Rule Library

Sigma Rules

809 rules found for "privilege-escalation"

3,731Total
3,132Detection
457Emerging
139Hunting
Emerging Threatmediumtest

DLL Names Used By SVR For GraphicalProton Backdoor

Hunts known SVR-specific DLL names.

WindowsImage Load (DLL)
CISAMon Dec 182023
Emerging Threathightest

Diamond Sleet APT DLL Sideloading Indicators

Detects DLL sideloading activity seen used by Diamond Sleet APT

WindowsImage Load (DLL)
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Oct 242023
Emerging Threatcriticaltest

Diamond Sleet APT Scheduled Task Creation

Detects registry event related to the creation of a scheduled task used by Diamond Sleet APT during exploitation of Team City CVE-2023-42793 vulnerability

Windowssecurity
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Oct 242023
Emerging Threathightest

Lazarus APT DLL Sideloading Activity

Detects sideloading of trojanized DLLs used in Lazarus APT campaign in the case of a Spanish aerospace company

WindowsImage Load (DLL)
Thurein Oo+1Wed Oct 182023
Emerging Threathightest

Potential CVE-2024-3400 Exploitation - Palo Alto GlobalProtect OS Command Injection

Detects potential exploitation attempts of CVE-2024-3400 - an OS command injection in Palo Alto GlobalProtect. This detection looks for suspicious strings that indicate a potential directory traversal attempt or command injection.

paloaltoapplianceglobalprotect
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Apr 182024
Emerging Threatmediumexperimental

Potential CVE-2024-35250 Exploitation Activity

Detects potentially suspicious loading of "ksproxy.ax", which may indicate an attempt to exploit CVE-2024-35250.

WindowsImage Load (DLL)
Isaac FernandesWed Feb 192024
Emerging Threathightest

Potential KamiKakaBot Activity - Winlogon Shell Persistence

Detects changes to the "Winlogon" registry key where a process will set the value of the "Shell" to a value that was observed being used by KamiKakaBot samples in order to achieve persistence.

WindowsRegistry Set
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Fri Mar 222024
Emerging Threathightest

Kapeka Backdoor Persistence Activity

Detects Kapeka backdoor persistence activity. Depending on the process privileges, the Kapeka dropper then sets persistence for the backdoor either as a scheduled task (if admin or SYSTEM) or autorun registry (if not). For the scheduled task, it creates a scheduled task called "Sens Api" via schtasks command, which is set to run upon system startup as SYSTEM. To establish persistence through the autorun utility, it adds an autorun entry called "Sens Api" under HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run via the "reg add" command. Both persistence mechanisms are set to launch the binary by calling rundll32 and passing the backdoor's first export ordinal (#1) without any additional argument.

WindowsProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan PoudelWed Jul 032024
Emerging Threathightest

Kapeka Backdoor Autorun Persistence

Detects the setting of a new value in the Autorun key that is used by the Kapeka backdoor for persistence.

WindowsRegistry Set
Swachchhanda Shrawan PoudelWed Jul 032024
Emerging Threathightest

Kapeka Backdoor Scheduled Task Creation

Detects Kapeka backdoor scheduled task creation based on attributes such as paths, commands line flags, etc.

Windowssecurity
Swachchhanda Shrawan PoudelWed Jul 032024
Emerging Threathighexperimental

Lummac Stealer Activity - Execution Of More.com And Vbc.exe

Detects the execution of more.com and vbc.exe in the process tree. This behavior was observed by a set of samples related to Lummac Stealer. The Lummac payload is injected into the vbc.exe process.

WindowsProcess Creation
Joseliyo SanchezThu Dec 192024
Emerging Threathightest

Potential Raspberry Robin Aclui Dll SideLoading

Detects potential sideloading of malicious "aclui.dll" by OleView.This behavior was observed in Raspberry-Robin variants reported by chekpoint research on Feburary 2024.

WindowsImage Load (DLL)
Swachchhanda Shrawan PoudelWed Jul 312024
Emerging Threathightest

Forest Blizzard APT - Custom Protocol Handler Creation

Detects the setting of a custom protocol handler with the name "rogue". Seen being created by Forest Blizzard APT as reported by MSFT.

