PowerShell MSI Install via WindowsInstaller COM

Detects the execution of obfuscated PowerShell commands that attempt to install MSI packages via the Windows Installer COM object (`WindowsInstaller.Installer`). The technique involves manipulating strings to hide functionality, such as constructing class names using string insertion (e.g., 'indowsInstaller.Installer'.Insert(0,'W')) and correcting malformed URLs (e.g., converting 'htps://' to 'https://') at runtime. This behavior is commonly associated with malware loaders or droppers that aim to bypass static detection by hiding intent in runtime-generated strings and using legitimate tools for code execution. The use of `InstallProduct` and COM object creation, particularly combined with hidden window execution and suppressed UI, indicates an attempt to install software (likely malicious) without user interaction.

WindowsProcess Creation
Meroujan Antonyan (vx3r)Tue May 27windows
Detectionmediumexperimental

PowerShell MSI Install via WindowsInstaller COM From Remote Location

Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that attempt to install MSI packages via the Windows Installer COM object (`WindowsInstaller.Installer`) hosted remotely. This could be indication of malicious software deployment or lateral movement attempts using Windows Installer functionality. And the usage of WindowsInstaller COM object rather than msiexec could be an attempt to bypass the detection.

WindowsProcess Creation
Meroujan Antonyan (vx3r)Thu Jun 05windows
Detectionhightest

PowerShell Execution With Potential Decryption Capabilities

Detects PowerShell commands that decrypt an ".LNK" "file to drop the next stage of the malware.

WindowsProcess Creation
X__Junior (Nextron Systems)+1Fri Jun 30windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential PowerShell Downgrade Attack

Detects PowerShell downgrade attack by comparing the host versions with the actually used engine version 2.0

WindowsProcess Creation
Harish SegarFri Mar 20windows