WindowsRegistry Set
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Apr 232024
Emerging Threathightest

Forest Blizzard APT - Custom Protocol Handler DLL Registry Set

Detects the setting of the DLL that handles the custom protocol handler. Seen being created by Forest Blizzard APT as reported by MSFT.

WindowsRegistry Set
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Apr 232024
Emerging Threathighexperimental

Non-Standard Nsswitch.Conf Creation - Potential CVE-2025-32463 Exploitation

Detects the creation of nsswitch.conf files in non-standard directories, which may indicate exploitation of CVE-2025-32463. This vulnerability requires an attacker to create a nsswitch.conf in a directory that will be used during sudo chroot operations. When sudo executes, it loads malicious shared libraries from user-controlled locations within the chroot environment, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution and privilege escalation.

LinuxFile Event
Swachchhanda Shrawn Poudel (Nextron Systems)Thu Oct 022025
Emerging Threathighexperimental

Potential Notepad++ CVE-2025-49144 Exploitation

Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2025-49144, a local privilege escalation vulnerability in Notepad++ installers (v8.8.1 and prior) where the installer calls regsvr32.exe without specifying the full path. This allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges by placing a malicious regsvr32.exe alongside this Legitimate Notepad++ installer. The vulnerability is triggered when the installer attempts to register the NppShell.dll file, which is a component of Notepad++.

WindowsProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Thu Jun 262025
Emerging Threathighexperimental

Potential Exploitation of CrushFTP RCE Vulnerability (CVE-2025-54309)

Detects suspicious child processes created by CrushFTP. It could be an indication of exploitation of a RCE vulnerability such as CVE-2025-54309.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nisarg SutharFri Aug 012025
Emerging Threatmediumexperimental

Commvault QLogin with PublicSharingUser and GUID Password (CVE-2025-57788)

Detects a qlogin.exe command attempting to authenticate as the internal `_+_PublicSharingUser_` using a GUID as the password. This could be an indicator of an attacker exploiting CVE-2025-57788 to gain initial access using leaked credentials.

WindowsProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Mon Oct 202025
Emerging Threatmediumexperimental

Potential Exploitation of CVE-2025-5054 or CVE-2025-4598

Detects attempts of an attacker to enable core dumps for set-user-ID (SUID) processes by modifying the system file /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable, typically by setting its value to 1 or 2. Enabling this feature allows memory dumps (core dumps) of SUID processes, which usually run with elevated privileges. These dumps may contain sensitive information such as passwords, cryptographic keys or other secrets. CVE-2025-5054: Information leak via core dumps from SUID binaries using apport. CVE-2025-4598: Information disclosure in systemd-coredump due to insecure handling of SUID process memory dumps.

LinuxProcess Creation
Milad CheraghiTue Apr 282025
Emerging Threathighexperimental

Atomic MacOS Stealer - Persistence Indicators

Detects creation of persistence artifacts placed by Atomic MacOS Stealer in macOS systems. Recent Atomic MacOS Stealer variants have been observed dropping these to maintain persistent access after compromise.

macOSFile Event
Jason Phang Vern - Onn+1Sat Nov 222025
Emerging Threatcriticalexperimental

RedSun - TieringEngineService.exe Staged in RS-Prefixed Temp Dir

Detects the creation of a file named TieringEngineService.exe inside a directory whose path contains the RS- prefix characteristic of RedSun's staging directory (e.g. %TEMP%\RS-{GUID}\TieringEngineService.exe). RedSun registers a Cloud Files sync root under this RS-prefixed path and drops a masqueraded placeholder there as part of its oplock-based AV bypass and privilege escalation chain. The RS-{GUID} directory name is generated by RedSun itself and has no legitimate system usage, making the combination of this path prefix and the TieringEngineService.exe filename a highly specific indicator of RedSun activity.

WindowsFile Event
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Fri Apr 172026
Emerging Threatcriticalexperimental

RedSun - Named Pipe Created

Detects the creation of a named pipe with the hardcoded name "REDSUN". The RedSun exploit tool uses a pipe with this name for synchronisation and command communication between its components during the Cloud Files API + oplock-based AV bypass and privilege escalation chain. RedSun creates the pipe as \\??\pipe\REDSUN. The pipe server listens for the token-duplicated elevated process to connect and respond, completing the privilege escalation from user to SYSTEM. Presence of this pipe name indicates active or recent RedSun execution.

WindowsNamed Pipe Created
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Fri Apr 172026
Emerging Threathighexperimental

RedSun - Conhost.exe Spawned by TieringEngineService.exe

Detects two stages of the RedSun post-exploitation process chain that deliver a SYSTEM-level shell to the attacker's interactive session. Observed process chain services.exe → TieringEngineService.exe → conhost.exe (SYSTEM, CommandLine: bare path, no arguments) → cmd.exe / shell (SYSTEM, TerminalSessionId = attacker's session) Stage 1 — TieringEngineService.exe spawns argument-less conhost.exe: After winning the oplock + Cloud Files mount point race, the malicious TieringEngineService.exe (RedSun.exe copied to System32, started via CoCreateInstance / services.exe) detects it is NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM and calls LaunchConsoleInSessionId(). This opens \\.\pipe\REDSUN, reads the attacker's session ID, duplicates the SYSTEM token, re-stamps it with that session ID via SetTokenInformation(TokenSessionId), then calls CreateProcessAsUser to spawn conhost.exe with no arguments. Stage 2 — Shell spawned from rogue conhost.exe (EDR sources with GrandParentImage): The rogue SYSTEM conhost.exe spawns a shell (cmd.exe, PowerShell, etc.) as SYSTEM in the attacker's interactive session. On EDR sources that expose GrandParentImage, the full three-level chain (TieringEngineService.exe → conhost.exe → shell) can be matched directly. The legitimate TieringEngineService.exe is a headless COM server that is unlikely to spawn conhost.exe under normal conditions.

WindowsProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Fri Apr 172026
Emerging Threatcriticalexperimental

RedSun - TieringEngineService.exe Detected as EICAR Test File

Detects Windows Defender (EventID 1119 - Remediation Action Failed) flagging TieringEngineService.exe dropped in a characteristic RS-{GUID} temporary directory, or the RedSun.exe process itself being present. This covers the staging pattern used by RedSun, a Cloud Files API and opportunistic lock (oplock) based AV bypass/privilege escalation tool. RedSun works as follows: 1. Registers a Cloud Files sync root and creates a Cloud Files placeholder for TieringEngineService.exe under %TEMP%\RS-{GUID}\ 2. The placeholder file carries EICAR test file content (Virus:DOS/EICAR_Test_File) to reliably trigger a Defender scan and remediation attempt 3. Requests a batch oplock (FSCTL_REQUEST_BATCH_OPLOCK) on the placeholder file 4. When Defender attempts to scan/quarantine the file, the oplock triggers - holding the file open 5. During the oplock break window, RedSun swaps the mount point (junction) to redirect \\?\C:\Windows\System32 to the attacker-controlled temp path 6. This races the AV/OS into executing the malicious TieringEngineService.exe with elevated privileges

Windowswindefend
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Fri Apr 172026
Emerging Threathighexperimental

TeamPCP LiteLLM Supply Chain Attack Persistence Indicators

Detects the creation of specific persistence files as observed in the LiteLLM PyPI supply chain attack. In March 2026, a supply chain attack was discovered involving the popular open-source LLM framework LiteLLM by Threat Actor TeamPCP. The malicious package harvests every credential on the system, encrypts and exfiltrates them, and installs a persistent C2 backdoor.

LinuxFile Event
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Mon Mar 302026
Emerging Threathighexperimental

LiteLLM / TeamPCP Supply Chain Attack Indicators

Detects process executions related to the backdoored versions of LiteLLM (v1.82.7 or v1.82.8). In March 2026, a supply chain attack was discovered involving the popular open-source LLM framework LiteLLM by Threat Actor TeamPCP. The malicious package harvests every credential on the system, encrypts and exfiltrates them, and installs a persistent C2 backdoor.

LinuxProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Mon Mar 302026
Threat Huntmediumtest

Potential Remote WMI ActiveScriptEventConsumers Activity

Detect potential adversaries leveraging WMI ActiveScriptEventConsumers remotely to move laterally in a network. This event is best correlated and used as an enrichment to determine the potential lateral movement activity.

Windowssecurity
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+1Wed Sep 02windows
Threat Huntlowtest

Scheduled Task Deletion

Detects scheduled task deletion events. Scheduled tasks are likely to be deleted if not used for persistence. Malicious Software often creates tasks directly under the root node e.g. \TASKNAME

Windowssecurity
David Strassegger+1Fri Jan 22windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

CreateRemoteThread API and LoadLibrary

Detects potential use of CreateRemoteThread api and LoadLibrary function to inject DLL into a process

WindowsRemote Thread Creation
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)Sun Aug 11windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Remote Thread Created In Shell Application

Detects remote thread creation in command shell applications, such as "Cmd.EXE" and "PowerShell.EXE". It is a common technique used by malware, such as IcedID, to inject malicious code and execute it within legitimate processes.

WindowsRemote Thread Creation
Splunk Research TeamMon Jul 29windows
Threat Huntlowtest

Scheduled Task Created - FileCreation

Detects the creation of a scheduled task via file creation.

WindowsFile Event
Center for Threat Informed Defense (CTID) Summiting the Pyramid TeamWed Sep 27windows
Threat Huntlowtest

Task Scheduler DLL Loaded By Application Located In Potentially Suspicious Location

Detects the loading of the "taskschd.dll" module from a process that located in a potentially suspicious or uncommon directory. The loading of this DLL might indicate that the application have the capability to create a scheduled task via the "Schedule.Service" COM object. Investigation of the loading application and its behavior is required to determining if its malicious.

WindowsImage Load (DLL)
Swachchhanda Shrawan PoudelMon Sep 02windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Potential Shellcode Injection

Detects potential shellcode injection as seen used by tools such as Metasploit's migrate and Empire's psinject.

WindowsProcess Access
Bhabesh RajFri Mar 11windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Potential Password Reconnaissance Via Findstr.EXE

Detects command line usage of "findstr" to search for the "passwords" keyword in a variety of different languages

WindowsProcess Creation
Josh NickelsThu May 18windows
Threat Huntlowtest

Net.EXE Execution

Detects execution of "Net.EXE".

WindowsProcess Creation
Michael Haag+2Wed Jan 16windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Scheduled Task Creation From Potential Suspicious Parent Location

Detects the execution of "schtasks.exe" from a parent that is located in a potentially suspicious location. Multiple malware strains were seen exhibiting a similar behavior in order to achieve persistence.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Wed Feb 23windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Elevated System Shell Spawned

Detects when a shell program such as the Windows command prompt or PowerShell is launched with system privileges. Use this rule to hunt for potential suspicious processes.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Thu Nov 23windows
Threat Huntlowexperimental

Potential Executable Run Itself As Sacrificial Process

Detects when an executable launches an identical instance of itself, a behavior often used to create a suspended “sacrificial” process for code injection or evasion. Investigate for indicators such as the process being started in suspended mode, rapid parent termination, memory manipulation (e.g., WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread), or unsigned binaries. Review command-line arguments, process ancestry, and network activity to confirm if this is legitimate behavior or process injection activity.

WindowsProcess Creation
François HubautFri Oct 17windows
Threat Huntlowtest

Scheduled Task Created - Registry

Detects the creation of a scheduled task via Registry keys.

WindowsRegistry Event
Center for Threat Informed Defense (CTID) Summiting the Pyramid TeamWed Sep 27windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Registry Set With Crypto-Classes From The "Cryptography" PowerShell Namespace

Detects the setting of a registry inside the "\Shell\Open\Command" value with PowerShell classes from the "System.Security.Cryptography" namespace. The PowerShell namespace "System.Security.Cryptography" provides classes for on-the-fly encryption and decryption. These can be used for example in decrypting malicious payload for defense evasion.

WindowsRegistry Set
Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)Fri Dec 01windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Service Binary in User Controlled Folder

Detects the setting of the "ImagePath" value of a service registry key to a path controlled by a non-administrator user such as "\AppData\" or "\ProgramData\". Attackers often use such directories for staging purposes. This rule might also trigger on badly written software, where if an attacker controls an auto starting service, they might achieve persistence or privilege escalation. Note that while ProgramData is a user controlled folder, software might apply strict ACLs which makes them only accessible to admin users. Remove such folders via filters if you experience a lot of noise.

WindowsRegistry Set
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Mon May 02windows